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Abstract 
 
 This thesis aims to determine how and why Rome undertook a series of interventions 
in Illyria during the period of 230 – 167 BC. The thesis is based on a detailed examination and 
consideration of the ancient written sources and the subsequent historiography on the subject. 
The Roman interventions in Illyria during this period have traditionally been treated as a 
component of wider studies of Roman expansion, although Rome’s involvement in Illyria has 
recently been examined by Dzino in his 2010 work Illyricum in Roman Politics 229BC-AD68. 
This work examined the development and integration of Illyricum in Roman political 
discourse, in which the Roman interventions were a smaller component in the broader study. 
A study of the Roman interventions in Illyria during the period of 230 – 167 BC has never 
previously been treated on this scale, nor effectively with a synthesis of the various approaches 
and pieces of evidence that are now available. Over the past decade, marine archaeology has 
been conducted in the Adriatic and the initial reports have recently been published which 
provide greater contextual insight on the geopolitical situation in Illyria. Additional new 
approaches to the subject from the faculty of international relations have emerged, although 
these have proven as problematic as they have been insightful. 
 This thesis shall examine the new evidence and assess the latest approaches to provide 
the necessary context for considering the Roman interventions in Illyria. This context shall be 
initially considered to enable the thesis to progress to consider and analyse each Roman 
intervention in turn. By effectively grounding the thesis in the geopolitical context, the 
disparate nature of the communities that made up Illyria can be better understood. This thesis 
will use the material evidence available in conjunction with the written accounts of ancient 
historians to consider the implications of the Roman interventions and the underlying 
motivations for Rome in securing the Adriatic and developing their involvement in Illyria and 
the Greek East beyond. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
The rise of Rome during the middle Republic, through a series of interventions, has 
been a particular area of interest to modern and ancient scholars alike. The ancient historian 
Polybius, contemporary to some of the events in question, stressed in the preface to his 
Histories, that Rome's emergence as hegemon over the Mediterranean was an event without 
precedent and one of substantial magnitude and importance.1 The Roman interventions in 
Illyria are an important component in explaining Rome’s rise to pre-eminence in Polybius’ 
work. Polybius outlined this importance upon introducing the Illyrians into the Histories: 
‘ἅπερ οὐ παρέργως, ἀλλὰ μετ᾿ ἐπιστάσεως θεωρητέον τοῖς βουλομένοις ἀληθινῶς τήν τε 
πρόθεσιν τὴν ἡμετέραν συνθεάσασθαι καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν καὶ κατασκευὴν τῆς Ῥωμαίων δυναστείας’2 
This thesis aims to determine how and why these interventions took place, specifically 
focusing on the First, Second and Third Illyrian Wars. This covers the period of 230 – 167 BC, 
beginning with the initial Roman intervention east of the Adriatic and culminating with the 
dissolution of the Illyrian kingdom with Rome’s victory in the Third Illyrian War. An 
intervention, as it will be considered in this thesis, can be simply defined as the interference of 
one entity in the affairs of another. The Romans intervened in this way by both military and 
diplomatic means. One the one hand, the Romans invaded territory with their armed forces and 
engaged in warfare, whilst on the other, the Romans negotiated with other entities and forged 
friendships and alliances. The three Roman interventions sparked otherwise limited Roman 
interest and involvement in Illyria during this period. The thesis shall employ a chronological 
structure to consider each of the three Illyrian Wars in turn, and utilise the evidence provided 
by ancient historical texts in conjunction with material evidence to aid in placing the written 
historical texts in context. This structure will enable the thesis to focus on the specific events, 
enabling a closer critique of the historical accounts for each intervention and facilitating the 
development of the wider implications, developments and underlying themes to emerge. 
Defining Illyria is a difficult task; a consistent and agreed upon definition of the area 
being absent from antiquity. Throughout antiquity the terms ‘Illyria’ and ‘Illyrians’ have often 
been used as broad generalisations and sometimes in reference to more clearly defined ideas. 
 
1Polybius, Histories 1. 1. 
2Polybius, Histories 2. 2. ‘The history of this expedition must not be treated as unimportant; but must be 
carefully studied by those who wish to clearly understand the history that I have determined to narrate, and to 
trace the progress and consolidation of the Roman Empire’ (self-translated). 
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The provincia of Illyricum was a Roman creation and distinguished for the first time the Roman 
parameters of what definitively could be classified as Illyria. The provincia of Illyricum was 
not however established until the 1st Century BC, after the period being considered in this 
thesis. The origins of the term derive from the Greek terms Illyris and Illyrioi, which refer to 
Greece's North-Western non-Greek neighbours and to a group of peoples inhabiting the region 
who they believed shared common ancestry, culture and language.3 Wilkes goes further by 
asserting that the latter term may have originally referred specifically to one southern Illyrian 
Bronze Age tribe whom Greeks had first encountered and subsequently applied the term 
generically to people with similar language and customs.4 Pliny the Elder writing in the First 
Century AD referred to a narrowly defined group of 'Illyrians as properly called' and it is 
possibly to this tribal group to whom he is referring.5 Consequently,  ‘Illyria’ and the ‘Illyrians’ 
who inhabited the region, are ill defined in written sources, especially during the period being 
considered in this thesis. Dzino has however noted that the region is divided into three eco-
geographical zones on account of its physical geography, those being the Dalmatian coast with 
its islands and immediate hinterland, the mountain belt of the Dinaric Alps and the Pannonian 
plains. The narrow Adriatic coastal belt together with the Italian coast represents a distinctive 
geographical unit.6 This forms a useful basis for defining the parameters of Illyria to be 
considered in this thesis. Illyria shall be considered in this thesis as an area occupying the 
eastern Adriatic coast and immediate hinterland. The reasons for this are borne out of the source 
material and the historical contacts between Rome and Illyria. Rome during the period being 
considered in this thesis, undertook military and diplomatic interventions with entities on the 
eastern Adriatic coast, the islands off that coast, and the immediate hinterland; progression into 
the Illyrian interior did not occur until later periods of Roman history. Dzino assigns to the 
early period of his study the title, the ‘Adriatic phase’ and notes the importance of the Adriatic 
coast and immediate hinterland to the period down to 167 BC in Roman interaction with the 
region.7 Therefore, Illyria in the thesis shall be considered the area of the eastern Adriatic coast 
and the immediate hinterland. 
Studies of the Roman interventions in Illyria have featured as smaller components of 
larger works or have focused on specific phenomena such as Illyrian piracy or the development 
 
3Dzino, Illyricum in Roman Politics, p. 3. 
4Wilkes, The Illyrians, p. 92. 
5Pliny, Natural History 3. 144. 
6Dzino, Illyricum in Roman Politics, p. 31. 
7Dzino, Illyricum in Roman Politics, pp. 3-5. 
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of an eastern Adriatic provincia.8 This has held especially true for the historiography on 
subjects relating to Roman expansion and imperialism. Roman interventions in Illyria in these 
sources often serve as a component of Roman expansion into the wider Greek world or are 
placed in the context of mid-Republican Roman expansion.9 The essential focus on the Roman 
interventions in Illyria in this thesis will offer a different sort of approach. An analysis of the 
ancient historical texts is, naturally, not the function of archaeological research; inference 
drawn is subsequently based on archaeological research methodology rather than the 
methodology of ancient historical research. Royal, in his publication of the archaeological 
findings from the Illyrian Coastal Exploration Program, provides a solitary reference to 
Polybius and Appian each and no reference to Livy, Cassius Dio or Diodorus Siculus.10 This 
has raised the need for a greater synthesis in research between the written ancient historical 
sources and the archaeological data. Royal indeed notes in his report that ‘although piracy is 
frequently cited as a factor in the region’s historic economy, it is important to contextualize it 
with archaeological evidence, including shipwreck sites and the frequency of amphora types 
present at all sites’.11 On certain contextual issues that are being examined during this thesis, 
the archaeological data can prove informative in grounding the ancient historical texts. 
Recent developments in Adriatic archaeology have enabled better inferences to be 
drawn, based on some of these contextual issues. This is particularly apparent regarding 
Adriatic trade. Marine archaeology has been an important development in studies of the Illyrian 
coast in the past decade; the archaeological report for the initial findings of the Illyrian Coastal 
Exploration Program (2007-2009) has recently been published.12 The area that the programme 
investigated was previously not well examined, Royal indeed noting in the abstract that the 
areas for which data had been gathered from the Albanian and Montenegrin coasts were 
‘previously undiscovered’.13 Research of this nature is nevertheless still in its infancy and other 
 
8Examples include: J. J. Wilkes, The Illyrians (Oxford, 1992); F. W. Walbank, 'Polybius and 
Rome's Eastern Policy', Journal of Roman Studies Vol. 53 (1963), pp. 1-13; N. Rosenstein, Rome 
and the Mediterranean 290-146 BC: The Imperial Republic (Edinburgh, 2012); H. J. Dell, 'The 
Origin and Nature of Illyrian Piracy', Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Vol. 16 No. 3 
(1967) pp. 344-358; D. Dzino, Illyricum in Roman Politics 229BC-AD68 (Cambridge 2010). 
9Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70BC.; A. M. Eckstein, Mediterranean Anarchy, 
Interstate War and the Rise of Rome (London, 2006).; J. Rich, 'Fear, Greed and Glory: The Causes of 
Roman War-Making in the Middle Republic' in J. Rich and G. Shipley (eds.), War and Society in the 
Roman World (London, 1993), pp. 38-68. 
10J. G. Royal, ‘Illyrian Coastal Exploration Program (2007–2009): The Roman and Late Roman Finds and Their 
Context’, Journal of Archaeology, Vol. 116 No. 3 (2012), pp. 405-60. 
11Ibid. pp. 440-1. 
12Ibid. 
13Ibid. p. 405. 
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areas of the coast are currently being investigated.14 Although the material published so far is 
limited, it nevertheless presents data from which some inferences can be drawn. This has been 
furthered by the greater collation of amphorae data that has been published. The work of Miše, 
in particular, in cataloguing data for Gnathia ware in the Adriatic has enabled more patterns 
and correlations to be observed from the published sites. Miše has noted that ‘current 
knowledge of Gnathia ware has reached a stage where we can speak of the entire production 
process, which covers all aspects: from moulding and decorative techniques, to firing and 
distribution, from identification of the different workshops to an understanding of the function 
of the vessels in different archaeological contexts.’15These developments in material evidence 
in the last decade have enhanced the interpretations that can be drawn, beyond simple 
speculation. Further limitations must be noted, however, for material evidence of this type. 
Dzino has noted that ‘archaeology does not provide a complete picture as it focuses only on 
artefacts which are preserved, while a range of perishable artefacts, such as, for example, 
textile, leather, or wood, rarely survive.’16 In the case of amphorae, this limitation is particularly 
significant when there is a lack of correlation between the perishable contents and the surviving 
vessels. Although some speculation can be made on the likely contents of an amphora based 
on the typical function of the vessel, a gap in the evidence is nevertheless present. This thesis 
shall not utilise this material evidence to explain the existence of phenomena such as piracy; 
the ancient historical textual sources are the sole means to do this. The material evidence shall 
instead be utilised to provide a greater context for the written sources. 
Although these important developments have added to the source material available, 
the key source material for the examination of the Roman interventions in Illyria remains the 
ancient historical texts. As mentioned earlier, the main source for the Roman interventions is 
Polybius’ Histories. Polybius, as a near contemporary of the events in question and an author 
politically connected to important events and figures throughout his Histories, provides a 
valuable insight into the period being considered in the thesis.17 Polybius however drew on 
important earlier Roman and Greek annalists for some of his source material; these sources 
tend to present Greece, and especially Rome, in an overly positive and apologetic light. These 
 
14An example of this can be found in the Adrias Project being led by the University of Zadar, which is 
excavating areas of the Croatian coast (areas not significantly examined during the Illyrian Coastal Exploration 
Project. The Adrias Project currently has ongoing fieldwork and archaeological reports in progress and due for 
publication. For more details, see http://www.adriasproject.org/en/project/ (Last Accessed 26/8/2018). 
15M. Miše, Gnathia and Related Hellenistic Ware on the East Adriatic Coast (Oxford, 2015), p. iii. 
16D. Dzino, Illyricum in Roman Politics 229BC-AD68 (Cambridge 2010), p. 8. 
17For a detailed outline on Polybius’ life, see D. W. Baranowski, Polybius and Roman Imperialism (Bristol, 
2011), pp. 1-3. 
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sources, Walbank asserts, ‘are no longer identifiable’ and have been ‘woven into a close and 
homogeneous fabric in which the separate threads are now indistinguishable.18 It is important 
to  critique the version of events that Polybius provides in his accounts and to consider the 
origins of the annalistic traditions. The accounts of Polybius, moreover, were influential for 
later authors. Within the ensuing century after his death, Polybius was highly regarded in 
Rome; Cicero asserted that Polybius was ‘a particularly fine author’, while Livy described 
Polybius as ‘an author who is reliable for all aspects of Roman history, especially for events 
that occurred in Greece’.19 Later authors, such as Livy, often relied on Polybius for certain 
sections of their historical accounts. This has raised issues in cases where discrepancies exist 
between Polybius and the accounts of later historians. 
 In constructing his Histories, Polybius had a wide array of personal experiences to draw 
upon due to him being contemporary to many events of the period and connected to some of 
the important figures featured in the accounts. Polybius and his family were prominent 
members of the Achaean League, with Polybius serving as ἵππαρχος (cavalry commander) of 
the Achaean League in 170/69 BC. The role of Polybius in the Achaean League features in his 
accounts, including his participation in an Achaean war council, a shortened version of a long 
speech delivered by himself and a meeting conducted with a Roman consul.20 Polybius here 
provides a fascinating insight into these events, drawing from his own involvement. Polybius’ 
version of these events may however overstate matters or be coloured by the author to present 
himself in the most admirable light. Polybius indeed asserts that his speech won over the 
assembly in attendance and was important in changing Achaean attitudes towards Eumenes II 
of Pergamum.21 Champion however asserts that the ‘ambiguity in these passages is suggestive 
of the tensions that must have arisen concerning Polybius’ own cautiously ambivalent policies 
towards Rome in 170-168 BC’.22 Polybius may subsequently have been reflecting the diverse 
moods of the Achaeans towards the Romans during the period of tension in the prelude to the 
Third Macedonian War. Whether or not the speech and reaction to it are a true reflection of 
Polybius’ thoughts or those of the wider Achaean council is unknown. The ambivalence of 
feelings alluded to by Champion in any event, led, in any event to Polybius and other Achaeans 
being taken hostage by Rome. The subject matter in these passages was subsequently 
 
18F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius: Volume I (Oxford, 1970), p. 26. 
19Cicero, De Officiis 3. 113.; Livy, ab urbe condita 33. 10. 
20Polybius, Histories 28. 6, 28. 7. and 28. 13 respectively. 
21Polybius, Histories 28. 7. 
22C. B. Champion, ‘Romans as βάρβαροι: Three Polybian Speeches and the Politics of Cultural Indeterminacy’, 
Classical Philology, Vol. 95 No. 4 (2000), p. 439. 
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politically sensitive and although Polybius could draw on his own personal experience, there 
would have been a strong need for the author to present events in a manner that would not 
attract controversy. 
Speeches in Polybius’ work moreover, present further complications for studying the 
text. Recorded speeches in ancient historical texts are notorious for being fraught with issues 
of reliability and accuracy.23 Polybius, nevertheless, saw value to their inclusion in his work. 
For Polybius, these speeches were a tangible means of explaining the reasons for events 
happening or ideas changing and developing. As Walbank notes, ‘policy can only spring from 
discussion: consequently, speech is at the roots of political life’.24 Longley has also noted that 
Polybius, like Thucydides before him, saw value in recording speeches, Polybius indeed 
stressing in Book II, the importance of the pursuit of the truth through these speeches in the 
methodology of history.25 Whether or not the actual words in these recorded speeches are 
accurate, or even a rough reflection of what had been said, is impossible to determine. 
Addressing these issues in Polybius is most fruitfully done on a case-by-case basis as the 
speeches serve to draw attention in his work to important moments and developments thereafter 
in the course of his Histories. Polybius utilised speeches for his accounts of Roman affairs in 
the eastern Adriatic, the most prominent example for Rome’s interventions in Illyria coming 
from an interview conducted between a Roman ambassador and Queen Teuta in the prelude to 
the First Illyrian War.26 The speech marks an important moment in Polybius’ Histories, serving 
as an important pretext for the first Roman crossing of the Adriatic. Walbank however 
describes the speech of the Roman ambassador as a likely post eventum, to further the Roman 
justification for their intervention as a result of the perceived outrage over Illyrian actions.27 
De Souza, moreover, asserts that Polybius’ account of the interview is more moralistic and 
rhetorical than the alternative account of Appian and notes the ‘symbolic importance’ of the 
scene depicted in Polybius for his wider work.28 The interview itself highlights the problems 
of the use of speeches in Polybius’ work, especially in this instance, as Polybius is the only 
source that records this interview taking place at all. Thus, although the speeches in Polybius’ 
 
23For more details on the historicity of recorded speeches, see A. Mehl, Roman Historiography (Stuttgart, 2001), 
especially pp. 21-2. 
24F. W. Walbank, Polybius (London, 1972), p. 44. 
25G. Longley, ‘Imperialism, Thucydides, Polybius and Human Nature’ in C. Smith and L. M. Yarrow (eds.), 
Imperialism, Cultural Politics and Polybius (Oxford, 2012), pp. 71-3.; Polybius, Histories 2. 56. 
26Polybius, Histories 2. 8. This interview will be closely examined later in the thesis. 
27Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius: Volume I, pp. 158-60. 
28P. De Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World (Cambridge, 1999), p. 79. Appian, Illyrian Wars 3. 2. 7. De 
Souza on account of the deficiencies in Polybius’ account, prefers the Appian version in this instance. 
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Histories may be an accurate reflection of what was said, the veracity of the speeches cannot 
be determined for certain. The speeches in Polybius’ Histories that serve as important 
milestones for the development of key themes in the work are more likely than others to be 
reconstructed in a way that promotes the symbolic importance of the speeches that Polybius 
has chosen to include. 
Much of Polybius’ later life in Rome was spent in the company of the Cornelii 
Scipiones, a pre-eminent family of Republican Rome, and he served as a mentor to Scipio 
Aemilianus, accompanying him on the Carthaginian campaign in 149-146 BC. This further 
presents complications over the effects of the relationships built by Polybius in Rome, on the 
accounts in his Histories. Luce asserts that ‘Polybius had the opportunity to become acquainted 
with the nature of Roman politics and warfare first-hand and at the highest level’, enjoying 
‘considerable freedom and action of movement’ in the process, despite being an internee.29 
This would have given Polybius ample experience in judging the mechanics of the Roman 
system at first-hand and an unusual freedom for a internee to pursue his historical writing. 
Polybius, it must be stressed, was renowned for his work and the prodigious talent that he had 
shown in his accounts and Achaean politics; it is likely that he would have kept an open and 
inquisitive mind to the situations around him. Polybius, during his time in Rome, forged several 
high-profile friendships in Rome amongst other Romans and resident Greeks.30 Although 
Momigliano has highlighted the importance of the Scipionic circle, he has also stressed that 
the political life Polybius found at Rome was not too dissimilar to that which he had 
experienced in Greece.31 This would suggest that although Polybius’ most important 
connection was developed with Scipio Aemilianus and those close to him, he also developed a 
wider variety of connections. The important connection with Scipio is alluded to in the 
Histories as Polybius describes his close association with Scipio Aemilianus as being like that 
of father and son.32 The importance of this association on the accounts for the period being 
considered in this thesis is however harder to determine. As McGing has noted, it is unclear 
exactly when the particular sections of the Histories were written, although he notes that 
Carthage was continually described in existence in the work until Book 15 and therefore it is 
 
29T. J. Luce, The Greek Historians (London, 1997), p. 124. 
30A. M. Eckstein, Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius (London, 1995), p. 9. These included the future 
Seleucid king Demetrius I Soter. 
31A. Momigliano, Alien Wisdom: The Limits of Hellenization (Cambridge, 1971), p. 24. 
32Polybius, Histories 31. 25. 1. 
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likely that accounts up until Book 15 were likely written before 146 BC.33 Carthage’s eventual 
subjugation however was much after this, in 146 BC and so it is extremely difficult to determine 
the exact timing of the writing of the various accounts in the Histories. For his accounts of the 
first half of the 2nd Century BC however, Polybius does discuss wider familial relations to 
Scipio, and occasionally criticises their actions. Polybius, for example, criticises Scipio’s own 
father-in-law, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus on multiple occasions for his incompetence and 
deceit.34 Although Polybius’ friendship with Scipio was strong therefore, he was not averse to 
criticising those close to him. The personal relationship between Scipio and Polybius would 
also develop after the period being considered in this thesis, and as such, the significance of 
the connection on Polybius’ veracity is less evident for this period. 
 Polybius’ treatment of annalistic traditions in his Histories is also of particular 
importance, relying on it for some sections of his accounts, but effectively critiquing it in other 
parts. The evidence that Polybius had to draw on for his Histories was varied, deriving from a 
number of sources, including historical works now lost, official archives and eyewitness 
testimony.35 Polybius was especially cautious for an historian of his time in using these sources, 
conscientiously critiquing the material where he deemed it necessary in his work. Early in the 
Histories, Polybius is critical of Fabius Pictor and Philinus for their pro-Roman and pro-
Carthaginian biases respectively, and critical of Phylarchus in opposition to Aratus, for his 
indiscriminate history and random statements on Greek affairs.36 Considering these passages 
with his aforementioned criticism of Timaeus, it is clear that Polybius did not take his sources 
at face value, but rather critically engaged with the sources that he utilised for various sections. 
Eckstein indeed stresses that ‘Polybius was no mere copyist – and he was aware of Fabius’ 
biases as he was the biases of Philinus’.37 Although aware of the biases contained in these 
accounts, Polybius was also aware of the deficiencies that he had for evidence of events prior 
to 220 BC. Polybius’ main body of the Histories subsequently started at this date; Polybius 
noting that from this date onwards, the evidence would allow him to make sound judgments 
and clear statements.38 His reliance on the annalistic traditions for earlier sections in his work 
can most significantly be seen in the context of this thesis, in his treatment of the First Illyrian 
 
33B. C. McGing, Polybius’ Histories (Oxford, 2010), p. 148. The preceding books cover Roman interventions in 
Illyria down to 203 BC. 
34Polybius, Histories 31. 6., 32. 4. 
35For more details on the range of Polybius’ sources, see Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius: 
Volume I, pp. 26-35. 
36Fabius Pictor and Philinus; Polybius, Histories 1. 14-5. Phylarchus contra Aratus, Polybius, Histories 2. 56. 
37Eckstein, Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius, p. 64. 
38Polybius, Histories 4. 2. 
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War. Walbank notes that several sections of Polybius’ account of the war ‘represent a Roman 
tradition, which may well be Fabius’.39 Bearing in mind Polybius’ critique of Fabius for his 
partisanship towards Rome, it is not surprising that the accounts in Polybius present Rome in 
a particularly positive light, defiantly standing up for the victims of Illyrian piracy. This has 
made the Polybian version of this conflict particularly problematic for historians to interpret. 
Although reliant on annalistic traditions for the period preceding 220 BC, Polybius’ critiquing 
of his source material in later passages is invaluable to later historians and has added to the 
reliability of his work on these sections. 
 Throughout his accounts of the Illyrian Wars, Polybius is not positive in his portrayal 
of the Illyrians, particularly pouring scorn on the actions of their leaders. Agron is presented as 
an indulger and a drunkard, his wife Teuta misogynistically as rash and impetuous, Demetrius 
of Pharos as careless, rash and churlish, and Genthius as brutal, intemperate and cruel.40 These 
leaders do not exhibit traditional Graeco-Roman qualities of leadership and appear as irrational 
figures in the accounts. By contrasting the virtues of the Romans in comparison, Polybius is 
able to effectively juxtapose the different sorts of leaders in his work. Champion has noted that 
in these sections, ‘Roman enemies exhibit impulsive behaviour, greed and treachery – qualities 
we have found to be constituent elements of Polybius’ barbarians’.41 These actions should also 
be placed in the context of wider Roman imperialism; acting in defiance of the stronger power 
of Rome is presented as imprudent action in Polybius’ work. Baranowski asserts that 
‘throughout the Histories, Polybius takes the view that weaker states should cooperate 
prudently with Rome and avoid military conflict against the superior power’.42 As mentioned 
earlier, the issue of cooperation with Rome was an important consideration for Polybius when 
a member of the Achaean League. The lack of heed paid by the Illyrians in Polybius’ accounts 
to Roman status and power is probably set against Polybius’ own experiences in Greece. 
Champion has also remarked that with Agron, Teuta and Demetrius of Pharos, Polybius may 
employ the individual in order to underscore the characteristics of the ethnic-cultural group.’43 
This is more difficult to ascertain due to Polybius’ concentration in his accounts of the 
prominent figures involved. The passing comment of Polybius at the end of the First Illyrian 
War, calling the Illyrians ‘the enemy of all mankind’ (or at least the enemy of Greeks and 
 
39Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius: Volume I, p. 153. 
40Agron Polybus, Histories 2. 4; Teuta Polybius, Histories 2. 8.; Demetrius Polybius Histories 3.16-9; Genthius 
Histories 29. 13. 
41C. B. Champion, Cultural Politics in Polybius’ Histories (London, 2004), p. 102. 
42Baranowski, Polybius and Roman Imperialism, p. 124. 
43Champion, Cultural Politics in Polybius’ Histories, p. 104. 
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Romans alike) is perhaps indicative of Polybius extending the associated behaviour to apply to 
the Illyrians more generally.44 Polybius’ subsequent pejorative treatment of the Illyrians is 
evident from the use of language and strong tone; these passages will consequently be closely 
critiqued throughout the thesis. 
 Polybius’ work had important themes that underpinned his Histories and shaped the 
way the author considered Roman imperial expansion. Polybius, from the outset of his work, 
stressed the importance of the period being covered in his Histories for producing an 
‘interconnectedness’ between the affairs of Italy, Greece and North Africa.45 This underlying 
theme can be seen to affect his interpretation of events as Polybius sought to add particular 
emphasis to specific events as turning points and milestones in his work. Eckstein notes that in 
the context of the important event of the ‘Pact between the kings’ in 203/2 BC in Polybius’ 
Histories, the author ‘liked to emphasise the power of large underlying factors and large 
historical patterns, as opposed to contingent events’.46 An earlier example is sometimes cited 
in the First Illyrian War, although Walbank has stressed that the events of the First Illyrian War 
served as an anticipation of the ‘interconnectedness’ rather than the emergence of the 
phenomenon; an ἐπιπλοκή rather than a συμπλοκή.47 Nevertheless, the importance of the event 
appears to have been magnified by Polybius as it relates to his wider underlying theme. In 
relation to this, Polybius set his work out into separate theatres around individual years in an 
Olympiad. This has facilitated the dating of key events and their interpretation. De Sanctis has, 
for example, noted that the norm was for foreign embassies to be heard in Rome at the 
beginning of the new consular year.48 This has made the dating of diplomatic events such as 
these, and military events easier to determine due to the set times of the year that these took 
place. Walbank asserts that ‘it generally suited the account of diplomatic exchanges; but it also 
suited the description of military campaigning (…) the war decision usually followed the entry 
of the new consuls into office’.49 This has made it easier to date the significant events in 
considering military and diplomatic interventions in Polybius’ Histories. Although the 
structure of his work has facilitated a study of Roman interventions, the selective highlighting 
 
44Polybius, Histories 2. 12. 
45Polybius, Histories 1. 4. 
46A. M. Eckstein, ‘The Pact Between the Kings, Polybius 15.20.6 and Polybius’ View of the Outbreak of the 
Second Macedonian War’, Classical Philology Vol. 100 No. 3 (2005), p. 241. 
47F. W. Walbank, ‘Symploke: Its role in Polybius’ Histories’ (1975) in D. Kagan (ed.), Studies in the Greek 
Historians (Cambridge, 2010), p. 198. 
48G. De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani Volume IV: I (Turin, 1923), p. 387. 
49Walbank, ‘Symploke: Its role in Polybius’ Histories’, p. 210. 
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of events by Polybius may be less reflective of their overall significance, and more their ability 
to best fit the underlying themes of his work. 
  The later accounts provided by Appian as part of his monograph on the Illyrian Wars, 
provide additional coverage of events. Polybius’ accounts were available to Appian and served 
as important source material, although disagreement has emerged amongst modern scholars 
over the manner in which Appian utilised Polybius’ accounts. Schwartz suggested in the late 
19th Century that Appian used an intermediary source for the accounts of Polybius, potentially 
through a Roman annalist writing after Livy.50 Conversely, Schulten, writing in the early 20th 
Century, suggested that Appian used Polybius directly, closely using Polybius’ accounts of 
important battles and diplomatic events.51 Identifying any potential intermediary source 
remains speculative. This has been compounded by the fact that the potential full range of 
sources available to Appian cannot be determined. The Roman interventions in Illyria were 
events more distant to Appian than many of his other accounts, including those on the Roman 
Civil War and it remains likely that Polybius’ work was an important authority on these events 
for Appian. Rich has more recently noted that Schwartz’s view that Appian was a ‘mere 
compiler’ has been refuted by recent research.52 The careful comparison between passages used 
by Brodersen for the Syrian War, has highlighted the importance of comparing particular 
sections of Appian and Polybius for events. As Appian’s accounts of the Roman interventions 
are structured in a monograph rather than Polybius’ broader, chronological history, it is 
important to closely analyse the passages side-by-side to comprehend and consider any 
divergences between the accounts. This is particularly important when considering the period 
being considered in this thesis. Nissen in the mid-19th Century highlighted the limitations and 
problems with Appian’s accounts for the period of 200 – 167 BC, questioning the critical 
handling of his source material.53 The passages on the Roman interventions provided by 
Polybius and Appian will thus be carefully critiqued throughout the thesis in addressing the 
interventions in turn. 
 
50E. Schwartz, ‘Appianus’, RE II, pp. 217-22. 
51A. Schulten, Eine topographische-historische Untersuchung. Abhandlungen der königlichen Gesellschaft der 
Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, philologische-historische Klasse (Berlin, 1905), pp. 77-106. 
52J. Rich, ‘Appian, Polybius and the Romans’ war with Antiochus the Great: a study in Appian’s sources and 
methods’ in K. Welch (ed.), Appian’s Roman History: Empire and Civil War (Swansea, 2015), pp. 66-67. See 
also K. Brodersen, Appian’s Anitochike (Syriake 1.1-44,232) Text und Kommentar nebst einem Anhang: 
Plethons Syriake-Exzerpt’, Münchener Arebiten zur alten Geschichte (1991), pp. 77-87. 
53H. Nissen, Kritische Untersuch–ungen uber die Quellen der vierten und fiunften Dekade des Livius (Berlin, 
1863), p. 117. 
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 As with Polybius, Appian utilised the Roman interventions in Illyria for particular 
purposes in his work. Goldmann has provided a more positive appraisal of Appian’s work, 
underlining the distinction between rational and irrational motivations in the account and 
Appian’s ability to draw on his legal and administrative experiences.54 Appian served as a 
procurator and a barrister, claiming in the preface of his Roman History, to have reached the 
summit of positions in his native Egypt and to have plead cases in Rome before the emperors 
themselves.55 Appian could draw on his knowledge and experience in these roles in his 
historical writing and would have had significant practice in rhetoric. Appian in the preface to 
his work, also extolled the size and endurance of the Roman Empire, highlighting the 
importance to that success of Roman bravery, patience and hard work.56 These virtues, together 
with an emphasis on past Roman glory, would have appealed to Appian’s audience comprised 
predominantly of Roman aristocrats. The Roman interventions in Illyria served as an important 
stage to highlight these virtues and comparative vices to his audience. By contrast, the preface 
of Polybius, outlined at the beginning of this thesis, sought to explain the rise of Rome and the 
eventual dominance of the Romans in Greek affairs to Greeks and Romans alike. The Roman 
interventions in Illyria served as a key set-piece in this progression in Polybius’ account. 
Additional source material has come from Livy’s accounts of the interventions as part 
of his monumental Roman history. Livy’s accounts of the first two interventions by the Romans 
are lost, although brief excerpts exist from the Periochae, whilst his accounts of the Third 
Illyrian and Macedonian Wars have survived. Livy’s use of Polybius as a source has been the 
subject of debate amongst modern scholars since the influence of Polybius on certain sections 
of Livy’s work was identified by Nissen.57 Tränkle in analysing the relationship between the 
two works in the 1970s, identified three ways in which material from Polybius was adapted in 
Livy’s text. These were abbreviations made by Livy from Polybius, the expansion and 
rearrangement of the Polybian version by Livy and lastly, deliberate factual changes by Livy 
from Polybius.58 In cases where a discrepancy existed between Polybius and an alternative 
annalistic tradition for Livy, Tränkle has argued that Livy cast his own judgement on which 
was more suitable. In discussing Livy’s methods of composition, Briscoe has also noted that 
 
54B. Goldmann, Einheitlichkeit und Eigenständigkeit der Historia Romana des Appian (Olms, 1988); P. 
Heilporn, ‘Review of B. Goldmann, Einheitlichkeit und Eigenständigkeit der Historia Romana des Appian 
(Olms, 1988)’ in L’antiquité classique, Tome 60 (1991), p. 375. 
55Appian, Roman History Praef. 1.1-11 (self-translated).  
56Ibid. 
57Nissen, Kritische Untersuch–ungen uber die Quellen der vierten und fiunften Dekade des Livius. 
58H. Tränkle, Livius and Polybios (Basel-Stuttgart, 1977). 
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Livy ‘adapted Polybius for his own literary purposes’, leaving out and re-arranging material 
and occasionally ‘inserting blatant falsehoods’.59 Although Livy’s accounts of the first two 
Roman interventions have been lost, the dynamic between Livy’s account of the Third Illyrian 
War and what is contained in the Periochae, and those accounts of the other ancient historians 
will be important to consider in the thesis for each intervention in turn. 
The composition of Livy’s monumental history has a further bearing on how his 
accounts of the Roman interventions need to be examined. As part of the Augustan revival in 
late 1st Century BC, Livy’s text sought to document events up until that point from the city’s 
foundation and to reaffirm Roman pride and prestige in doing so. In the preface to his work, 
Livy outlines his intention to ‘memorialise the accomplishments of the foremost people of the 
world’.60 The political motivation behind the commissioning and composition of the text were 
reflected in a desire to present the Romans in a positive light through the various historical 
episodes. This renewed sense of patriotism and self-confidence would have struck accord with 
Livy’s Roman audience of the Augustan age. The political sensitivity of the environment in 
which Livy was writing has placed particular emphasis on his selection of material. The 
selection of material for his account was imbued with reasoning beyond historical judgement. 
Tränkle has described these factual changes made by Livy as typical ‘procedures of 
subtraction’.61 These procedures served as a means of reconciling differences between the 
annalistic traditions available to Livy and the accounts of Polybius, by omitting one version 
and adopting another. This further stresses the need to carefully critique these accounts in 
conjunction with the other ancient historical sources to address and explain discrepancies 
between the sources. 
Although the ancient historical texts are the primary evidence to be considered in the 
thesis, the lack of an Illyrian voice has made the interpretation of the Graeco-Roman sources 
problematic. In studying a topic regarding the political subjugation of a voiceless people this 
issue becomes particularly prominent. Gruen has outlined such an issue, stressing 'the 
denigration, even demonization of the 'Other' in order to declare superiority or to construct a 
contrasting national identity'.62 Wilkes at the start of his study, noted that 'many Greek and 
 
59J. Briscoe, ‘Some Misunderstandings of Polybius in Livy’ in B. Gibson and T. Harrison (eds.), Polybius and 
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Roman writers vie with each other in expressing contempt and detestation for the Illyrians.’63 
Not only has this been based on an 'otherness' associated with Illyrians from the Greek and 
Roman sources but it has also stemmed from the nature of Roman and Greek contact with the 
region and its inhabitants. The environments in which Greeks and Romans encountered the 
Illyrians were largely through international relations and warfare. Livy in a passing comment 
on a voyage up the Adriatic notes that the fleet commanded by the Spartan king Cleonymus  
continued straight on to the Venetian coast out of dread for the Illyrians, Liburnians and 
Histrians who were savage tribes notorious for conducting piracy.64 Oakley has noted that 
Livy's stereotype is emphasised by his use of the generic term Illyrii in reference to the peoples 
of the eastern Adriatic.65
 
Dzino has noted that ‘the sources were all written by members of the 
Mediterranean elite, for a specific audience in order to fulfil their expectations and fit certain 
literary genres of their period.’66 Illyrians appear in Greek and Roman histories unsurprisingly 
in relation to Macedonian, Greek and Roman entities and most frequently as mercenaries and 
pirates. Greek and Roman sources would have based such generalisations in the context of their 
contact with tribes of the eastern Adriatic. Nevertheless, ‘the lack of indigenous narratives can 
be in some degree compensated with archaeological evidence’.67 Archaeology can provide 
indications of social, cultural and economic interactions without the taint of the potential bias 
present in the written sources. In this way, the archaeological evidence will be used to better 
posit the written sources in context throughout the thesis. 
The efficacy of Illyrian studies has nevertheless been limited due to the politicisation 
of lines of enquiry and the appropriation of the material in particular periods in which historical 
research has been undertaken. Wilkes notes that although a greater freedom has emerged in 
Albania for scholars to operate in, ‘the long standing Albanian claim for a continuity of descent 
from the ancient Illyrians is now accompanied by arguments that Kosovo and Metohija form 
parts of an ancient Illyrian homeland that should naturally be joined with the rest of modern 
Albania’.68 Under the strict communist dictatorship in Albania, Illyrian archaeology was 
tainted with political appropriation; ‘Hoxha also emphasised the autochthonous ethnogenesis 
of the Albanians’ as a means to link ‘their origins to the ancient Illyrians’ through the ‘political 
 
63Wilkes, The Illyrians, p. 3. 
64Livy, Ab urbe condita 10. 2. 
65S. P. Oakley, A Commentary on Livy Volume IV: Book X (Oxford, 2005), p. 58. 
66Dzino, Illyricum in Roman Politics, p. 7. 
67Dzino, Illyricum in Roman Politics, p. 8. 
68Wilkes, The Illyrians, pp. 26-7. 
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appropriation of Illyrian archaeology and history’.69 During periods of Albanian history 
moreover, Pelasgian romanticism has been a problem in the historical discipline, where ‘the 
dividing line between myth and history was not easily discernible’.70 In modern Albania, 
prominent Illyrian figures from the historical period covered by this thesis are remembered 
through imagery based largely on modern interpretation and construction; a series of examples 
have been included in the Appendix.71 The modern busts of Illyrian leaders have been 
constructed with little to no historical evidence for their appearance.72 These busts are located 
in a prominent museum on the site of Genthius’ stronghold of Scodra. Likewise, the coinage 
shown in Fig. 8. and Fig. 9. of the Appendix are current Albanian coins in circulation bearing 
images of Genthius and Teuta. These images present these figures in a manner that, one would 
assume, the modern Albanian government would like them to be seen rather than drawing on 
a basis from archaeology or history. The history of the ancient Illyrians has been an effective 
way for modern Albanians to reconnect with past identity and heritage in the region post 20th 
Century, a period which saw great upheaval for the Albanian people. This increasing interest 
in the history of Illyria in the new millennium has had the positive effect, as mentioned earlier, 
of inspiring interest into the archaeological and historical past of the region. There is a 
continuing need however for historical research of the region to be undertaken through 
traditional methods of historical enquiry to ensure the historical record is as veracious as 
possible. 
Illyrian studies have undergone important recent developments that have seen a number 
of significant publications that have added to the historiography. The most established 
examinations of Illyrian antiquities for western scholars have been the archaeological research 
undertaken by Evans and Wilkes.73 Evans was the first archaeologist to excavate the area in 
the 1880s, and his comprehensive findings have provided an important basis for all future work 
in the associated fields. Wilkes’ works on Illyria and Dalmatia have provided the most 
comprehensive modern works for examining the history, culture and archaeology of the region. 
In recent times, the work of Dzino has been particularly important in examining the 
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development of Roman interactions with Illyria.74 Dzino’s work ‘focuses on examination of a 
more conventional narrative of the events that we today recognise as Roman political 
engagement in Illyricum’.75 Rather than focusing on Rome’s interventions in Illyria, Dzino’s 
work has concentrated on group identities amongst the Illyrians and the interactions between 
Romans and Illyrians; ‘the colonisers and the colonised’.76 The modern historiography for 
Illyrian studies however has prominently consisted of scholars from the eastern Adriatic. The 
work of scholars such as Olujić, Stipčević and Šašel Kos have augmented scholarship on the 
subject by carrying out research with very specific focuses; the larger corpus of such work has 
enabled the emergence of broader and more detailed analyses.77 Dzino has however alluded to 
the paucity of Anglophone historiography on Illyria, but has noted that recent publications by 
Šašel Kos have augmented the modern scholarship.78 Despite a lack of published secondary 
sources in the English language, the wider corpus of material available to scholars in a variety 
of languages have enabled greater analyses to made of the subject matter. 
The wider contexts of Roman imperialism and expansion have long been the subject of 
considerable debate in the historiography. Theodor Mommsen writing in 1864, included 
coverage of Illyria in his wider History of Rome and his work set a trend through the subsequent 
scholarship of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.79 The argument initially put 
forward by Mommsen, asserted that Roman interests east of the Adriatic were minimal down 
to the end of the Second Century BC. This has been subsequently tagged with the term 
'Defensive Imperialism', a term which is somewhat of an oxymoron. The basis of this view 
holds that Roman wars during the period were fought out of a reaction to the threats posed by 
foreign aggressors faced by the Romans. This argument was later furthered by Holleaux who 
outlined a perspective in 1935 which built on Mommsen’s earlier thesis, advocating that 
Roman wars were predominantly fought on the grounds of self-defence and fear of the threats 
posed by other states.80 The 19th and early 20th centuries were periods where imperialism and 
empires were dominant in European politics; the praise of Rome, and the drawing of 
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contemporary imperial comparisons to Rome, were important ideas in the discourse. Brunt has 
noted that historians in the heyday of British imperialism were eager to make comparisons 
between the British and Roman empires.81 This perspective has largely been discredited in the 
modern historiography, partly due to the tendency of this orthodox view to take sources at face 
value, and partly due to perceptions of an underlying apology for imperialism. 
The orthodox view was later challenged by Harris in 1979 with his work War and 
Imperialism in Republican Rome, which drew greater attention to the 'advantages which the 
Romans, the aristocrats above all, derived from war and from the expansion of power which 
resulted from successful war'.82 Harris rejected the traditional approach to take the ancient 
sources at face value and adopted an analytical rather than narrative framework to explain the 
associated historical phenomena. In doing so, his work sought to examine the underlying 
behaviours and motivations of various groups within Roman society towards war and 
imperialism. Harris’ work has inspired a number of modern scholars to study and critique 
Roman imperialism and, in turn, the nature and underlying purpose and motivation behind the 
historical accounts.83 The Roman interventions in Illyria from this perspective must be placed 
in the context of an aggressive and ambitious Roman Senate and a bellicose broader Roman 
society. Harris noted in his discussion of the origins of the First Illyrian War that a pattern was 
set of Rome seeking justification for engaging in aggressive foreign interventions.84 Harris’ 
work has effectively encouraged greater and more rigorous criticism of the source material 
although his work is more overarching, providing an overview of a one-dimensional Rome. 
Eckstein has recently criticised this approach, by suggesting that Harris’ work has centred 
‘sternly on Roman action, Roman ambition, Roman expansion, Roman aggression – in short, 
on Roman imperialism.’85 This thesis seeks to add to the existing historiography on the subject 
by bringing the Illyrian perspective back into consideration, alongside that of the Romans. As 
mentioned earlier, the greater range of source material now available has enabled a more 
nuanced and specific approach to be adopted in addressing the Roman interventions in Illyria. 
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Eckstein, himself, by contrast has recently provided 'a re-examination of the early 
involvement of the Republic of Rome with the eastern Mediterranean' by reconsidering the 
fundamentals of ‘Defensive Imperialism’ in a new light.86 Eckstein’s thesis, stressing the 
importance of a limited early Roman interest in Illyria and the eastern Adriatic has provided a 
sound analysis for Rome’s initial limited involvement in Illyria. Developments during the 
period however need to be considered as Eckstein has stressed in his work. Eckstein describes 
this development as a shift ‘from anarchy to hierarchy’; the replacement of the ‘Hellenistic 
multipolar anarchy’ with the unipolarity of Rome.87 Eckstein has largely modelled this on his 
perspective of interstate relations during the period through Realist international relations 
theory. This approach has considered a changing dynamic in the international structure as 
fundamental to the changing nature of Roman interventions in the Greek East. Eckstein has 
highlighted the particular importance of the ‘Pact between the Kings’ in 202 BC in this 
development, describing the event as constituting a ‘diplomatic revolution in the 
Mediterranean’.88 This event, coupled with the sending of embassies from several states to 
Rome in complaint, served in Eckstein’s view to prompt subsequent Roman interventions.89 
Polybius’ account of the Roman decision to intervene in 201 BC is lost, although the Pact is 
highlighted by Polybius, who uses it as a key set-piece in his work. Polybius, in describing the 
event, signposted the later defeats of both entities at the hands of Rome.90 Eckstein is correct 
to highlight the changing nature of interstate relations between Rome and their counterparts in 
the Greek East. The events of 202 BC were, nevertheless, specifically spotlighted by Polybius 
in his account as a means to illuminate the main theme of ‘interconnectedness’ in his narrative. 
This development occurred between the Roman interventions in the Second and Third Illyrian 
Wars and, as shall be discussed later in the thesis, it is important to consider this context in the 
changing nature of Rome’s interventions in Illyria during the period being considered in the 
thesis. 
Realist theory itself, was most prominently set out in Waltz’s 1959 work, Man, the State 
and War in which Waltz saw a system of anarchy persisting in international relations between 
sovereign states; a system in which ‘conflict, sometimes leading to war is bound to occur.’91 In 
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Realist international relations theory, states are the primary actors in an anarchic system of 
international politics and act out of self-maximisation and self-preservation to gain advantage 
in a highly competitive environment. The origins of the core ideas and principles of Realist 
theory have been traced back to Thucydides and the origins of the Peloponnesian War. For 
Thucydides, the underlying cause of the war was the growth of Athenian power and the fear 
this inspired in Sparta.92 Eckstein has asserted that ‘most modern Realist thinkers claim 
Thucydides as their intellectual ancestor’ and that key principles that inform contemporary 
Realist theory were expounded upon by Thucydides in documenting the harsh nature of 
interstate relations amongst Greek poleis of the time.93 Eckstein has argued that this state of 
affairs was not unique however, existing as the norm throughout much of antiquity with a 
dramatic change occurring with Rome’s rise to unipolarity.94 This challenged the view 
presented by Harris in his earlier work, which highlighted the exceptional century of Roman 
bellicosity and aggressiveness of which the period under consideration in this thesis is a part. 
Harris succinctly outlined this view by stating that ‘states vary widely in their willingness to 
exert themselves for the extension and maintenance of power’.95 This has been furthered by 
Hornblower who has argued that Roman militarism was far more marked than any Greek state, 
even Sparta.96 Although Rome was a particularly bellicose state, there is a need to consider 
how other states reacted to Roman aggression and how these reactions changed with the 
developing power structures of the Mediterranean interstate system. 
Utilising Realist international relations theory to better understand the Roman 
interventions in Illyria is however problematic due to the Illyrian geopolitical situation and the 
nature of the interventions themselves. The core principles of Realist international relations 
theory of self-maximisation and security are applied in relation to a consistent notion of 
competition between states. Eckstein has asserted that ‘Rome was one state in an interstate 
system (…) where all states competed bitterly with each other for security via the gaining of 
power’.97 Throughout the period being considered in this thesis, Rome and the different 
Illyrians they engaged with, existed on an unequal footing regarding their power and influence 
within the international system. Moreover, defining the existence and nature of the ‘Illyrian 
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state’ that engaged within the interstate system raises further problems. As shall be discussed 
in the next chapter of the thesis, Illyria’s geographic position between the Adriatic and the 
Greek and Macedonian interior would be reflected geopolitically for the period being 
considered in this thesis. Although security concerns had an important bearing on Illyrian 
international relations, Roman security concerns were located elsewhere. Rome’s interventions 
in Illyria during this period were notably short, with limited Roman involvement in the region 
in their aftermath. Applying the theory to understand the Roman interventions from both 
Roman and Illyrian perspectives thus raises a series of problems that reduce the efficacy of the 
theory’s application. 
  Modern international relations theory has also been applied through the alternative 
theory of constructivism. Constructivism was formed out of perceived failures of the Realist 
theory model and regards the international system as a social construction formed by discursive 
practices. Constructivists consider individuals to be the key actors in the international system, 
with structures being constraints on individuals and view the world more idealistically, seeking 
world peace through social consciousness.98 Burton has recently used constructivism in his 
work, Friendship and Empire, as a means to interpret the development of Roman diplomacy 
in the Middle Republican period.99 In his work, Burton has identified the importance to Rome 
of informal friendship, amicitia, based on a moral bond of trust, fides, and has stressed the 
importance of shared ideas and linguistic constructs in the formation of international 
relationships.100 Unlike Realism, Constructivism assumes the seeking of world peace through 
social consciousness, which has proven much more problematic to apply to a period which 
engaged in warfare on such a consistent and prolonged basis. Burton indeed notes in his work 
that it is not a study of Roman imperialism even though considerations of this nature are 
unavoidable in part.101 Thus, whilst Burton in his application of constructivism is correct to 
stress the important elements of Roman diplomatic arrangements, applying the theory to 
ancient Rome has proven very problematic and does not provide an effective means of 
interpreting Roman interventions. 
Furthermore, modern political terminology has often been applied to describe and 
define the events and associated phenomena of the Roman interventions in Illyria. Before 
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raising these in the course of the study, it is important to initially define these terms as they 
shall be utilised throughout the thesis. Although the etymology of the term ‘imperialism’ can 
be traced back to the Latin term imperium, there is no equivalent Latin term for imperialism. 
Subsequently, modern scholars have sought to define the concept in different ways. The 
economist Schumpeter was an important contributor to theories of imperialism, seeing 
imperialism as antithetical to the capitalism and societal progress of his time. Schumpeter 
defined imperialism as ‘the objectless disposition on the part of a state to unlimited forcible 
expansion’.102 Schumpeter used the New Kingdom in Egypt as an example of ancient 
imperialism in practice, describing the existence of a ‘war machine’ that saw war as a necessary 
condition for ensuring domestic stability.103 Although Rome has been argued to exhibit 
similarly bellicose tendencies, the power-relationship between states in the Roman context has 
led to Schumpeter’s definition being expanded upon. Champion and Eckstein have used a 
definition that states that ‘imperialism is an unequal power relationship between two states in 
which the dominant state exercises various forms of control, often forcibly, over the weaker 
state’.104 Most recently, Harris has defined imperialism as ‘the activity by which a state or its 
surrogates impose its power, which it subsequently exercises and maintains, far beyond its 
previous boundaries, as part of a long-lasting policy of expansion’.105 The definition provided 
by Champion and Eckstein shall be adopted for this thesis as it provides a more accurate 
reflection on how imperialism was employed in relation to the Roman interventions in Illyria. 
The exercise of Roman power in Illyria was done on a basis of unequal power in accordance 
with this definition and the long-lasting policy of expansion as defined by Harris was not 
consistently applied by the Romans in the region. 
Throughout the thesis, the term ‘hegemony’ shall also be utilised to describe the nature 
and degree of Roman supremacy over the region. Hegemony in this context, should be 
considered as the pre-eminence or dominance of a single entity (in this case, Rome) over all 
others within a defined area (in this case, Illyria, as defined at the outset of the thesis). Eckstein 
has been the chief proponent of the term, using it to describe Rome’s geopolitical status in a 
variety of regions during the period of 230-188 BC. In Illyria, Eckstein has asserted that Rome 
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operated an ‘external hegemony’ during the late 3rd Century BC.106 This saw Rome operating 
as the hegemonic power in Illyria without directly administering the region. The threat of 
Roman intervention kept the region in-line and maintained Roman hegemony at a distance. 
Dzino has also used ‘hegemony’ to describe the Roman geopolitical position over the central 
Adriatic in the 2nd Century BC.107 These ideas in the modern scholarship reflect how Polybius 
viewed Rome’s growing status in the Mediterranean. Polybius saw Rome by the mid-2nd 
Century BC as the hegemonic power in world affairs.108 As such, the label of ‘hegemony’ 
applied to Rome by modern scholars is a useful one in defining Roman control in a region 
without effectively utilising direct administration. 
 The term ‘hegemony’ has however accrued significant modern connotations which 
have limited the effectiveness in applying the concept to the ancient world. In an influential 
modern work examining imperial power, Doyle has provided effective definitions for the 
concepts of ‘empire’ and ‘hegemony’. Doyle defined ‘empire’ as the effective political control 
exercised by one state over another subordinate state in their domestic and foreign affairs.109 A 
distinction for hegemony was also provided by Doyle, as the control over a state’s foreign 
affairs only, and not their domestic affairs.110 Eckstein has highlighted the importance of 
Doyle’s distinction to understanding the subtle differences between the two concepts and has 
furthered Doyle’s definition by stressing that a hegemonic state ‘seeks to continually control 
weaker states’ foreign relations but leaves their internal policies and politics alone.’111 Harris 
has noted a modern reluctance to apply the terms ‘empire’ or ‘imperialism’, and a preference 
to apply euphemisms instead.112 Although ‘hegemony’ can be utilised as a euphemism for 
empire, the definitions provided by Doyle reflect the important distinction between the two 
concepts. This distinction shall be employed by the thesis to effectively distinguish between 
the two terms and their application. 
It is necessary moreover, when considering the Roman interventions to address and 
define the key operators within the process of undertaking interventions. Rome, although 
possessing a mixed constitution as set down by Polybius, has typically been seen as an 
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oligarchy, with aristocratic forces holding the leverages of power.113 These aristocrats have, in 
turn, been traditionally seen as the driving force behind Roman imperial expansion, with 
‘powerful imperatives’ for them to wage war.114 Whilst the importance of the Roman 
aristocracy to Roman imperial expansion has received general consensus, the way this worked 
in practice has received differing opinions. Mommsen was the first to outline ‘a firm, 
unwavering, patriotic foreign policy’ amongst the Roman elite.115 The idea of a definable 
Roman foreign policy was later developed by Eckstein, who stressed that this ‘usually rested 
in the hands of the Senate’.116 Morley has however argued that ‘the study of Roman 
imperialism is not the study of the explicit and univocal policy of a government or a ruler’ but 
was rather formed ‘between ill-defined groups connected by ties of kinship, friendship or 
advantage, not between parties united around beliefs or political programmes.’117 The Roman 
Senate in this regard, was made up of a variety of different interests where political ties between 
individuals were loosely constructed and for a variety of different reasons. This has made a 
discernible and fixed ‘foreign policy’ difficult to ascertain. Although these differences between 
senators were apparent, decisions carried by the senate would have set down a resolute course 
of action. Byrd has stressed that between the victory over Hannibal and the reforms of the 
Gracchi in 133 BC, ‘the Senate exercised a practically unchallenged control over the Roman 
state’.118 Developments over time, with new generations of senators emerging through the 
system, would have added to this; the changeable stance of Rome’s foreign outlooks being 
dependent on the makeup of the Senate. Thus, although the Senate set Rome’s course of action, 
the notion of a coherent programme for Roman imperial expansion was not evident amongst 
Roman aristocrats. Roman aristocrats were individuals with divergent opinions and particular 
motivations for imperial expansion, and the Senate underwent developments over time. 
 Rome has moreover been seen as a bellicose society, where the aristocracy had an 
important role as military leaders. The link between the practice of warfare in the period being 
considered in this thesis, and aristocratic status, was set out by Polybius. Polybius notes that 
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no-one can hold political office in Rome without having completed ten years of service on 
campaigns.119 Harris has asserted that ‘the Roman state made war every year, except in the 
most abnormal circumstances’.120 Although this may be due, in part, to the array of foreign 
entities that Rome came into contact with, the aristocracy had a vested interest and an important 
role in the functioning of warfare. Rosenstein has also pointed to the constancy of Roman 
campaigns, noting the ‘considerable advantage’ in learning lessons for the Romans from one 
campaign to the next, and subsequent handbooks to instruct officers of their duties.121 The 
perpetual nature of warfare and the development of  Roman aristocratic adeptness in its practice 
could thus be seen to go hand-in-hand. Roman aristocrats who sought military campaigns for 
a variety of reasons, would in turn, develop their proclivity and proficiency in the art of 
campaigning through its perpetual utilisation. This would have enabled the Roman aristocrats 
to become well versed in the dynamics of command and battle strategy. For a Roman aristocrat, 
a successful military career was an essential component for climbing the political ladder. 
Rosenstein has also noted that military command was ‘a facet of political leadership, part of 
what it meant to be a Roman aristocrat and the fruit of electoral success.’122 The expectations 
of a Roman aristocrat were thus to be a Roman military commander on campaign; the value of 
an aristocrat to Rome first and foremost being seen in their success in this theatre. With this 
expectation in place, Roman aristocrats would likely seek out war to further their political 
standing. 
 The role of the wider Roman citizenry is also important to consider, although the 
driving force behind Roman imperial expansion was the Roman aristocracy. Polybius sets out 
the important role of the citizenry in the process of Roman intervention by noting that it is the 
Roman citizenry that ultimately decides on peace or war and it is the citizenry who ratify or 
reject treaties and alliances.123 Although possessing this ability, the citizenry rarely exercised 
it to its full extent. Harris asserts that ‘the effective decisions were almost always made in the 
Senate’ and ‘no case is known in which a senatorial decision to make war was successfully 
resisted by the people.’124 Rich has however argued that rather than showing their political 
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weakness, this is reflective of the citizenry’s acquiescence for war.125 It is not clear  whether 
the sentiment of the citizenry or their lack of political authority is the more important factor, 
although a combination of both is equally likely. Determining the degree of popular support 
for war making is hard to judge based on the limited evidence available. Plautus, a 
contemporary popular playwright, can be seen to indicate a strand of popular opinion due to 
his need to appeal to a popular audience. In a number of his plays, the prologue concludes with 
a bidding of farewell and a blessing on Romans wishing them well in the field of war.126 
Although the evidence is limited by not directly providing a voice for the citizenry, these 
excerpts from the prologues of Plautus’ plays suggest that a blessing of good fortune in war 
was in common parlance. Polybius suggests that for the common Roman soldiers, the 
introduction of civic and mural crowns for acts of valour were important in lifting their spirits 
and providing incentives.127 This once more suggests that the Roman soldiers felt part of the 
Roman military process and saw their fortunes associated with the military fortunes of Rome 
at war, although it’s very difficult to ascertain what popular attitudes were. 
 The importance of Roman aristocrats in foreign affairs should not however be seen 
merely in their role in military endeavours; their diplomatic role and importance was also very 
significant. The Roman Republic had no formally trained diplomats or state infrastructure 
devoted to the practice, and although major decisions, such as the sending of diplomatic 
ultimatums, were carried out by institutions in Rome, diplomacy was carried out by Roman 
magistrates. Eilers has noted that Rome had no foreign office, ‘nor did foreign states have 
permanent representatives at Rome, even though in many cases, relations with Rome were 
fundamental to their ongoing prospects’.128 Before the First and Third Illyrian Wars, the 
Romans sent magistrates in the form of ambassadors, πρέσβεις, to conduct their diplomacy.129 
Roman diplomacy with foreign entities was in its relative infancy and consequently the practice 
of diplomacy by Roman magistrates would have developed on an ad-hoc basis. These 
developments would have made diplomacy more contingent on the practicalities of the 
situations that the Romans encountered, rather than a practice strictly laid down in constructed 
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treatises. It is perhaps unsurprising in this light, that the most prominent forms of diplomatic 
association utilised by the Romans were flexible and relatively informal.130 On the election of 
a Roman aristocrat to the position of magistrate, the conduct of diplomatic affairs would have 
been an expected duty contained with the remit of the role. Thus, the expectation of Roman 
aristocrats to fulfil a diplomatic role on election to become a Roman magistrate served as an 
important consideration in their role in foreign affairs. 
 The economic benefits to campaigning have been considered by modern scholars in 
two main ways: the economic benefits to the state through national economic interests;  benefits 
to the individual in the form of plunder and the spoils of war divided up after the conclusion of 
the campaign. The first of these ways has proven considerably problematic. Frank attempted 
to calculate the income and public expenditure of the Roman state during the first half of the 
2nd Century BC although the results were largely inconclusive.131 Harris has noted that the 
survey was limited on account of the difficulty in effectively judging certain types of income 
that ‘cannot be worked out within useful limits’.132 Morley has also noted that ‘a discussion of 
the material motivation for Roman war-making sometimes becomes conflated with modern 
ideas of ‘economic imperialism’; he also stresses that ‘there is little evidence to suggest that 
this was a significant factor in antiquity’, citing a possible anomaly in the First Illyrian War.133 
Modern economic systems work in different ways to the economy of ancient Rome and 
applying modern economic theory to ancient Rome is highly problematic. In contrast to modern 
economies, the Roman economic system during the period being considered in this thesis, was 
largely agrarian and rich industrialists were not as evident. The Romans in the First Illyrian 
War were probably well aware of the important trade networks in the southern Adriatic; 
judging, however, the potency of a desire to exploit such trade is an entirely different 
proposition. 
The economic benefits for individuals are easier to ascertain, in the form of the spoils 
of war and the uneven distribution of these in the aftermath of campaigns. Harris has stressed 
the importance of material gains from warfare, asserting that ‘economic gain was to the 
Romans (and generally in the ancient world) an integral part of successful warfare and of the 
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expansion of power. Land, plunder, slaves, revenues were natural results of success; they were 
the assumed results of victory and power’.134 Polybius, in describing a siege of New Carthage 
in 209 BC, sets out the progress of a siege with a defined order of operations; Roman plundering 
began on a signal being given by the commander for the massacring of inhabitants and animals 
to cease.135 Similar accounts that feature plundering beginning upon a signal from the 
commander also appear in Livy.136 This would suggest that plundering was an important 
component of Roman warfare; sieges incorporated a period of plundering into the systematic 
taking of a settlement. Ziolkowski however notes that although some basic rules appear evident 
in the process, the two limits to a soldier’s spoils were his physical ability to gather plunder 
and the strategic and logistical considerations of the baggage train.137 Although an allocated 
time was given by Roman commanders to plundering, Roman soldiers would have had an 
opportunity to take advantage of their situation through plundering. The opportunity to acquire 
material gain through plunder was thus a facet of war that all Roman soldiers could acquire 
some degree of benefit from. 
 It is important at the outset of the thesis to, moreover, establish what is meant by certain 
ancient terms and concepts and to consider their importance to understanding the nature of 
Rome’s interventions. Fides, which can be translated as faith or trust, was a deified virtue which 
underpinned many of Rome’s dealings with foreign entities. Roman diplomacy was enacted 
under divine observation and treaties were kept in the temple of fides, located on the Capitoline 
hill.138 Diplomatic treaties and arrangements were stored in the temple under the observation 
and protection of the divine fides. Before the construction of the temple, a simpler shrine was 
present on the site; the construction of the temple highlights the importance of fides to the 
Romans in the 3rd Century BC. Rome in the 3rd Century BC was engaging in early contact and 
forging initial relations with foreign states; the temple may have been established out of a desire 
to gain greater favour from the divine entity or from the practical need to properly and piously 
store the physical copies of Rome’s diplomatic agreements. Cicero in De Officiis, described 
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fides as fundamentum… iustitiae, the foundation of justice.139 As such, the concept was integral 
to Roman diplomatic practice, the success or failure of which was dependent on fides. Burton 
has noted that ‘when a Roman pledged his fides and extended his right hand, he was aware of 
the enormous and awesome significance of the act – and the terrible retribution the gods could 
exact if he violated his oath’.140 The breaking of a diplomatic arrangement was therefore 
considered not only an act against the opposing party but was also impious in defying the 
divinely ordained pact. As shall be discussed later in the thesis, this would have important 
connotations for the arrangements Rome struck with various Illyrian entities. 
 Fides was particularly important to these arrangements, as many were informal and 
based on ties of friendship. Friendship, amicitia, can best be defined as a mutually beneficial 
voluntary arrangement based on bonds of trust and affinity, although the Romans utilised it in 
a flexible manner in accordance with the informality of the arrangement. Badian has 
highlighted the form of informal friendship as paramount to Roman strategic thinking in their 
early interventions in Illyria in the 3rd Century BC.141 These friendship ties enabled the Romans 
to build relations in the region without being tied down by more formal arrangements. In 
addition to Roman arrangements with amici, Rome also formed associations with socii 
(allies/associates); some sources also point to arrangements with affiliates designated as socii 
et amici. The existence of a distinction between the socii and amici was first asserted in the 
modern scholarship by Mommsen, who viewed the diplomatic arrangement of socii et amici, 
as reflecting a more formal alliance of friendship.142 This was later challenged and largely 
discredited by a number of historians, who have noted that no precise distinction between the 
two terms is evident in the sources.143 Burton has noted that there is ‘proof from inscription 
evidence that official documents used the same combinations of terms without necessarily 
implying formal technical distinctions.144 An example of this can be seen in the Appendix, 
showing two sections of a psephisma from Pharos.145 The inscription is believed to mention, 
in line 8 of fragment A (Fig. 7a.), the existence of an alliance and friendship, συμμα - [ξίαν (καὶ 
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φιλίαν)] between Pharos and Rome, although the fragmentary nature of the line has made it 
difficult to ascertain the precise nature of the affiliation being referred to. Burton has argued 
that it is unlikely that a formal alliance existed between the states at the time, asserting that 
‘even in ‘official’ contexts, the terminology of Roman diplomacy was highly fluid.’146 
Although the evidence presented in the psephisma is unclear and shall be discussed at greater 
length later in the thesis, Burton is correct to highlight the importance to Rome of utilising 
diplomatic terminology that was highly fluid. With such terminology being relatively 
ambiguous, Rome could draw inference from the arrangement to suit their diplomatic needs 
and potentially frame the context for intervention around whether or not the obligations, or 
terms of such an association, were violated. 
It is also important to distinguish what the Romans considered ‘friendship’ and 
relationships that amounted more to a patron-client structure. Badian’s influential work, 
Foreign Clientelae, effectively defined the origins of the concept of a patron-client relationship 
in foreign affairs, citing its semi-mythological origin from the time of Romulus; ‘the client may 
be described as an inferior entrusted, by custom, or by himself to the protection of a stranger 
more powerful than he, and rendering certain services and observances in return for this 
protection.’147 A patron-client structure emerged therefore out of an imbalanced friendship 
formed between parties of unequal status. Badian observed that amicitia developed into ‘a 
polite term for an inferior (or, conversely, a superior) i.e. a client or patron’ and for the Romans, 
‘amicitia necessarily becomes another term for clientship’148 The development of amicitia into 
a more unequal form of association between Rome and her affiliates should be seen in the 
context of the growing power, status and influence of Rome during the period being considered 
in this thesis. The growth of Rome changed the dynamic upon which friendships operated and 
Rome became a more dominant entity in these associations. 
 It is important, however, to consider amicitia within the diplomatic context in which it 
was utilised. The Greek concept of φιλίᾳ, friendship, predated Rome’s involvement in the 
Greek East and the similarity between the two concepts would have facilitated diplomacy. 
Although Dionysius of Halicarnarsus reports an offence caused with the Tarentines in 282 BC, 
on account of the poor quality of Greek uttered by Rome's envoy, no similar event is reported 
through Roman involvement in Illyria, Greece and Macedon.149 The diplomatic terminology 
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utilised by the Romans has often been seen to be based on original Greek concepts. Gruen has 
argued that Roman international relations concepts such as fides and amicitia, were 
synonymous with their related Greek concepts such as Πίστις and φιλία.150 This however has 
been challenged by Ager who notes the problems of such an equation of terms, citing the 
Rhodian attempt to mediate a settlement to the Third Macedonian War as an example where 
Roman and Greek understanding of the concepts differed greatly.151 A distinction needs to be 
made here regarding concepts and conceptions in the practice of diplomacy in the ancient 
world. Whilst the concepts shared a mutual basis of understanding in Greek and Roman culture, 
they were not entirely synonymous and conceptions regarding them consequently could cause 
tension between the different parties. The greater mutual understanding of these concepts 
between Greeks and Romans would have nevertheless facilitated diplomacy between them. 
Roman aristocrats, for whom Greek was often a second language, would have likely found 
negotiating with Greeks easier in practical terms than negotiating with Illyrians on account of 
the language barrier. Gruen notes that ‘no problem in communication arose during Roman 
negotiations with Pyrrhus. Nor in dealings with Greek cities across the Straits of Otranto during 
the First Illyrian War.’152 Thus, whilst occasions have been recorded in the sources of 
miscommunication between Romans and Greeks, a mutual understanding of the implications 
of diplomacy seems to have existed. The sources available do not, by contrast, provide any 
discernible Illyrian diplomatic concepts, limiting our ability to understand and appreciate the 
Illyrian perspective in these diplomatic episodes. Diplomatic engagements between Illyrian 
leaders and their Greek and Roman counterparts would have provided these leaders with some 
experience of Greek and Roman diplomatic discourse. The relations between the Illyrians, 
Greeks and Romans had particular geopolitical significance throughout the period being 
considered in this thesis and would shape the outlook of the varied disparate Illyrian leaders 
and communities. 
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Chapter 2 – The Illyrian geopolitical landscape 
 
Introduction 
 
 Neither the region of Illyria, nor the people that inhabited the region during the period 
being considered in this thesis, were homogenous. Illyria instead was made up of a series of 
disparate communities, each with their own political structure, interests, culture and outlook. 
In his analysis of the native peoples of Dalmatia prior to the Roman conquest, Wilkes notes the 
existence of clear differences between the various areas of the region, each with its own pattern 
of development.153 This distinction was most discernible between the Illyrian communities in 
the Southern Adriatic, situated in close proximity to important trade routes to Southern Italy, 
Greece and the Mediterranean beyond and those of the Northern Adriatic where tribal societies 
persisted and trade routes were less pronounced. This chapter shall focus on the Illyrian 
geopolitical issues during the period being considered in the thesis and consider how the 
geopolitical landscape of Illyria shaped the conduct of the Roman interventions. The chapter 
will not seek to further our understanding of Illyrian ethnographic issues surrounding how 
people in the disparate Illyrian communities lived, nor seek to enhance our understanding of 
the geography of the region through a detailed geographical outline documenting the various 
Illyrian tribes. These areas have been well covered in the existing historiography and are not 
directly relevant to a study of the Roman interventions.154 The chapter will instead consider the 
implications of the geography, external contacts and political structures of Illyria on the Roman 
interventions to provide a more complete appreciation of how they were conducted. 
 These issues have been insufficiently considered in the historiography, primarily due 
to the limitations of the evidence available in formulating an Illyrian perspective. As Stipčević 
 
153J. J. Wilkes, History of the Provinces of the Roman Empire: Dalmatia (Cambridge, 1969), p.190. 
154For Illyrian ethnography, see especially J. J. Wilkes, The Illyrians (Oxford, 1992) and D. Dzino, ‘‘Illyrians’ 
in ancient ethnographic discourse’, Dialogues d'histoire ancienne, Vol. 40 No. 2 (2014), pp. 45-65. For the 
development of Illyrian language and culture, see especially A.Stipčević, The Illyrians: History and Culture 
(New Jersey, 1977) and R. Katičić, 'Ancient Languages of the Balkans: Issue I' in Winter. W. W. (ed.), Trends 
in Linguistics: State-of-the -Art Reports (The Hague, 1976), pp. 154-89. For a detailed geographic outline of 
the various tribes in the region, see especially Section C of N. G. L. Hammond, 'The Kingdoms in Illyria 
circa. 400-167 BC', The Annual of the British School at Athens Vol. 61 (1966), pp. 239-53 and J. J. Wilkes, 
History of the Provinces of the Roman Empire: Dalmatia (Cambridge, 1969). 
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has noted, not a single inscription has been left by the Illyrians in their own original language.155 
As a result no political document constructed by the Illyrians themselves pertaining to their 
governance is in existence and modern scholars have subsequently had to piece together a 
variety of limited evidence. The material evidence available, principally found in burial sites, 
coin hoards and underwater archaeological excavations, can provide a greater understanding 
of Illyrian political structures and cultures and external influences on these, as well as Adriatic 
trade and the dispersal of goods throughout different parts of Illyria. The cataloguing of the 
production and distribution of amphorae on the Southern Italian and Eastern Adriatic coast by 
Miše in 2015 has proven useful in enabling greater inference to be drawn from the 
archaeological data.156 Moreover, the recent publication of underwater archaeological findings, 
especially by the Illyrian Coastal Exploration Programme, has provided a greater corpus of 
evidence than previously available. This evidence however has certain limitations, most 
notably with the limited number of shipwrecks analysed and the location of the shipwrecks 
themselves. The recent publication of previously unavailable evidence however has made it 
particularly important to consider, especially in shedding greater light on Adriatic trade and 
transport. Utilising this evidence in conjunction with the textual evidence can help the study 
better assess the nature and diversity of existing trade in the Adriatic and the economic 
motivations behind Roman intervention; the importance of the impact on Italian traders being 
specifically highlighted in the Polybian account for Rome’s decision to initially intervene in 
the region.157 
 
Geographical Issues 
  
The geography of the region of Illyria had an important role in shaping the nature of 
the communities, their outlooks and their economies. Dzino notes that archaeology divided the 
indigenous Iron-Age archaeological cultures of Illyricum into three areas; the south-east Alpine 
area with western Pannonia, the Adriatic Western-Balkan area, and the Central Danubian 
area’.158 In Dzino’s work, the area of the Adriatic Western-Balkans (the region being 
considered in this thesis) consisted of Histrian, Iapodian, Liburnian, Central-Dalmatian, 
 
155A. Stipčević, The Illyrians: History and Culture (New Jersey, 1977), p. 68. 
156M. Miše, Gnathia and Related Hellenistic Ware on the East Adriatic Coast (Oxford, 2015). Gnathia ware are 
amphorae, whose design originated from Taras (Tarentum) in Southern Italy. Production of Gnathia amphorae 
expanded to Apulia, then to the rest of Southern Italy and Magna Graecia. 
157Polybius, Histories 2. 8. 
158Dzino, Illyricum in Roman Politics, p. 36. 
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Central-Bosnian and Glasinac groups.159 Strabo has provided a geographic circuit of Illyrian 
tribes along the coast which includes the Iapodes, the Histrians, the Liburnians, the Delmetae, 
the islands off the coasts of Liburnia and Dalmatia, the Ardiaei followed by the Rhizonic Gulf 
and the southern Adriatic.160 This geographic circuit follows closely an earlier 4th Century BC 
periplus of Pseudo-Skylax.161 Dzino has noted that Strabo’s work has plentiful inaccuracies, 
especially in the geography of the Northern Adriatic and a lack of coverage for the Adriatic 
Greeks.162 Wilkes has additionally highlighted inaccuracies and misconceptions in the 
geography of the region from earlier in antiquity and has noted that ‘as late as the Fourth 
Century it was still widely believed that the Northern extremity of the Adriatic was very close 
to the Black Sea and the mouth of the Danube.163 The separation of Illyria into three distinct 
cultural sub-regions is more useful in considering the geographical makeup of the region as a 
whole. Much divergence nevertheless can be evidenced between the different tribal groups in 
the Northern and Southern sections of the Adriatic Western-Balkans. Wilkes has particularly 
stressed the important divergences of the Liburnians within the aforementioned sub-group from 
those Illyrian communities further South. From his study of the different peoples along the 
Dalmatian coast, Wilkes found that the traditional tribal system had been superseded by a 
monarchy in the South East that was able to supervise an organised form of naval warfare, 
whilst no political structure with this capability developed in Liburnia.164 This discrepancy is 
important to consider, as the limited ability of the Liburnians in the North to engage in warfare 
would have posed a less pronounced concern to the Romans, than existed in the Southern 
Adriatic. 
 The area of the Illyrian Western-Balkans, along the Adriatic coastline and immediate 
hinterland was naturally separated from parts of the interior by the Illyrian topography. The 
Dinaric Alps, stretch for approximately 400 miles from the Northern Adriatic to the South 
Eastern Adriatic, separating the Adriatic coast from the interior. Braundel has noted that 
although the mountain range operated as a physical obstacle to the interior, the coastal 
communities remained open and receptive to influences from across the Mediterranean.165 The 
importance of this geographic barrier is also reflected in Wilkes. Expounding on the Greek 
 
159Ibid. 
160Strabo, Geography 7. 5. 
161Ps.Skylax, Periplus 14-34. 
162D. Dzino, ‘Strabo 7. 5. and imaginary Illyricum’, Athenaeum: Studi periodici di letteratura e storie 
dell’Antichità, Vol. 96 No. 1 (2008), pp. 183-5. 
163Wilkes, History of the Provinces of the Roman Empire: Dalmatia, p. 1. 
164Wilkes, History of the Provinces of the Roman Empire: Dalmatia, p. 190. 
165F. Braundel, La Méditeraranée et la Monde Méditerranéen a l’époque de Philippe II (Paris, 1966), pp. 22-47. 
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misconception of the geographic location of the Northern extremity of the Adriatic, Wilkes 
notes in his later work, The Illyrians, that such a misconception is indicative of a lack of regular 
contact between the Greek world and the ‘inland peoples between the Adriatic and the Sava’.166 
Dzino has also highlighted the importance of physical geography, noting that ‘the mountainous 
northern part (of the Illyrian region) is covered with thick forests and abundant vegetation’ and 
that ‘there was no significant indigenous urbanisation’.167 By contrast Dzino asserts that the 
coastal regions ‘remained strongly linked with the rest of the Mediterranean world, and 
archaeology reveals the strong impact of Mediterranean ‘globalisation’ even before the Greek 
colonisation in the central Adriatic in the fourth century BC’.168 The physical geography of the 
Dinaric Alps ensured that coastal regions, especially in the Southern Adriatic and in proximity 
to the Ionian Sea, had greater contact with the wider Greek world, enabling Hellenistic 
influences to more easily permeate into regional cultures. 
 The geography of the region had a further impact on the economic opportunities 
available for the populace. In his geographic description of the Adriatic coast, Strabo notes that 
although the eastern seaboard was capable of growing certain foodstuffs and full of harbours, 
the Illyrians were initially ignorant of the fertility of the region primarily out of 'the wilderness 
of the inhabitants and their piratical habits'.241 Whilst passing comment on the perceived habits 
of the local populace, Strabo here points to a tendency of the Illyrians living on the coast to 
look to the sea rather than the land for supplies. As shall be discussed later in the thesis, the 
economic opportunities provided by the Adriatic that were presented to Illyrians dwelling along 
the Adriatic coast were added to by lucrative opportunities for piracy, which presented a 
particularly attractive prospect for Illyrians to gain plunder. Wilkes notes that ‘agriculture was 
never developed in Dalmatia as highly as it was in neighbouring areas’169 Dell has linked 
Adriatic piracy to the economic prospects of the region, by arguing that Illyrian raiding was 
'caused by overpopulation and lack of suitable farmland'.170 Wilkes has noted for much of the 
people of Dalmatia, excluding the Ardiaei in the South, ‘external contacts were few, and there 
was an almost total preoccupation with food production, especially livestock.171 Strabo’s 
description of the fertility of the Illyrian region thus appears oversimplified, and does not take 
 
166Wilkes, The Illyrians, pp. 101-2. 
167Dzino, Illyricum in Roman Politics, p. 32. 
168Ibid. pp. 31-2. 
169Wilkes, History of the Provinces of the Roman Empire: Dalmatia, p. 180. 
170H. J. Dell, ‘The Origin and Nature of Illyrian Piracy’, Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Vol. 16 No. 3 
(1967), p. 358. 
171Wilkes, History of the Provinces of the Roman Empire: Dalmatia, p. 190. 
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into account this regional discrepancy. The Adriatic nevertheless remained integral to the 
Illyrian coastal communities and, as shall be discussed later in the chapter, the influx of 
maritime trade would have made this more appealing for the acquisition of supplies and 
resources. 
Adriatic Greeks 
 
 Another important geopolitical consideration in Illyria is the Greek influence along the 
coast, especially as a direct result of earlier colonisation of the region. Greek colonisation in 
the Adriatic occurred during the 7th to 4th centuries BC with sites being founded at several 
locations; these locations were largely confined to the central and southern Adriatic and their 
adjacent islands.172 These locations were ideal for Greeks to exploit the maritime trading 
opportunities of the Adriatic, and the archaeological evidence highlights the importance of 
trade in this region. Trade was conducted primarily on a regional basis, and this can be seen 
from the distribution of amphorae. In his documentation of Gnathia ware in the eastern 
Adriatic, Mise has noted that out of the sites where Issaean produced Gnathia ware have been 
found, none of these sites are outside of a 60km radius of the settlement.173 Wilkes notes that 
‘for several centuries Greek and Illyrian communities appear to have maintained a separate 
existence’.174 The distribution of Gnathia ware however would suggest that in the later time in 
which Gnathia were prevalent (4th – 2nd Centuries BC), greater cultural immersion had taken 
place between Greeks and Illyrians in neighbouring settlements. Of particular importance as a 
Greek coloniser in the region was Corinth; the location of the settlement across the isthmus 
gave it good naval access to the Adriatic.175 Wilkes notes that ‘Epidmanus and Apollonia were 
for centuries the principal ports for traffic between Greece, the western Balkans and the middle 
Danube’.176 The links between Greek colonies in the Adriatic and Greek settlements elsewhere 
held significance into the period being considered in this thesis. The psephisma in the Appendix 
(Fig. 7a and 7b), shows an appeal from Pharos in the Adriatic to Paros, its metropolis, in the 
 
172This can best be seen from the map provided in the Appendix (Fig. 1.) 
173M. Miše, Gnathia and Related Hellenistic Ware on the East Adriatic Coast (Oxford, 2015), p. 41. These sites 
have Greek and Illyrian origins: Cape Ploča, Trogir, Resnik, Solin, Stobreč, Stari Grad, Lumbarda and Nakovana 
Cave. The nature of Adriatic trade will be discussed later in the thesis when considering the Illyrians and Adriatic 
piracy. 
174Wilkes, The Illyrians, p. 112. 
175The Corinthians established prominent colonies in the Southern Adriatic and Ionian seas at Corcyra, 
Epidmanus and Apollonia. 
176Wilkes, The Illyrians, p. 113. 
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Aegean for aid and assistance during the period being considered in this thesis.177 Cabanes 
notes of the psephisma that ‘it is remarkable to see how a colony turns to its distant metropolis, 
Paros, for aid and assistance, a fine illustration of the solid ties between the Greek cities and 
their colonial settlements in the Adriatic Sea.’178 
 Greek settlement in the Adriatic showed important discrepancy between the Northern 
Adriatic and the Southern and Central Adriatic. Wilkes notes that no Greek settlement is known 
to have been founded North of Epidamnus. North of the river Drin neither coast nor hinterland 
invited permanent settlement and, although Greeks undoubtedly lived and traded in several 
places, the three formally constituted colonies were all on islands, Black Corcyra, Issa and 
Pharos.179 In his study of the region of Dalmatia, Wilkes further observed important differences 
between the political structures of a variety of places. He notes that ‘in the southeast there is 
evidence for a more advanced political development, due largely to the closer contacts with 
Macedonia and Greece’ and that the only evidence of a political community in the Dalmatian 
region, that was ruled by the central authority of the king, could be observed in the Ardiaei.180 
He furthers this by noting that among the Liburnians in the Northern Adriatic, ‘tribal society 
lasted in places into the Roman period’ whilst ‘elsewhere the majority of the native population 
remained in a tribal society up to, and in many areas long after, the Roman conquest.’181 Roman 
interests in the various regions of the Adriatic were affected by the differing societies, cultures, 
political structures and trading networks that existed along the coastline. In the North, ‘the 
general security of Northern Italy before the Aquileian foundation (181 BC), seems to be of 
key strategic importance for the Romans’182 whilst ‘Roman initial trans-Adriatic engagement 
was focused chiefly on the south-eastern Adriatic coast’;183 in this area, Rome secured its 
initially diplomatic engagements and fostered burgeoning trade networks. This has led Dzino 
to consider Roman operations in the Adriatic through two operational zones; the southern zone 
comprising of ‘the southern Adriatic coast from the border of Epirus up to the border between 
the Delmatae and Liburni on the river Titius (Krka) with the immediate hinterland’; the 
northern zone was ‘initially limited to the Histrian territory, but later included the Liburni, 
 
177The dating, contents and importance of this psephisma shall be discussed later in the thesis. 
178P. Cabanes, ‘Greek Colonisation in the Adriatic’ in G.R. Tsetskhladze (ed.), Greek Colonisation: An account 
of Greek colonies and other settlements overseas: Volume II (Leiden, 2008), p. 183. 
179Wilkes, The Illyrians, p. 113. This can be most clearly seen on the map in the Appendix (Fig. 1). 
180Wilkes, History of the Provinces of the Roman Empire: Dalmatia, p. 188. 
181Ibid. p. 190. 
182Dzino, Illyricum in Roman Politics, pp. 58-9. 
183Ibid. p. 44. 
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Cisalpine Iapodes, Carni and Taurisci.’184 Although it is unclear whether or not the Romans 
themselves divided  the eastern Adriatic into zones in this manner, the division nevertheless 
reflects the development of Roman interventions during the period being considered in this 
thesis; Rome’s greater enthusiasm to intervene in the Southern Adriatic showing correlation 
with this division. 
 Furthermore, it is important to address the geopolitical status and relationship between 
Illyrian and Greek communities in the region. The emergence of a Greco-Illyrian culture in the 
sixth and fifth centuries BC has been the subject of debate amongst modern scholars. Mano-
Zissi and Parović-Pešikan have argued that a greater abundance of Greek style burial goods in 
the West and Central Balkans during this period reflected the development of a Greco-Illyrian 
culture through Illyrian craftsmen imitating Greek styles.185 Wilkes has exercised a greater 
degree of caution however, noting the ‘persistent conservatism of Illyrian burial traditions’ 
particularly regarding the contents of the tumuli burials of the Glasinac plateau.186 In addition 
to the Illyrian goods in these burials, there are examples of metal-ware and pottery of a high 
standard and jewellery in Greek styles. It remains uncertain whether these goods were designed 
by Illyrian craftsmen imitating Greek styles or whether they were imports from Greek 
craftsmen overseas. Wilkes has highlighted this speculation and noted that after the middle of 
the fifth century BC, Greek imports were absent from Illyrian tombs, bar a few exceptions, 
with a greater predominance of goods from Italy and the Adriatic after this point.187 This trend 
towards Italian and Adriatic goods for this period is reflected in the greater abundance of 
Gnathia style vases in the region for the later period (4th to 2nd Centuries BC), which shall be 
discussed later in the chapter. Although the existence of a coherent Greco-Illyrian culture is 
hard to discern, the greater conglomeration of goods in Greek and later Italian styles in these 
tombs suggests the greater contact and exchange between these peoples. 
 The importance of the growing trade networks in the region for the Adriatic Greeks is 
reflected in the written historical accounts for the initial Roman intervention east of the 
Adriatic. In the accounts of both Polybius and Appian, the initial Roman intervention in the 
 
184Ibid. p. 62. 
185D. Mano-Zissi, ‘Die Autochtone Bevölkerung West-und-Zentralbalkans und des südlichen 
Mitteldonaugebietes und ihre kulturelle Beziehungen zur griechischen Zivilisation’, Actes du VIIIe congrès 
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186Wilkes, The Illyrians, pp. 104-5. 
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region is framed around the need to come to the aid of Greeks in the region.188 Eckstein has 
stressed that the tradition of the Romans coming to the aid of the Issaeans is too propagandistic 
although the threat posed to the Adriatic Greeks by Illyrian pirates was significant. Eckstein 
notes that Illyrian piracy was having a ‘deleterious effect on the shipping lanes’ which was 
exacerbated by Illyrian geopolitical advances that gave them greater potential to conduct 
further raids.189 Marasco has argued that the ability for Illyrian pirates to convince the Greek 
inhabitants of Epidamnus to allow them into their settlement is not suggestive of tense relations 
between Illyrians and Greeks in the region.190 Marasco however stresses that after the fall of 
the Epirote monarchy, the Illyrian pirates had bases and greater resources at their disposal to 
conduct further raiding and this caused a dramatic escalation of tensions.191 The importance of 
these events in Roman decision making will be discussed later in the thesis. The concerns of 
the Adriatic Greeks, over the piratical threat to their established settlements and trade networks 
is evident. This emphasises the important developments in the region of Greek 
commercialisation and the significance that maritime trade had in the region for the Greeks. 
 
Maritime Trade and Economy 
 
As mentioned earlier, Greek contact, especially Corinthian influence, was particularly 
important in the southern Adriatic in preceding periods. Beaumont has highlighted the 
particular importance of Corinthian trading interests in the region, and that these were based 
largely on silver and luxuries.192 Royal has noted ‘a shift to more luxury and economic-based 
items in the fourth to third centuries B.C.E. is associated with significant numbers of Corinthian 
amphoras, fine wares, and occasional jewellery in burials at large cities such as Apollonia.’193 
Trade in luxuries however was not limited to trade with mainland Greece alone. The cosmetic 
jug displayed in Fig. 3. of the Appendix, was a 4th Century BC import to the Eastern Adriatic 
from Southern Italy. This might be suggestive of wider trading networks, although the quality 
rather than quantity of such pieces stands out. Munn asserts that the clustering of Corinthian 
 
188Polybius, Histories 2. 9 and 2. 5; Appian, Illyrian Wars 3. 2. 7. 
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transport amphorae in the region is indicative of ‘close commercial ties’ between Corinth, 
Southern Italy and Sicily but notes that there are few Italian or Sicilian imports in Corinth.194 
This would suggest that although trade was prevalent between Corinth and Magna Graecia, 
there was a greater market for Corinthian goods in these areas rather than vice versa. The 
greater prosperity of a trade in luxury goods nevertheless suggests a greater affluence for 
inhabitants in the Southern Adriatic, with fashionable Greek styles being traded between the 
Greek settlements in Magna Graecia and on the Adriatic coast. This suggests that Greek trade 
was well established and important in the southern Adriatic before the period being considered 
in this thesis. 
Marine archaeological findings in the area from the 3rd Century BC are few in number, 
but they enable some insight to be gained on the nature of Adriatic trade. As mentioned earlier, 
the Illyrian Coast Exploration Programme, which began in 2007 has conducted surveys off the 
coasts of Albania and Montenegro, gathering data for Southern Adriatic marine archaeology 
and their initial results have been recently published.195 The two shipwrecks that have been 
excavated from the 3rd Century BC are off the coast of Butrint in modern southern Albania.196 
The limited number and geographic location of these excavations has limited the potency of 
the inference that can be drawn from such findings. Butrint, located in the Northern Ionian Sea, 
south of the Otranto Straits, is not strictly in the Adriatic, although due to its close proximity 
to the Adriatic, transport in the area was likely to be entering or exiting the Adriatic Sea. The 
importance of Corcyra, located approximately 10km off the coast of Butrint, as a trading post 
for the Corinthians, is reflected in Thucydides, who notes that Corinthian vessels would put in 
at Corcyra on voyages north.197 Royal, in his analysis of the data, has however noted that ‘the 
number of wrecks in the Adriatic rose significantly after the Third Century B.C.E., to a peak 
spanning the Second Century B.C.E to the First Century C.E. – the pattern mirrored in the 
Mediterranean as a whole’.198 Although the number of 3rd Century BC excavations is limited, 
 
194M. L. Z. Munn, ‘Corinthian trade with the Punic West in the Classical Period’, Corinth Vol. 20 (2003), p. 
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195These have been published by the initiator of the programme: Royal, ‘Illyrian Coastal Exploration Program 
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during the course of the programme. This is included in the Appendix (Fig. 13). 
196These have been dated to the 3rd Century BC and 280-260 BC. Both shipwrecks contained cargoes of 
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Butrint on the Adriatic coast. 
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it is conducive with the Mediterranean as a whole and as such, the number of shipwrecks does 
not appear unusual. Royal furthers his analysis of this trend in the data, by stating that the 
results are ‘inconsistent with the hypothesis that the inflated numbers of sunken merchantmen 
in the Adriatic are due to heightened piracy in the Third Century B.C.E.’199 It is subsequently 
difficult to infer on the limited results with any degree of certainty. Although the correlation 
with results across the Mediterranean may indicate that trade was no more significantly 
disrupted than elsewhere, the limitations of the data render the findings inconclusive, especially 
to the effects of piracy. The Illyrian raiding tactics and their pirate vessels, with their cargo-
holds and without rams, were not indicative of a strategy to sink ships. There are also practical 
difficulties inherent in acquiring data for earlier shipwrecks which add to the limitations of the 
data, not least due to the greater age and possible deterioration of the underwater remains. 
 A much greater quantity of evidence can however be found from recorded data of the 
distribution of amphorae across the eastern Adriatic region. A particularly useful example of 
vessels to examine can be found in Gnathia ware, for which a plentiful number of examples 
have been discovered from the 3rd and 2nd Centuries BC. A recent publication by Miše has, for 
the first time, catalogued a large number of these Gnathia vases across the Adriatic and has 
provided great insight into their production and distribution.200 Although Gnathia ware 
originated in Southern Italy, Gnathia have been found at several locations in the Eastern 
Adriatic and a production centre at Issa has also been analysed.201 This makes Gnathia ware 
especially useful for documenting connections, contact and commerce between Southern Italy 
and the Eastern Adriatic. The publication has analysed data collected from tombs, burial sites, 
sanctuaries and settlements in Southern Italy and the East Adriatic coast.202 The amalgamation 
of this data enables a greater amount of inference to be drawn from the findings. The greatest 
number of examples that have been published for Gnathia ware have been found at Issa. Miše 
inferred from this, and the inclusion of Issa in the written historical sources for the period, that 
in the late 3rd and 2nd centuries BC, Issa was a ‘political and economic leader’ as a result of 
economic growth and ‘with the support of a rising Rome, since Issa became a Roman ally after 
the Illyrian War in 229 BC’.203 Although the evidence published so far has limitations, the 
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200Miše, Gnathia and Related Hellenistic Ware, pp. 65-155. 
201A tabulated version of the data collected by Miše can be seen in the Appendix (Fig. 5.). This provides the 
number of Gnathia that have been found at a plethora of published sites in the Eastern Adriatic. For more details 
on the production centre at Issa, see Miše, Gnathia and Related Hellenistic Ware, pp. 38-9 
202Miše, Gnathia and Related Hellenistic Ware. Miše breaks the data down into oinochoai, pelikai and skyphoi. 
203Miše, Gnathia and Related Hellenistic Ware, p. 62. 
Page 44 of 181 
 
importance of Issa is reflected from the 38 Gnathia sites excavated.204 The existence of a 
production centre for Issaean Gnathia moreover is suggestive that Issa was an important 
commercial centre. The distribution of Issaean produced Gnathia ware however is particularly 
limited, with no examples having been found in the Southern Adriatic. The sites where Issaean 
Gnathia have been found are Cape Ploča, Trogir, Resnik, Solin, Stobreč, Stari Grad, Lumbarda 
and Nakovana Cave;205 each of these sites is on the Dalmatian coast or surrounding islands and 
within 60km of Issa. Whilst Issa was an important commercial centre, its exports were limited 
to a small catchment area. This would suggest that the bulk of trade was still relatively 
localised, with the distribution of goods small and in areas both Greek and Illyrian. This also 
draws additional light on the Issaean appeals that appear in some of the written sources.206 
Appian in particular notes that Issa appealed to Rome when Agron threatened the rest of the 
Adriatic with his fleet; based on previous Ardiaei targets in the Southern Adriatic, this 
presumably would have been areas further north. If Issaean trade was regional and concentrated 
on the central Adriatic, the greater Ardiaean focus on areas further north in the Adriatic would 
have put greater pressure on Issaean regional trade. 
 The evidence nevertheless has limitations, especially in the geographic range of the 
vessels that have been found. Gnathia have been predominantly found in the Southern Adriatic, 
with some examples from the central Adriatic and Dalmatian coast. The evidence drew Miše 
to the conclusion that the Southern part of the Eastern Adriatic ‘indicated contact with Southern 
Italy and ‘western Greece…unlike the central and Northern Adriatic, where contacts with 
mainland Greece are scarce and are so far only documented in Pharos and Issa’.207 Further 
archaeological evidence for the central Adriatic has been undertaken at Kaštel on the Adriatic 
island of Lestovo.208 Amphorae have been found in two locations on the island, the first group 
dated from the Bronze Age to the Iron Age and found on the Kaštel hilltop, and the second 
dated from the early to late Hellenistic period and found on the south slope of the hill. 
Amphorae from the first group were of the Graeco-Italic type, consisting of Corinthian B and 
Lamboglia 2 vases; those from the second group included black gloss fragments, ‘reddish-clay’ 
vases, a few Gnathia fragments and sherds from Issaean jugs.209 Some correlation can be seen 
 
204See Appendix (Fig. 5.). 
205Miše, Gnathia and Related Hellenistic Ware, p. 41. 
206Appian, Illyrian Wars 3. 2. 7., Dio Cassius, Roman History 12. 49. 
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Page 45 of 181 
 
between the findings on Lestovo and those of the Southern Adriatic; Corinthian vases being 
prominent in the preceding period and Issaean pottery and Gnathia vases emerging in the 
Hellenistic period. Although there is a lack of evidence from the Northern Adriatic, Gnathia 
have proven informative about trade networks in the Central and Southern Adriatic; trade with 
Southern Italy being particularly important to a consideration of Illyrian piracy in the Third 
Century BC that will be covered in the next chapter. Gnathia were the first type of ware from 
Southern Italy to be widely distributed from its main area of production; the late Apulian red-
figure vases which influenced Gnathia were rarely exported outside of Apulia.210 Whilst 
evidence for trade between Southern Italy and the East Adriatic coast can be informative, the 
exporting of this type of ware was still in relative infancy during the 3rd Century BC. It is in 
this context of greater exporting from Southern Italy to the Eastern Adriatic coast in the 3rd 
Century BC that Illyrian piracy needs to be considered. The impact of piracy on these 
burgeoning trade networks would have been greater than in previous periods. 
The types of Gnathia that have been catalogued, oinochoai, pelikai and skyphoi are 
often used in the preservation and consumption of wine.211 Earlier Greek amphorae found in 
the region, predominantly Corinthian B and Lamboglia 2 vessels, are also indicative of a trade 
in perishable goods, particularly wine. Kay has noted that these vessels most likely carried 
wine, although olive oil is another possibility.212 Strabo notes that on both seaboards of the 
Adriatic, the olive and the vine flourished, although the Illyrians had not effectively taken 
advantage of it on account of ignorance and piracy; an absence of the vine in the mountainous 
and northern regions of Illyria is also noted.213 Although obviously an example of a pejorative 
stereotype against the Illyrian people, Strabo’s account stresses the importance of rich 
resources of olives and wine to both seaboards of the central and southern Adriatic. Wine 
consumption as a motif also features on bronze Greek coinage from a coin hoard on Pharos 
dated from the late 3rd Century and early 2nd Century BC.214 The feature of this motif on coinage 
may be suggestive of the importance of the industry to the local economy or culture. Kay has 
further highlighted the importance of the wine trade for the Adriatic and has suggested that a 
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212P. Kay, Rome’s Economic Revolution (Oxford, 2014), p. 142.  
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boom occurred in the export of Italian wine in the Adriatic in the Second and First centuries 
BC.215 This would suggest that the better securing of Southern Adriatic trade routes by the 
Roman Republic enabled an even greater export culture to flourish. The construction of the Via 
Egnatia by the end of the Second Century BC, connecting Dyrrachium to Byzantium would 
have enhanced trade routes across the Otranto Straits and the Balkan peninsula, suggesting a 
Roman desire to secure and enhance trade in the region. It is certainly not clear what sort of 
goods may have eventually been pirated in the Third Century BC, nor can the material evidence 
inform on such matters. Nevertheless, the evidence is suggestive that a promising trade in wine 
and the accoutrements of its consumption was present in the 3rd Century BC, accounting for a 
good portion of the cargo vessels that have been found. Subsequently, if the Illyrian pirates 
were seizing cargo, vessels used in the preservation and consumption of wine were an 
important component of the cargo that was extant during the period. 
Furthermore, additional material evidence to inform on the nature of Adriatic trade can 
be found by examining the distribution of Roman coinage in the Eastern Adriatic. This is most 
commonly examined by looking at Adriatic coin hoards. Derow has noted a Roman bronze 
coin hoard at Mazin, likely dated from the 1st Century BC, although he notes that the bronze 
coins were valued more for their metal content than the fact that they were Roman.216 Evidence 
of Adriatic bronze coinage is not solely evident for Roman coinage. Evans noted in his 
archaeological study of the region that the narrative of ‘the piratic and barbarous side of Illyrian 
life’ did not accurately reflect his findings. Evans instead suggested that ‘the indigenous 
coinage existing at Rhizon, Scodra, Lissos and the isle of Pharos, and even among the mainland 
tribe of the Daorsi, is itself a proof that more commercial interests were developing among the 
aborigines of the Adriatic coast’.217 Royal has asserted that ‘many Illyrian towns, such as 
Byllis, Scodra, and Amantia, began to issue bronze coins in the third century B.C.E., another 
indication of economic complexity.’218 This would suggest that the economic situation in the 
Adriatic did not change dramatically with the introduction of Roman coinage. Dzino has 
asserted that in contrast to the Northern Adriatic, evidence for coinage in the Southern Adriatic 
is more useful due to the greater number of Illyrian tribes who minted their own coins in the 
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area.219 Whilst this coinage is informative of the greater economic power of Southern Illyrian 
tribes, it cannot effectively inform on Adriatic trade. Crawford has stressed the limited use of 
coinage in informing on Adriatic trade based on the lack of strong evidence; 
 ‘Trade across the Adriatic between the mid-third century and the mid-first century was 
not conducted with coinage as an object of trade. On the other hand, there is a fair amount of 
evidence throughout this period for the movement of isolated pieces across the Adriatic, mostly 
pieces of low value; they cannot be regarded as in any sense objects of trade…the numismatic 
evidence is worth recalling, in order to set it beside the evidence of Polybius for trade across 
the Starits of Otranto, interference with which by Illyrian privateers was regarded by Polybius 
as provoking the Romans into fighting the First Illyrian War’.220 
 As such, the distribution of coinage does not present strong enough evidence to 
effectively inform on Adriatic trade. The variety of coin hoards across the Adriatic in the 3rd 
Century BC feature a variety of coinage from Greek, Roman and Illyrian sources, with the 
majority found in the Central and Southern Adriatic. The lack of Roman coinage during the 3rd 
Century BC across the Eastern Adriatic limits whatever inference can be drawn. Nevertheless, 
the predominance of coin hoards with Illyrian and Greek coinage in the Central and Southern 
Adriatic highlights the importance of commercial contacts in the region during the 3rd century 
BC. 
Illyria and Macedon 
 
Relations between Illyrians and the Kingdom of Macedon traditionally followed an 
inconsistent pattern, fluctuating between affability and hostility. This is reflected in the earliest 
reference to such relations in Thucydides' account of the Battle of Lyncestis in 423 BC. The 
account details the hiring of Illyrian mercenaries by the Macedonian king only for them in turn 
to betray the Macedonians and switch sides.221 The hiring of Illyrian mercenaries is well 
attested in antiquity, most particularly by Macedon. Eckstein describes their use as a 'strategic 
tool' for Macedonian rulers to employ and asserts that the Antigonids had long been in the habit 
of using Illyrians as mercenary troops before 231 BC.222 As mentioned earlier in the chapter, 
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economic opportunities for Illyrians through much of antiquity had been limited. In addition to 
the allure of piracy for economic gain on the coast, the trade of mercenary soldiery may have 
been an appealing job opportunity for Illyrians also. The use of Illyrian mercenaries by 
Macedon and the unstable nature of such relations continued into the period being considered 
in this thesis, with the association of Scerdilaidas with Macedon. Polybius asserts that 
Scerdilaidas was moved to betray Philip V over a lack of payment and subsequently made 
attacks on Macedonian territory.223 Illyrian and Macedonian alliances throughout antiquity 
were thus short lived and tended to be founded on financial rather than cultural, social or 
political reasoning. As a result, the alliances tended to be volatile; dependent on the financial 
agreement holding water and the absence of a higher bidder. Dzino notes that 'the rivalry of 
Macedonian and Illyrian kings made this alliance more frequently a theory rather than a 
practice and never a matter of serious trouble for the Romans'.224 Subsequently, any fear that 
the Romans may have had for traditional links between the two entities was balanced by the 
volatility of such links. Illyrian and Macedonian relations and potential allegiances or hostilities 
were dependent on their respective interests; interests that Rome could try and appeal to. 
 The existence of Illyrian and Macedonian relations during Rome’s initial interventions 
in the First and Second Illyrian Wars have caused some debate over their implications on 
Rome’s outlook. The evidence for these relations is particularly weak and any resulting 
allegiances forged were not directed against Rome. Illyrian involvement in the battles of 
Medion in 231 BC and Sellasia in 222 BC have drawn questions regarding the nature of 
associations between the Illyrian rulers and the Macedonian state. Polybius notes that Agron at 
Medion had been induced by a Macedonian bribe to fight the Aetolians as Demetrius II was 
preoccupied.225 In similar fashion to earlier allegiances, the key elements were a Macedonian 
payment for a mercenary force and a short-term alliance. Demetrius' role at Sellasia in 222 BC 
has received greater attention in the secondary literature, however. Wilkes asserts that an 
alliance of the Macedonians and Illyrians was revived at Sellasia, presumably also inferring 
that an alliance had existed at Medion.226 Coppola has furthered this by arguing that Polybius' 
use of the term σύμμαχος is demonstrative of a formal alliance existing between the two 
states.227 Walbank agrees that Demetrius had allied himself with Macedon, but he makes a clear 
distinction between the formal members of the Hellenic Alliance and those personally allied to 
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Antigonus as king, of which Demetrius should be included.228 The wording from Polybius’ 
passage is indeed indicative of an alliance between the two entities, but more needs to be said 
of the term συμμαχία. The term is used generally to refer to an alliance and its literal meaning 
of 'fighting together' provides a particular military context for the allegiance. Sholten in this 
regard has described the arrangement as a Macedonian and Illyrian 'ad hoc alliance'.229 The 
alliance itself was based on the personal allegiance of the two leaders and was forged out of a 
military need. As such, the alliance may well have been more of a temporary arrangement. 
Macedon at no point came to the aid of Demetrius during the Second Illyrian War, merely 
allowing him amnesty after his defeat. Eckstein adds to this by noting that the following year, 
Demetrius and Scerdilaidas raided Pylos, a Macedonian ally through its membership of the 
Achaean League.230 As such, early Illyrian and Macedonian alliances seem makeshift affairs, 
forged primarily for the requirements and purposes of military campaigns. Roman concerns for 
the potential emergence of such alliances was subsequently more prominent in the context of 
war; an issue that would become increasingly important with the greater Roman involvement 
in the eastern Adriatic in the 3rd Century BC. 
These concerns regarding the formation of a Macedonian and Illyrian alliance were 
most pronounced during the concurrent Roman campaigns against Perseus and Genthius. 
Polybius describes the allegiance as a friendship and alliance between the two states and notes 
that the agreement came into force on the payment of three hundred talents to Genthius and an 
exchange of hostages.231 Whilst the terminology used by Polybius is indicative of a more 
formal alliance, the importance in the agreement of a Macedonian payment to the Illyrian king 
is once more reflective of the importance of the short-term military context. Appian has 
however stressed Roman concerns over Perseus' strong position and the further reinforcement 
of his position through alliances.232 Derow has pointed to the potential serious threat that 
Genthius may have posed the Romans, albeit one which never materialised.233 By hyping up 
the threat posed by the alliance of Perseus and Genthius, Appian is able to place the Romans 
in greater peril and in doing so further stress Rome's great success in the campaign in defeating 
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both rulers. Once more the lack of a Macedonian payment to their Illyrian ally caused 
considerable tension in the allegiance between the two rulers.234 This again demonstrates the 
important threads which held such alliances together. During the prelude to the conflict, Rome 
had sought on multiple occasions to consolidate their pre-existing relations with Genthius.235 
Genthius was playing his cards close to his chest, hoping to secure a preferable arrangement 
for himself. The Romans were perhaps acutely aware of this, and the importance of their 
diplomatic ties in the region, in their intervention in the Third Illyrian War. 
The growing involvement of Rome in Illyrian affairs increased the geopolitical 
importance of the Romans to the Illyrians. In this context, Illyria operated as a geopolitically 
inferior or weaker entity in the process of diplomacy with Rome. Eckstein, in applying Realist 
international relations theory, has stressed that ‘weaker states had been seeking the protection 
of stronger states against dangerous local threats for centuries in the Greek world – and for that 
matter, in the Western Mediterranean as well’.236 In the anarchic system in place before the 
establishment of Roman hegemony, weaker entities such as Illyria would act out of self-
maximisation, seeking the protection of stronger neighbours due to security concerns. In this 
regard, Illyrian leaders were more inclined to seek the protection of Rome, whose geopolitical 
status was on the rise. Eckstein however proceeds to question why the weaker states he 
examined, namely Rhodes, Pergamon, Egypt and Athens sought accommodation with Rome 
rather than the Macedonians or Seleucids.237 The situation in Illyria however worked 
differently, with Illyrian leaders caught between Rome and Macedon for their support. In this 
environment, Illyrian rulers could effectively bargain for the best deal possible with either rival 
stronger entity. Wilkes has stressed that ‘for around 20 years (after 189 BC), a king of Illyria 
(Pleuratus) profited from the hostility between Rome and Macedonia, but matters were to turn 
out very differently for his successor’.238 Although Genthius and Pleuratus employed different 
strategies in dealing with the Romans during this period, the growing importance of their 
dealings with Rome reflected the increasing geopolitical importance of Rome to Illyria. As 
shall be discussed later in the thesis, the establishment of Roman hegemony in the region 
ensured that Illyrian geopolitics were centred around Rome, whose status in the region 
challenged and eventually superseded tribal geopolitical structures and Macedonian influences. 
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Illyrian Kings 
Pre-Roman Illyria was a region known for its kings and the Greek sources often refer 
to the existence of a ‘king of the Illyrians’. Hammond in his work on the Illyrian kingdoms in 
the pre-Roman period, stressed that ‘when a Greek author described a man as ‘king of the 
Illyrians’ or as ‘king of Illyrians’, he was using the word ‘Illyrians’ in a general sense to indicate 
that he ruled over some Illyrian tribes, and not in a specific sense to indicate that he ruled over 
one particular tribe called Illyrian’.239 At various times in history, some of these tribal 
kingdoms rose to pre-eminence and acquired the label amongst our sources.240 The kings 
referred to by the title are more plentiful in the ancient historical sources for the period being 
considered in this thesis, rather than preceding periods. This may be due to the greater historical 
coverage of the Illyrians during this period, or it could be due to the greater power exercised 
by Agron from his predecessors. Polybius notes that Agron possessed a greater land and 
maritime power than any previous Illyrian king.241 In either case, the prominence of the kings 
of the period being considered in this thesis is noteworthy, especially in relation to previous 
periods where few examples emerge of especially powerful and significant kings. 
 For later rulers during the period covered in the thesis, the terminology used to describe 
their status is more complex. The most references to the aforementioned titles of ‘King of 
Illyria’ or ‘King of the Illyrians’ are afforded to Genthius, although modern scholars are still 
uncertain if Genthius was a king of the Ardiaei or the Labeatae. Dzino has noted that the ‘rise 
of Scerdilaidas was at the same time a period of transition of power from the Ardiaei to the 
Labeatae.’242 Gruen, on the other hand, asserts that Pleuratus ruled the Ardiaei and his 
successor was Genthius.243 Although the line of succession is uncertain, it is possible that 
Scerdilaidas, Agron’s brother, was ruler of the Labeatae in 205 BC whilst Pleuratus, his son, 
ruled the Ardiaei; on the death of the former, his son Pleuratus gaining control of both tribal 
groups. The status of Demetrius of Pharos after being established in his position by the Romans 
in the aftermath of the First Illyrian War has also caused debate in the scholarship. Appian 
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describes Demetrius as Agron’s leader in Pharos; Demetrius was given Corcyra also.244 
Polybius, by contrast, affords Demetrius no royal title, merely distinguishing him by his 
location.245 It is perhaps unsurprising that Polybius afford Demetrius with no royal title, given 
the hostility Polybius shows towards him in his account.246 Dio asserts that Demetrius had 
become the de-facto regent of the Ardiaei on account of the infant Pinnes, through his marriage 
to the boy’s mother, Triteuta.247 With such discrepancy amongst the sources, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that modern scholars have preferred to use a more generic term to describe 
Demetrius’ status. Dzino, Dell and Gruen have all chosen to use the term ‘dynast’ to refer to 
Demetrius.248 Whilst this more generic title is largely appropriate, it nevertheless carries certain 
assumptions. Dell notes that a dynast had certain expectations amongst his people to engage in 
warfare (especially raiding as an Illyrian dynast), and the term ‘dynast’ often implies 
membership of a ‘dynasty’.249 As such, the generic term ‘ruler’ is perhaps more appropriate for 
Demetrius of Pharos, who was appointed by the Romans to his status (his status on Pharos 
under Agron, as ‘leader’, is more difficult to define), rather than inheriting it as part of a 
dynasty. 
An important  source of evidence for Illyrian kings has been coinage, although a lack 
of examples for Illyrian kings during the period has limited the inference that can be drawn 
from the evidence. The only examples of coins minted by an Illyrian king for the period being 
considered in this thesis are for Genthius. Wilkes has noted that among the 131 tombs of a late 
third and early second centuries BC cemetery of Gostilj, several coins issued during the reign 
of Genthius and after his deposition were found.250 Genthius’ coinage has featured in a number 
of archaeological findings from Scodra; the coins depicting him in profile with a καυσία 
(obverse) and usually a light Illyrian vessel (most probably a λέμβος (reverse)).251 Šašel Kos 
has noted that the vessel on the reverse of the coin could be indicative of a strong maritime 
power.252 This is certainly possible, although a maritime motif was a common feature on 
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Illyrian coinage. The καυσία was a well-known Macedonian fishing hat, but it also had 
connotations by this time with the Illyrians. An Illyrian stereotype is presented in Plautus’ early 
2nd Century BC comedy Trinummus, where a swindler enters the stage complete with an 
enormous καυσία; Charmides comments on his appearance noting that he has the look and 
countenance of an Illyrian and that his head appears like a giant mushroom on account of the 
enormity of the brimmed hat.253 Dzino notes that the ‘Illyrian look’ referred to by Plautus 
would have been well known to the audience.254 It is thus likely that the look was synonymous 
with Illyrians as well as Macedonians by the time Genthius inherited the throne. Genthius’ 
political status in Illyria however has come into question regarding the possible centralisation 
of his kingdom. Dzino has suggested that Genthius’ coinage may be indicative of a desire to 
introduce a greater centralisation to his kingdom ‘following after the model of a Macedonian 
kingdom.’255 With the availability of coinage available, this is entirely possible; minting coins 
on this scale would be indicative of a stronger centralised government. Any link made however 
between Genthius’ style of kingship and that of Macedon is more tenuous. 
The notion of Genthius’ centralisation of the Illyrian government has however raised 
debate in the literature. Livy asserts that Genthius was organising marauders to conduct 
Adriatic piracy and that Issaean envoys had come before the Senate to plead their case against 
Genthius.256 Gruen stresses that it cannot be determined how veracious the account is, or how 
much Rome believed it, but highlights the target of piracy being Istria.257 By contrast,  Šašel 
Kos has stressed that Genthius wasn’t able to control his subjects, but asserts that it is 
impossible to conclude whether or not the Issaean allegations were false.258 Polybius asserts 
that upon Genthius’ ascension, the Dalmatians broke away from Genthius’ rule, albeit at a 
nondescript time. The context that this passage appears in Polybius is to events in 158 BC 
referring back to the reign of Genthius and subsequently it cannot be accurately determined 
when the action took place. It would nevertheless indicate a lack of central authority from 
Genthius, and this may explain his desire to centralise the government of his kingdom. Dzino 
notes that the Issaeans may have been lobbying at Rome against Genthius, on account of their 
hostilities with him.259 Once more this may well be true; the potency of envoys and their 
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complaints was noted in the Second Century BC, especially in their conflicts with Macedon. 
The suggestion of a link between Genthius and Perseus in this context may have given more 
credence for Rome of their cause. Whether or not the greater centralisation of Genthius’ 
government can be determined from the written accounts or extant coinage is difficult to 
ascertain. The minting of coins nevertheless reflects operations on a grand scale, and with a 
lack of extant examples of coinage from earlier kings in the period, it is indicative of the greater 
scale of operations being conducted by Genthius during his reign. 
The rise of the Ardiaei 
 
 It is important to also consider at this stage the importance of the emergence of the 
Ardiaean kingdom to the geopolitical landscape during the period being considered in this 
thesis and the implications of this on the subsequent Roman interventions. The importance of 
the emergence of the Ardiaei was first attested by Polybius, who noted that Agron had at his 
disposal, a greater land and maritime power than any previous Illyrian ruler.260 This power 
became manifest by the Illyrian victory over the Aetolian League in 231 BC.261 Wilkes has 
highlighted the importance of this victory over a famed league of Greek city states, asserting 
that it ‘caused a sensation in Greece’.262 Eckstein however has noted that ‘this fit a pattern 
going back 150 years: whenever Greek states on the Illyrians’ frontiers were beset with military 
and/or political weakness, the result was Illyrian expansion’.263 Hammond documents some of 
these occurrences, including Bardylis in the 4th Century BC taking advantage of Macedonian 
and Epirotic weaknesses, and Glaukias taking advantage of Molossian weaknesses in the early 
3rd Century BC.264 Polybius’ statement, especially in regard to the land forces of the 
aforementioned kings alluded to by Hammond, appears hyperbolic. This may be due to the 
Aetolian bias in Polybius’ account. Walbank notes that Polybius’ source for this section is 
predominantly Greek and the ‘narrative is strongly prejudiced against Aetolia’.265 The original 
Greek source material would likely over-estimate the impact of the Ardiaean emergence on 
account of the shock it caused in Greece and Polybius would have likely relished the 
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opportunity to highlight this downturn in Aetolian fortunes. Beaumont has however argued that 
the statement by Polybius is unequivocal and indicates that Agron was the first ruler on the 
eastern Adriatic coast to have an organised maritime power.266 Although the growth of an 
Illyrian power along the coast had some historical precursors, what was particularly important 
to Ardiaean power that set the kingdom apart, was their coastal position on the Adriatic and 
their ability to take advantage of that element. Dell has described this change as ‘a 
transformation of Illyrian piracy from disorganised sorties aimed at procuring foodstuffs to 
something like large scale raids and incipient imperialism’.267 The Ardiaean pirates were 
operating on a scale not previously seen. As shall be further discussed in the next chapter, 
instances of piracy from the evidence prior to 231 BC were sporadic, and poorly documented 
at best, whilst the Ardiaean raids were conducted on a greater scale. 
 Moreover, the emergence of the Ardiaean power in the eastern Adriatic should be seen 
in relation to the concurrent collapse of the Epirote monarchy. The capture of Phoenice, a key 
settlement in the newly formed Epirote League, encouraged greater Ardiaean activity in the 
region.268 Having taken Phoenice, the Illyrians targeted Epidamnus, Apollonia and Corcyra in 
the Ionian Gulf.269 These targets have particular strategic importance for the Southern Adriatic; 
control over these sites gave the Illyrians a strong power base North and South of the Otranto 
Straits. Moreover, these cities, as discussed earlier, were sites of prosperous trade and were 
vulnerable with the decline in Epirote power; an all too appealing target for Illyrian raiding. 
The collapse of the Epirote monarchy created a power vacuum in the region, which the Illyrians 
sought to take advantage of. Eckstein has asserted that this constituted an ‘Illyrian geopolitical 
expansion’.270 The collapse of the hegemonic in the region of Epirus, the Epirote monarchy 
created a geopolitical imbalance; this imbalance created an opportunity for the Ardiaei to 
undertake this geopolitical expansion. 
 
Subsequent diplomatic relations between the Illyrians and the Epirotes need to be 
considered however, the implications of these has raised debate amongst modern scholars. 
Gruen has argued that these relations took the form of a ‘diplomatic revolution’ as the pirate-
 
266Beaumont, ‘Greek Influence in the Adriatic Sea before the Fourth Century BC’, p. 161. 
267Dell, ‘The Origin and Nature of Illyrian Piracy’, pp. 358. 
268Polybius, Histories 2. 5., Appian, Illyrian Wars 3. 2. 7. Appian notes that the Ardiaei captured a part of 
Epirus, which one can assume refers to Phoenice. 
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raiding Ardiaei transitioned from ‘buccaneers to respectable imperialists’.271 This can be seen 
in the sources which indicate a shift from raiding to more conventional forms of warfare in 
naval battles and sieges.272 Gruen however furthers this by arguing that the Ardiaei in 229 BC 
were drawn by the prospect of a renewed invasion of Greece and were ‘intent on becoming a 
major power in Hellas’.273 Gruen perhaps overstates the importance of Greek conquest for the 
Ardiaei. The passage of Polybius is particularly untrustworthy; Walbank notes that it is largely 
an annalistic version of events and the interview later in the passage bears strong hallmarks of 
Rome ‘fighting to avenge an outrage’.274 By elevating the importance of Greek conquest for 
the Ardiaei, the annalistic tradition could present Greece as greatly imperilled by the Illyrians 
and in need of an avenging force to protect them. The most direct and potent Ardiaean threats 
to Greece were conducting a year earlier, with raids as far south as the southern Peloponnese.275 
Teuta, in Polybius’ account becomes more determined to harm the Greeks upon seeing the rich 
spoils taken from the Ardiaean capture of Phoenice.276 The immediate subsequent actions of 
Ardiaean pirates however, in attacking Italian traders is suggestive of broader Ardiaean goals 
than those exclusively set on Greece. 
 
Roman Activity in the Adriatic 
 
In examining the initial Roman interventions in Illyria, it is important to posit these in 
the wider context of Roman activity in the Adriatic during the Third Century BC. In the 
aftermath of the Pyrrhic War, the Romans sought to consolidate their position over Magna 
Graecia, and, in particular, Southern Italy. It is important to consider the implications of the 
foundation of a Latin colony at Brundisium in 244 BC. Eckstein has noted that the foundation 
of the colony was indicative of ‘senatorial concern about the raiders in the Straits of Otranto’ 
rather than concerns over the emergence of a powerful Ardiaean state.277 Eckstein is correct to 
dismiss the credibility of Roman concerns over the Ardiaean state, but more needs to be stated 
regarding the aforementioned escalation of Ardiaean activity in the aftermath of the foundation 
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of the colony rather than the preceding period. The importance of Brundisium as the major 
Roman port of embarkation to the East is well attested in antiquity, but specific mention should 
be made here of its immediate importance to the Roman interventions under consideration. 
Cassius Dio makes specific mention of Brundisium as the port from which the maltreated 
Italian traders sailed and Polybius notes that troops sent across in the consequent campaign 
sailed from Brundisium.278 Harris however has stressed that the foundation of the Roman 
colony was demonstrative of Rome's growing ambition over Italy's south eastern coastal waters 
whilst Fronda has maintained that the measure was primarily taken to better secure Roman 
control over Magna Graecia.279 The location of Brundisium's port overlooking the Otranto 
Strait, gave Brundisium strategic positioning for a short Adriatic crossing and it also served to 
improve trade links with the Southern Adriatic. As has been discussed, trade in the Southern 
Adriatic was diverse and prosperous and the foundation of Brundisium could be indicative of 
a greater Roman desire to become involved in this trade. The impact of attacks on Italian traders 
in the Southern Adriatic would have been exacerbated by the foundation of the Latin colony 
and the extension of the Appian Way. Brundisium offered a strong natural harbour that would 
have encouraged trade across the Adriatic and through the strengthened link to Rome and 
Campania provided by the Appian Way, reverberations in trade disruption could have extended 
beyond the vicinity of South Eastern Italy.  
Rome’s primary concern in the Northern Adriatic in the 230s and 220s BC, on the other 
hand, was in dealing with the tribes of Cisalpine Gaul and in settling the ager Gallicus.280 The 
written historical accounts for these events are particularly dramatic. Polybius, in discussing 
the gathering together of Gallic forces in 231 BC describes a great anxiety in Rome and harkens 
back to the events of 390 BC and the Gallic sack of Rome.281 Plutarch presents an even more 
dramatic scene in his Life of Marcellus, where Roman panic is such that two Greeks and two 
Gauls are buried alive and mysterious and secret ceremonies continue in Plutarch’s day in 
memory of these victims.282 Whether or not the panic in Rome reached such a level is dubious, 
especially considering that a Gallic invasion did not materialised until the 220s. Nevertheless, 
the idea of a large Gallic army invading Italy may well have conjured up the evocative sack of 
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Rome in 390 BC. The scene presented in Plutarch is reminiscent of an episode in Livy, 
recalling the burying alive of two unchaste vestal virgins during the Second Punic War as a 
means of purifying the city and restoring confidence amongst the public after the disastrous 
defeat at Cannae.283 Although it is difficult to determine the veracity of such events, the 
dramatic tone is utilised to hyperbolically present the panic and anxiety that such events may 
have caused for the Roman population. Rankin notes that in the campaign against the Gauls, 
‘the fighting was savage, and, from a Roman point of view, the outcome cannot have seemed 
certain".284 The mustering of a large army to deal with the Gallic threat is indicative of the 
primacy of this concern for the Romans.285 This in turn raises questions about the sending of a 
large army, in such a context, across the Adriatic to deal with the Illyrians. Polybius’ account 
features an immediate jump between the events of 231 BC (2.22) and 225 BC (2.23). The 
urgent enrolling of legions on both occasions would suggest that the initial army that was 
enrolled was disbanded sometime in the interim 6 years.286 Although an uncertainty over when 
the Gauls may have attacked must have persisted, the gap of six years would have presented 
an opportunity for Rome to send a large army across the Adriatic. This would have been 
particularly apparent with the large number of troops already enrolled in Italy in preparation 
for a potential campaign against the Gauls. 
 Rome’s settling of the ager Gallicus was a more proactive geopolitical step undertaken 
by the Roman Republic but was carried out for a variety of reasons other than purely out of a 
desire to exert greater control over the Northern Adriatic. Feig Vishnia has argued that the 
settlers of the ager Gallicus may have been those attacked by the Illyrian pirates in the build-
up to the First Illyrian War. Feig Vishnia asserts that maritime transportation was the most 
preferable means of transporting the persons and cargo to the area, with Arminium and 
Brundisium suggested as possible harbours for the execution of the operation; the cargo and 
persons themselves being particularly tempting to Illyrian pirates.287 Although maritime 
transport would have potentially been easier, the location of Brundisium in Southern Italy 
ensured that it was counter intuitive to settling Roman citizens in the North. The tendency for 
ships to traverse the eastern seaboard of the Adriatic presents further difficulties in this 
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analysis.288 The lex Flaminia was highly controversial at the time; the passage of the law has 
been seen as an early example of land reform and Polybius blamed Flaminius for instigating 
the conflict with the Gauls.289 Walbank has noted that the hostility in the account towards 
Flaminius is exaggerated and ‘seems to reflect the hostility of his (Flaminius’) senatorial 
opponents transmitted through Fabius Pictor’.290 The action of settling the ager Gallicus 
through the lex Flaminia was a means by which Rome could extend its geopolitical control  
over the Northern Adriatic. Walbank has stated that ‘certainly Flaminius is subsequently 
associated with a policy of expansion of Northern Italy.’291 Although a proactive step, Roman 
motivation was not directed at gaining greater naval control over the Northern Adriatic, but 
was motivated by the internal politics of land reform and to gain greater control over Northern 
Italy. 
 It is furthermore important to consider the contextual importance of the Roman 
campaigns against the Histrians in the 3rd and 2nd Centuries BC as they relate to this extension 
of Roman geopolitical expansion. As mentioned earlier, Dzino divides the Roman operations 
into two sectors, the Northern Adriatic and the Southern Adriatic, with Histria being an area 
located in the former.292 The campaign, as such, has been observed in the context of the Roman 
campaigns in Northern Italy. Sampson has recently suggested that the Histrian campaign 
provided an important bridge between the two theatres for the Romans with Istria serving as 
an important area to secure for wider Adriatic security concerns.293 Evidence for the Roman 
campaign against the Histrians, however, is limited and not particularly informative. Dio makes 
a brief reference to a campaign of subjugation in the region whilst Eutropius has provided a 
justification for the war in Histrian piracy directed against Roman grain ships.294 Harris has 
noted the similarities between Eutropius' cause of the war and the origins of the First Illyrian 
War although he notes that the aggression shown by Rome in the Histrian campaign is more 
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striking.295 Given the lack of evidence of the campaign in other sources, Eutropius is perhaps 
attempting to link the two events to further the issue of Adriatic piracy. Nevertheless, a desire 
to better secure Adriatic shipping appears to be evident once again suggesting the issue's 
importance to the Roman Republic during the period. The effect of Histrian piracy on the trade 
of grain in the Northern Adriatic is hard to effectively ascertain. Dell has asserted that the grain 
ships must have been moving North from Italy to support the Roman armies in Cisalpine Gaul 
and that the ships may have moved towards the eastern Adriatic shore for greater safety.296 
Although the direction of travel is impossible to determine, this would be in line with the 
traditional routes of travel mentioned earlier. Dell goes on to argue that the Roman grain ships 
would have amounted to an ‘extremely valuable haul’ to would-be pirates.297 Rather than being 
indicative of the grain trade in the Northern Adriatic, the piracy was targeted more directly 
towards the functioning of the Roman army. This would have inspired a strong-armed response 
from the Roman Republic. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Illyrian geopolitical landscape prior to the Roman interventions was complex and 
consisted of a series of disparate communities, cultures and political entities. This geopolitical 
incoherence derived in part from the physical geography and topography of the region, which 
shaped the political, economic and cultural outlooks of the various Illyrian tribes. As Dzino has 
noted, ‘politically the organisation of those indigenous groups (…) was deeply rooted in its 
kinship structure, rather than in the development of more sophisticated institutions of the polis 
or kingdom’.298 Greater diversity existed regarding the economic and cultural outlooks of the 
disparate Illyrian tribes. This diversity had a geographic distinction between the Northern and 
Southern Adriatic. Contact between Illyrian communities in the Southern Adriatic and Greek 
traders and settlers enabled a greater permeation of Hellenistic ideas, culture and goods into 
the local Illyrian communities. By contrast, the lack of Greek contact with the Northern interior 
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ensured that  these communities remained more closely associated with the land rather than the 
sea, with Celtic influences rather than Hellenistic influences predominating. Wilkes has 
asserted that ‘apart from the larger islands of the central coast, Dalmatia offered little 
inducement to Greek traders and settlers.’299 Although evidence for trade conducted between 
Greeks and Illyrians is limited, it is perhaps unsurprising that the extant evidence for trade is 
overwhelmingly documented in the Southern and Central Adriatic. 
 This division had important implications for Rome’s subsequent interventions in Illyria. 
Initial Roman interest and concerns were predominantly centred on the Southern Adriatic, 
particularly relating to the most extensive trade routes and shortest crossing point of the 
Adriatic of the Otranto Straits. Roman activity in the Northern Adriatic at the onset of the 
period being considered in this thesis was centred on security issues relating to Northern Italy. 
The subsequent impact of Adriatic piracy on the trade being conducted across the Southern 
Adriatic had an important bearing on Rome’s initial decision to intervene in Illyria. As Eckstein 
has noted, the Romans acted ‘in response to serious complaints from victims of the greatly 
intensifying Illyrian expansion’ which occurred as a ‘result both of the energy of King Agron 
and (importantly) the collapse of Epirus.’300 The geopolitical expansion of first the Illyrian 
kingdom, and then the Romans in the region served to provide a greater geopolitical coherence 
as the existence of more defined hegemonic entities in the region changed the nature of Illyrian 
geopolitical relations. As Dzino asserts, ‘the process of Mediterranean ‘globalisation’ and 
Roman expansion affected the creation of indigenous political structures (…) rather than being 
long-term socio-political entities, most of the groups of Illyricum might be an indigenous 
response to Roman expansion’.301 The eventual emergence of a Roman hegemony over Illyria 
ensured that Illyrian geopolitics was centred around Rome, which replaced the traditional tribal 
geopolitical and overarching Macedonian geopolitical structures. 
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Chapter 3 – The First Illyrian War 
 
Introduction 
 
  The First Illyrian War marked the first instance of Roman intervention east of the 
Adriatic. The events of the Roman intervention and the surrounding issues related to the Roman 
decision-making process have subsequently featured prominently in the coverage of these 
events in the primary and secondary literature. For Polybius and later authors influenced by his 
work, the remarkable nature of Roman imperial expansion needed explanation. As mentioned 
previously in the thesis, the Roman intervention in the First Illyrian War served as an important 
set-piece in the Histories of Polybius in explaining the rise of Rome and the greater 
‘interconnectedness’ of Greek and Roman affairs.302 Walbank has asserted that ‘clearly 
Polybius attached great importance to the idea of συμπλοκή’, ‘interconnectedness’ and used the 
First Illyrian War as an important precursor to this development.303 The pretexts provided in 
the ancient historical accounts for Rome’s intervention have, however, proven problematic and 
raised considerable discussion and debate amongst modern scholars. This chapter shall analyse 
and evaluate the Roman decision to intervene in the First Illyrian War and carefully critique 
the pretexts provided in the ancient historical accounts. This in turn will raise issues pertaining 
to the Roman justification and capacity for war which shall be examined to provide a fuller 
consideration of the decision-making process behind the Roman interventions in Illyria. 
Debate in the modern scholarship on the Roman decision to intervene has subsequently 
centred on the validity of the pretexts provided by the ancient sources and overarching notions 
of Roman imperialism. The ancient pretexts for the conflict centre around the murder of a 
Roman ambassador as a result of a failed Roman embassy sent to the Ardiaean Queen Teuta.304 
Modern scholars have sought to attribute additional motivation behind the Roman intervention 
to further explain the Roman decision to intervene. Eckstein has considered the Roman 
intervention a ‘response to the violence on the Adriatic coast, unusual not in its character but 
in its scale’.305 Harris, on the other hand, has asserted that ‘Rome took almost the first 
opportunity to intervene there (in Illyria) once the acquisitions of the First Punic War had been 
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put in order’.306 These additional motivations behind Rome’s decision to intervene were based 
on important contextual phenomena in which the intervention took place. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Roman interest in the Southern Adriatic was sparked by the escalation of 
Ardiaean aggression and, as a result of geopolitical actions taken by Rome in the Adriatic, the 
Romans were better positioned to launch a campaign in Illyria. These contextual issues will be 
considered in this chapter to provide a broad consideration of the underlying motivations of the 
Romans in their intervention. The pretext provided by the ancient sources, the murder of a 
Roman ambassador, definitively prompted the Romans to act, and served to shape the nature 
and scope of Rome’s subsequent initial intervention east of the Adriatic. 
 
The Construct of Illyrian Piracy 
 
Piracy, together with the associated practices of banditry, raiding and plundering have 
long traditions in the surviving historical record from antiquity. This subsection shall consider 
the construct of Illyrian piracy and determine the validity of the association of the Illyrians with 
the practice. Once established, the escalation of Ardiaean piracy at the outset of the period 
being considered in this thesis can be placed into proper context. The Adriatic, and the ancient 
Illyrians more particularly, have had a prominent association with the practice of piracy.307 
Strabo, in his geographic study of the region, saw it necessary to comment on the perceived 
savage behaviour of the inhabitants of the eastern Adriatic seaboard, and the piratical habits of 
the Ardiaei in particular.308 For modern scholars, the association was most directly asserted by 
Holleaux, who described piracy as a ‘profitable career that had been assiduously followed by 
the inhabitants of the eastern shore’ of the Adriatic’.309 This perspective has since been 
challenged, most notably by Wilkes and Dell, who have cited a lack of concrete evidence for 
long-term associations between the Illyrians and piracy.310 In 1967, Dell indeed asserted that 
the Illyrians had not been ‘historically the scourge of the Adriatic’ but rather underwent a 
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‘sudden transformation’ to become a more potent maritime power and greater threat in the 
region.311 The paucity of evidence for Illyrian piracy before the emergence of the maritime 
power of the Ardiaei in 231 BC demonstrates the important role played by the Ardiaei in 
shaping the association of the Illyrians with piracy. This important shift shall be examined in 
the next subsection to ascertain its particular importance in Rome’s decision to intervene. 
Gathering evidence for ancient Illyrian piracy has proven difficult due to the limited 
quantity of material available and the problematic nature of many of the sources . As De Souza 
notes, ‘all evidence of piracy in the Graeco-Roman world is textual. Piracy is not a phenomenon 
which can be documented from the material remains of classical civilizations’.312 The act of 
piracy is predominantly treated in the Graeco-Roman sources in a pejorative manner; the label 
itself is applied to ‘piracy’ and ‘pirates’ by others, rather than being self-declared by the 
‘pirates’ themselves. Polybius indeed asserts that the Illyrian piratical menace in the Third 
Century BC served as ‘an enemy to all mankind’, a notion that may have resonated with both 
his Greek and Roman audiences alike.313 Later authors in antiquity developed the Illyrian 
inclination to piracy as a useful means to explain and justify the Roman interventions and 
further stereotype the Illyrian ‘other’ in a derogative manner.314 Wilkes notes that ‘the 
stereotype of the Illyrian pirate became widespread in the Greek and Roman world and 
acquired a notoriety that far exceeded any actual misdeeds’.315 This has raised particular 
problems in assessing the presentation of Illyrian piracy in the extant sources for Rome’s initial 
intervention. These sources emphasised any Illyrian piratical activity as a means to better 
justify the Roman intervention in the First Illyrian War. 
A variety of terms in modern and ancient contexts have been utilised to describe the 
activity of piracy, associated practices and those practicing them. Piracy, in this context and in 
its modern usage, refers exclusively to armed robbery at sea rather than on land. The most 
commonly used ancient terms to denote the practice however do not explicitly distinguish 
between raiding or plundering on land or at sea. The commonly utilised ancient Greek terms 
for a pirate are λῃστής and πειρατής, the latter being a later arrival in the ancient Greek 
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lexicon.316 The term λῃστής is used by earlier authors such as Homer, Herodotus and 
Thucydides317 whilst the earliest attested usage of the term πειρατής is from a mid-third century 
BC Attic inscription from Rhamnous during the Chremonidean War.318 This would suggest 
that the choice of terms owes much to the convention of the time of authorship, although the 
choice may also be inspired by the discrepancy in the etymology of the two terms at the 
discretion of the author. Strabo uses derivatives of both terms as part of his Geographica in 
reference to different pirates. A derivative of the term λῃστής is utilised by Strabo in his 
description of the Ardiaei whilst he chooses to use a derivative of πειρατής to describe the 
piracy undertaken by the Cilicians;319 the distinction may be utilised to reflect the earlier time 
in which Ardiaean piracy took place.320 Strabo’s choice of term in the case of the Ardiaei may 
also be to apply greater emphasis. Considering the etymology of the term, deriving from ληίς 
(booty/plunder), it is possible that Strabo has sought to add greater emphasis to the plundering 
aspect of their activities. The seizure of plunder by the Ardiaei is a feature in the historical 
accounts, and the nature of the goods seized shall be discussed later in this subsection.321 
Polybius also utilises the two terms, predominantly using πειρατής and its derivatives 
in conjunction with a verb to greater clarify the nature of the activity. In describing the activity 
of the Illyrian pirates in the origins of the First Illyrian War, Polybius uses the verb ἐσύλησαν, 
to describe their carrying off, or seizure of, goods from Italian traders.322 The verb also appears 
in Homer’s Iliad in the context of seizing or stripping away of the spoils of war.323 In the first 
of these instances, the activity occurs as part of wider espionage and raiding; the book ending 
with the need for Diomedes and Odysseus to ritually cleanse themselves from the dirty work 
they had to carry out. Plundering was considered differently in the context of war, in the form 
of the earning of spoils, as opposed to other contexts such as piracy. Polybius’ usage of the 
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verb to describe Illyrian pirate activity may, once again, be to emphasise the nature of their 
plundering and the importance of the seizure of goods from the Italian traders; activity which 
was considered less honourable than more conventional forms of warfare. The need, however, 
for Polybius to further describe the activities of the Illyrian pirates through his choice of verb 
suggests that the term used to describe the pirates themselves does not adequately convey their 
actions. With no clear indication provided by the two terms πειρατής and λῃστής of the location 
(whether on land or at sea (unless patently obvious due to the content of the text)) and manner 
of the activity being conducted, Polybius perhaps sought to add this further clarification. 
Polybius’ treatment and definition of Illyrian piracy needs, however, to be put in the 
important context of his discussion of Aetolian piracy during the period. Polybius and his 
family were prominent figures in the Achaean League with a natural potential for anti-Aetolian 
bias. Polybius uses the term πειρατής in describing the Aetolian pirates, assigning to them the 
cause of the Social War and drawing attention to their desire for plunder.324 Ormerod compares 
Polybius’ treatment of the Aetolians to his treatment of other foreign enemies of Rome, serving 
as one of Polybius’ ‘bȇte noires’.325 Whilst Polybius’ pejorative treatment of the Aetolians is 
frequent in his Histories, the account of the Social War’s origins is particularly important to 
considering Ardiaean piracy. The start of the Social War, occurring in the interbellum between 
the First and Second Illyrian Wars, allows Polybius to present a continual series of piratical 
deprivations in his work carried out by the Aetolians and Illyrians. Sacks notes that the 
Aetolians in Polybius’ account have a ‘desire for aggrandisement and lust for booty’.326 In both 
cases, the aggressive pursuit of plunder is an important instigator in conflicts; conflicts that 
would have a profound effect in Polybius’ work. Grainger notes that Polybius not only sought 
to further the Aetolian association with piracy, but saw in Aetolian piracy, ‘an ingenious 
explanation of the Aetolian stasis’.327 It is subsequently important to consider Polybius’ 
treatment of Illyrian piracy in this context; piracy of the period was treated particularly 
pejoratively in his account and an act associated with those for whom he denounces with 
disdain. By presenting piracy as an important instigator in these conflicts, Polybius, in turn, is 
able to provide a greater moral reasoning for those trying to deal with the piratical menace. 
 
324Polybius, Histories 4. 4-6. 
325H. A. Ormerod, Piracy in the Ancient World (Liverpool, 1924), p. 141. 
326K. S. Sacks, ‘Polybius’ other view of Aetolia’, Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 95 (1975), p. 92. 
327J. D. Grainger, The League of the Aitolians (Leiden, 1999), p. 25. 
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 The only Greek term, however, that clearly denotes activity at sea, is καταποντιστής, 
literally referring to one who throws into the sea. This term however very rarely features in 
texts; the term featuring occasionally in the works of Isocrates, Pausanias and Demosthenes.328 
None of these historians however utilise the term to refer to Illyrian pirates or Adriatic piracy 
moreover. The only author who makes more frequent use of the term is Cassius Dio, who uses 
the term in his account of Caesar’s Civil War when the author has a need to make it clear that 
he is referring to piracy at sea rather than plundering on land.329 In his account of the Ardiaean 
pirates, Dio instead chooses to use the term λῃστής, which again could be used to add emphasis 
to the plundering of the Ardiaei.330 It is also possible that Dio may merely be following the 
traditional terminology employed by earlier sources. In the surviving historical record, the 
targets of the Ardiaei are nevertheless varied, ranging from individual traders to large 
settlements along the coast.331 The use of a more generic term such as λῃστής subsequently, 
could be utilised to reflect the broader nature of these targets. 
 The terminology used by Latin authors follows a similar pattern to the Greek, with two 
terms being used predominantly, praedo and pirata.332 In a similar manner to the Greek term 
λῃστής, praedo is derived from the term for booty, praeda in Latin; the term pirata derives 
from the other predominant Greek term, πειρατής. In the surviving Latin references to the First 
and Second Illyrian War, it is interesting to note that piracy is not explicitly alluded to.333 A 
more generic reference of ‘piratica’ occurs in Pliny the Elder’s Natural History, which asserts 
that piracy was a practice associated with the Bay of Oricum.334 The perceived piracy of 
Genthius receives a brief mention in Livy’s text, although no term for ‘pirate’ is used.335 
Although Livy does not directly refer to Illyrian pirates in the passage, he stresses the large 
number of ships used to plunder the coast. The term latro has also been used by historians, 
although often referring to a mercenary, or a plunderer on land or at sea. The first use of the 
 
328Isocrates, Panathenaicus 12.226. Pausanias, Description of Greece 8.52. Demosthenes, Against Aristocrates 
23. 166. The term is used in Isocrates and Demosthenes in conjunction with λῃστής. This allows for a clearer 
distinction to be made between raiding on land and raiding at sea. 
329Dio Cassius, Roman History 36. 20-22. 
330Dio Cassius, Roman History 12. 19. 
331Polybius, Histories 2. 4., Dio Cassius, Roman History 12. 49. 
332Praedo: Plautus, Pseudolus 3. 2. 105. Livy, ab urbe condita 38. 40. Pirata:  Florus, Epitome 1.16. Lucan, 
Pharsalia 3. 228. 
333Florus, Epitome 1. 16. Livy, ab urbe condita 20. 5 and 20. 8. (Periochae).  
334Pliny the Elder, Natural History 3. 63. Oricum itself, situated in the bay is about 200km south of Lissus and 
on the eastern shore of the Otranto Strait, the shortest crossing point from modern Apulia to Albania. 
335Livy, ab urbe condita 44. 30. Livy instead states that Genthius sent eighty ships to ravage the coast 
‘tenuit impetum eius fama lemborum vastantium maritimam oram. octoginta erant lembi’. 
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term occurs in Plautus, a contemporary comic playwright to the period covered in the thesis, 
although Plautus refers to brigandage on land.336 As such, the importance of the Latin 
terminology for Illyrian piracy is of lesser significance; the lack of mention in the source 
material and absence of clear definitions provided makes it difficult to ascertain the nature of 
the practice. As before with the Greek historians, Latin texts have, on occasion, also added 
terms to make it clearer that the activity taking place is piracy at sea rather than on land.337 The 
Latin terminology is thus used in a similar manner to the Greek and De Souza notes that ‘there 
are no significant controversies or academic debates over the meaning of these (the Latin) 
words’.338 The importance in both the Greek and Latin texts is rather in the manner of usage 
and the emphasis placed on the piratical activities. 
The liburnae and λέμβοι are frequently featured in the ancient sources with relation to 
Illyrian piracy, although important distinctions between the two need to be considered.339 Tarn, 
writing in 1905 assumed that the liburna was a type of λέμβος and pointed to their shared earlier 
usage in the Adriatic.340 Morrison writing in 1996, supports this view by stressing that the 
liburnae was ‘a local kind of λέμβοι’.341 This has however been challenged more recently by 
Dzino, who notes the important discrepancies in the sources between the two types of 
vessels.342 These distinctions surround the period in which these ships appear in the sources, 
the areas of the Adriatic they are associated with and the nature of the ships themselves. The 
liburna, as its name suggests, was synonymous with the Liburnians of the Northern Adriatic 
and its design was later utilised by the Romans for their light vessel, the liburnica.343 Dzino 
however asserts that the Liburnians were a significant maritime power between the 6th to 4th 
centuries BC and were isolated and culturally distinct from other Illyrian tribes.344 During the 
period considered in this thesis, Illyrian piracy invariably is undertaken with the use of 
 
336Plautus, Poenulus 3. 3. 50. 
337This is particularly done with the latin adjective maritimus. Caesar, De Bello Civili 3. 110. Cornelius Nepos, 
Life of Thermistocles 2. 3. 
338De Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World, p. 13. 
339Polybius Histories 2. 4. Livy, ab urbe condita 44. 30. 
340W. W. Tarn, ‘The Greek Warship’, Journal of Historical Studies, Vol. 25 No. 5 (1905), pp. 137-156. 
341J. S. Morrison, Greek and Roman oared warships 399-30 BC (Oxford, 1996), p. 264. 
342D. Dzino, ‘The influence of Dalmatian Shipbuilders on the Ancient Warships and Naval Warfare: The 
Lembos and Liburnica’, Diadora Vol. 21 (2003), pp. 19-36. Dzino goes further to suggest a division of piracy 
theatres in the Adriatic, the Northern Adriatic where the liburna featured and the South-East where the lembos 
was popularly used. 
343Appian, Illyrian Wars 3. 1. 3. 
344Dzino, ‘The influence of Dalmatian Shipbuilders on the Ancient Warships and Naval Warfare’, pp. 20-1. 
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λέμβοι.345 The λέμβος features in the sources from the 4th century BC onwards, although any 
connection with Illyrian piracy prior to the 3rd Century BC is tentative at best. The only 
reference which could be construed as referring to pirate ships is that from Aristotle, who 
compares the shape of a bird to the prow of a λέμβος.346 Given the nature of the reference and 
the context of the wider work, it is difficult to clearly state however that the λέμβος was being 
used for piracy. References of the λέμβος explicitly to Illyrian piracy begin in the historical 
accounts of the Ardiaei in the 3rd Century BC. Medas has stressed this importance by describing 
a close association, ‘stretto rapporto’, between the λέμβος and the inhabitants of the eastern 
Adriatic shore during the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC.347 Although there was an association 
between the use of λέμβοι and the Illyrians, references to λέμβοι are not exclusive to their use 
as pirate ships. Casson notes that the crews of such vessels are not exclusively pirates.348 Thus, 
although the usage of the λέμβος is not exclusively for piracy, it nevertheless was the vessel of 
choice for the Illyrian pirates during the period being considered in this thesis. 
 It is, moreover, important to consider the structure of the λέμβος as the vessel had 
particular attributes that can inform on the manner in which it was utilised. Dzino notes that it 
was unlikely that the λέμβος was originally fitted with a ram; a ship of similar type with a ram 
fitted being more commonly labelled as a πρίστις, ‘a beaked ship’ in the sources.349 Although 
not fitting a ram to a λέμβος reduced its ability to damage enemy vessels, it increased its usage 
in piracy. In describing an episode of Ardiaean piracy, Polybius states that the attack consisted 
of a boarding party rather than any form of ramming.350 Sinking a ship and risking losing the 
cargo and potential captives to the seabed was not an effective plundering strategy. Casson has 
asserted that the λέμβος was not only used as a light auxiliary naval unit, but also for ‘carrying 
cargo both across open water and on rivers’.351 The additional ability of the small vessel to 
carry cargo would enable prospective pirates to carry away plunder. Casson highlights this 
ability in his work by using an example from an Egyptian papyrus that documents the cargo 
 
345Polybius, Histories 2. 4., 2.9, 2. 10, 3. 16., Appian, Illyrian Wars 3. 2. 7., Livy, ab urbe condita 44. 30. (Livy 
uses the Latinised form lembi); Cassius Dio chooses neither term, instead using the more generic term πλοῖα 
(Dio Cassius, Roman History 12. 49 preserved in Zonaras 8. 19.) which usually means a small vessel of some 
kind. 
346Aristotle, Progression of Animals 710. 
347S. Medas, ‘Lemboi e Liburnae’ in L. Bracessi (ed.), La pirateria nell’Adriatico antico (Rome, 2004), p. 132. 
348L. Casson, Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World (Baltimore, 1971), p. 142. 
349Dzino, ‘The influence of Dalmatian Shipbuilders on the Ancient Warships and Naval Warfare’, p. 24. 
Polybius, Histories 16. 2., 18. 1; Livy, ab urbe condita 32. 32. These references are describing the fleet of Phlip 
V of Macedon. Philip’s fleet also made use of λέμβοι at various times. 
350Polybius, Histories 2. 10. 
351Casson, Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World, p. 162. 
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onboard a λέμβος from 259/8 BC.352 Although this cargo was intended to be transported over 
a longer distance and thus likely to be larger than anything carried by an Illyrian λέμβος being 
used for piracy, it gives an indication of the potential of the amount and type of cargo a λέμβος 
of roughly the same period could carry. Livy describes the use of the λέμβος in a military 
capacity by the Macedonians, noting that each λέμβος in the fleet was able to carry 2 horses 
and 20 captives.353 The use of λέμβοι in these examples demonstrates the wide range of usage 
of the vessel; rather than purely a pirate vessel, the λέμβος could be utilised for transporting 
people or cargo or used in formal forms of naval warfare. In its pirate usage, the λέμβος, even 
with a relatively modest cargo could still outmanoeuvre larger or less agile ships, taking 
advantage of a rugged coastline with many islands offering plenty of routes and means of 
escaping detection. Thus, as discussed earlier, the natural difficulties presented by Adriatic 
travel had an important impact on the reputation of the Adriatic, although it is unlikely that this 
accounted fully for the dangerous reputation of the sea. The natural difficulties provided a 
greater opportunity for Illyrian pirates, who utilised vessels that were well suited to take 
advantage of the piratical opportunity available. 
It is considerably more difficult however to try and identify the nature of the plunder 
being seized by the Illyrian pirates. The ancient sources do not make the type or amount of 
plunder abundantly clear. Polybius states that the Ardiaean pirates attacked a number of Italian 
traders, robbing some, murdering others and carrying a great number off alive into captivity.354 
The act of taking captives is reflected in Pausanias who asserts that at Methone, the Illyrians 
tricked the local inhabitants into trading wine with them only to carry off a number of the men 
and women into captivity.355 Polybius, again, mentions similar tactics being employed by the 
Illyrians after the Second Illyrian War with the capture of merchants between Leucas and 
Malea by Skerdilaidas in 217 BC.356 As such, the practice of taking captives during Illyrian 
raids seems a common trend and these captives would presumably be ransomed or sold into 
slavery. In analysing the passage in Pausanias, Wiedemann notes that ‘the victim of a pirate 
raid could claim back his freedom if he could prove it to the satisfaction of a Roman magistrate; 
 
352Ibid. P. Cairo Zen. 59015. Casson notes that one λέμβος carried 258 18-chous jars and 102 half-jars from 
Samos and Miletus to Alexandria, whilst another carried 122 18-chous jars and 140 half-jars. 
353Livy, ab urbe condita 44. 28. An important reason for the Macedonian choice to include λέμβοι in their fleet 
was on account of their speed and manoeuvrability. 
354Polybius, Histories 2. 8. 
355Pausanias, Description of Greece 4. 35. Methone is on the Messenian coast in the South-Western 
Peloponnese. 
356Polybius, Histories 5. 95. 
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but his chances of success might be minimal in practice’.357 Taking into account the speed of 
the Illyrian pirate ships in making their raids, it is relatively unlikely that many of the Italian 
traders who were captured may have recovered their previous status. This in turn raises a further 
question as to where the captives may have been taken. Braund, examining the earlier Classical 
Period, has argued that ‘many of the Illyrians known to have been sold as slaves into the Greek 
world, presumably came in via Corinthian interests in that region’.358 Whether or not this held 
true into the 3rd Century BC is unclear, or whether Illyrians would have sold captives in the 
same Greek markets that had previously traded in Illyrian slaves. Westermann however has 
noted that the period surrounding the First and Second Punic Wars witnessed a great increase 
in the number of captives being taken; ‘probably this source of slaves was supplemented, in 
some degree, even in the West by the piracy of the Illyrian kingdom until their activities were 
suppressed by the Romans in 228 BC.’359 Although it is unclear where the captives may have 
been sold, it appears that slave markets were flourishing during the 3rd Century BC and there 
would have been several places where the captives could have been sold into slavery. Hunt has 
recently argued that ancient slavery ‘thrived especially in places and periods lacking strong 
states with an interest in maintaining order – especially states with naval power’.360 The 
geopolitical situation in Illyria, as discussed earlier, provided the sort of conditions necessary 
for the industry of slavery to flourish.  
 
The shift in Illyrian piracy from 231 BC 
 
It is in these established contexts, that the development of Illyrian piracy in the Adriatic 
needs to be considered to directly ascertain the importance of the shift in piracy conducted by 
the Ardiaei in the Third Century BC. Whilst there is a good deal of evidence in the written 
sources for Illyrian piracy during this period, evidence for Illyrian piracy in previous periods 
is comparatively sparse and more problematic. The ancient historical record has often attributed 
an indefinite period for Illyrian piracy.361 The orthodox view has taken the written historical 
sources at relative face value. This was most notably put forward by Holleaux, who argued for 
 
357T. Wiedermann, Greek and Roman Slavery (London, 2003), p. 106. 
358D. C. Braund, ‘The Slave Supply in Classical Greece’ in K. Bradley and P. Cartledge (eds.), The Cambridge 
World History of Slavery: Volume I The Ancient Mediterranean World (Cambridge, 2011), p. 121. 
359W. L. Westermann, The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity (Philadelphia, 1955), p. 60. For an 
enumeration of the numbers taken see Ibid. p. 61. 
360P. Hunt, Ancient Greek and Roman Slavery (Chichester, 2018), p. 33.  
361Especially Polybius, Histories 2. 5. and Strabo, Geography 7. 5. 
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the presence of longstanding Illyrian piratical activity in the Adriatic in their trademark 
λέμβοι.362 As discussed earlier, the Illyrian association with the λέμβος is apparent during the 
period in question, although in the context of piracy, ‘it has long been noted that this word only 
comes into general usage in the Polybian account of the outburst of 231 BC.363 Evidence for 
piracy in the written historical record before 231 BC subsequently cannot be viewed through 
the traditionally associated vessel in which their Adriatic piracy was conducted. Although 
Strabo highlights the piratical habits of the Illyrians, the only tribe he names that are particularly 
associated with the practice of piracy is the Ardiaei.364 As such, the traditional association of 
the Illyrians with piracy seems to particularly relate to the Ardiaean raids of the late 3rd Century 
BC. 
 This view, which was most potently argued by Dell, challenged the orthodox view and 
maintained that evidence for Illyrian piracy prior to 231 BC was too weak and the traditional 
associations may, in fact, be referring to the episodes of Ardiaean piracy during this period. 
Dell has noted that ‘references to Illyria are only too often vague and circumstantial. This has 
caused a number of passages touching upon Illyrian affairs to be adduced as evidence for piracy 
in the early period, although these passages do not directly mention such piracy at all.’365 An 
example of this that has caused debate amongst modern scholars is the Syracusan intervention 
in the Adriatic during the 4th Century BC.366 Holleaux has argued that an attempt to curb 
piratical activity in the Adriatic was undertaken by Dionysius I of Syracuse in 385 BC.367 The 
passage appears in Diodorus Siculus and involves an attack on Illyrian light ships, with the 
sinking of some of the craft and the capturing and killing of the crews.368 The only explicit 
reference to piracy in this passage is in relation to unrelated actions taken by the Tyrrhenians.369 
This would suggest that claims that the Illyrians were undertaking piracy in the region are 
inconclusive. It is perhaps surprising that Diodorus would not apply the same label to the 
Illyrian actions as to the Tyrrhenians in the same passage and this doesn’t suggest that the 
Illyrians were committing acts of piracy. Diodorus however does include a reference to 
 
362Holleaux, 'The Romans in Illyria', p. 824. 
363Dell, ‘The Origin and Nature of Illyrian Piracy’, pp. 345. 
364Strabo, Geography 7. 5. 
365Dell, ‘The Origin and Nature of Illyrian Piracy’, pp. 348. 
366For more details on this debate, see P. Cabanes, ‘Greek Colonisation in the Adriatic’ in G. R. Tsetskhladze 
(ed.), Greek Colonisation: An Account of Greek Colonies and other Settlements Overseas: Volume Two (Leiden, 
2006), p. 81. 
367M. Holleaux, ‘Les Romains en Illyrie’ in M. Holleaux (ed.), Études d’epigraphie et d’histoire grecques IV: 
Rome, La Macédoine et l’orient grec (Paris, 1952), p. 80. 
368Diodorus Siculus, Library of History 15. 14. 
369Ibid. 
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Adriatic piracy in the 4th Century BC, but this is conducted by the Apulians rather than the 
Illyrians. Diodorus asserts that Apulian pirate ships were in operation across the entire Italian 
seaboard and had made the Adriatic unsafe for merchants.370 As a result of the Apulian piracy, 
Dionysios II, the Syracusan tyrant deemed it necessary to establish two cities in Apulia to 
provide safe port for merchant ships.371 Moreover, an inscription of an Athenian decree, dated 
to 325/4 BC, sets out the Athenian colonisation of the Adriatic with the founding of a colony 
to protect against Tyrrhenian pirates.372 Although the Adriatic is associated with these acts of 
piracy, the Illyrians are not mentioned; the Adriatic piracy is conducted by others. 
 
The Liburnians were also commonly associated with piracy with an indefinite 
timeframe. Appian asserts that the Liburnians were second only to the Ardiaei as a nautical 
people and committed acts of piracy in the Adriatic in the type of vessel named after them.373 
Livy, in a passing comment during his account of the Adriatic voyage of Cleonymus of Sparta 
in the late 4th Century BC, notes that the Liburnians and Histrians were savage tribes noted for 
their acts of piracy.374 These references in the ancient sources do not allude to any specific 
instance of Liburnian piracy, but rather appear as descriptive comments in reference to the 
geographic area of Liburnia. Wilkes notes that ‘like the Istri and the rest of the Illyrians, the 
Liburni were known to the Romans as pirates before the end of the fourth century BC’.375 
Whilst references in the sources appear in conjunction with events pertaining to these time 
periods, they are not indicative of any tangible evidence of piracy. Roman campaigns against 
the Liburnians are not recorded until 129 BC, when Appian mentions a campaign conducted 
by Gaius Sempronius Tuditanus.376 The significance of the Liburnians as an Iron Age power 
however is better attested. The ancient sources attest that Liburnian maritime power stretched 
southward to the islands off the central Dalmatian coast and perhaps as far south as Corcyra in 
the Ionian Sea.377 Wilkes however has asserted that ‘over the centuries it would appear that the 
Liburnians, having once controlled the Adriatic down to Corfu, were being steadily pushed 
northwards’ on account of pressure applied by new Illyrian groups moving towards the 
 
370Diodorus Siculus, Library of History 16. 5. 
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373Appian, Illyrian Wars 3. 1. 3. 
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Adriatic.378 This would suggest that although evidence for specific instances of Liburnian 
piracy are absent from the sources, the Liburnian maritime power was formidable in the Iron 
Age Adriatic and would have inspired a potent maritime reputation. Dzino notes that through 
this period, the ‘Liburnian, coastal, urbanised areas kept maritime trade routes with Italy and 
Greek colonies’.379 In order to maintain these trade routes, especially over a wide range of 
Adriatic territory, this maritime power would have been important. 
 
 Another source that needs to be considered are the engravings of Picene ships found on 
the stele di Novilara, which have traditionally been dated to the 7th Century BC. The stele di 
Novilara were discovered in a necropolis in Novilara, near modern Pesano, on the Northern 
Adriatic coast. The engravings on the stele di Novilara depict three naval scenes.380 These naval 
scenes, depict what appears to be a light vessel with a single bank of oarsmen, a naval battle 
scene with warrior figures in clashing vessels and the rudder of a ship complete with the figure 
of solitary rower. On the surface, the design of the naval vessels is similar to the styles of other 
light vessels that appear later in the sources, the λέμβοι and liburnae. Bonino notes that ‘the 
ships of Novilara are the first primary sources, which show consistent exchange of techniques 
with the lonian and Aegean seas’.381 Triboni notes that this hybridisation has found a general 
consensus amongst modern scholars, although he notes the difficulty in isolated specific 
aspects which distinguish the local Adriatic vessels from their Greek counterparts.382 Medas 
has also stressed that there is no way to be certain that the boats depicted in the stele di Novilara 
are the direct ancestors of the λέμβοι and liburnae recorded in the written sources.383 The 
evidence from the stele di Novilara is far from conclusive; uncertainty still prevails in 
determining the Adriatic or Greek features of the ships and their subsequent utilisation. In this 
regard, Medas has argued that the stele could be a memorial to an act of piracy against a Greek 
ship sailing to Spina, whilst Cobau has argued that it merely depicts local Picene merchants.384 
Neither of these conclusions is satisfactory, given the naval battle context of the second image 
 
378Wilkes, The Illyrians, p. 188. 
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383Medas, ‘Lemboi e Liburnae’, p. 138. 
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and the lack of conclusive inference that can be drawn from the first image as to the ship’s 
utilisation. A more limited conclusion, in line with the limitations of the evidence would be 
more satisfactory. Triboni notes that the more popular interpretations centre around the 
engravings reflecting ‘the first expression of local Adriatic nautical tradition’ and a ‘cross-
fertilisation between local and Greek shipbuilding techniques’.385 These suggest an 
interpretation from which a very limited amount of inference can be drawn on Adriatic 
maritime commerce and no effective inference can be drawn on Adriatic piracy. 
 
 The role of the Ardiaei in the development of Illyrian piracy in the Adriatic, as alluded 
to earlier, was very important; the events of 231 BC and beyond having a profound impact on 
the association of the Illyrians with the practice. This importance was first attested by Polybius, 
who noted that Agron had at his disposal, a greater land and maritime power than any previous 
Illyrian ruler.386 This power became manifest by the Illyrian victory over the Aetolian League 
in 231 BC.387 Wilkes has highlighted the importance of this victory over a famed league of 
Greek city states, asserting that it ‘caused a sensation in Greece’.388 Eckstein however has noted 
that ‘this fit a pattern going back 150 years: whenever Greek states on the Illyrians’ frontiers 
were beset with military and/or political weakness, the result was Illyrian expansion’.389 
Hammond documents some of these occurrences, including Bardylis in the 4th Century BC 
taking advantage of Macedonian and Epirotic weaknesses, and Glaukias taking advantage of 
Molossian weaknesses in the early 3rd Century BC.390 Polybius’ statement, especially in regard 
to the land forces of the aforementioned kings alluded to by Hammond, appears hyperbolic. 
This may be due to the Aetolian bias in Polybius’ account. Walbank notes that Polybius’ source 
for this section is predominantly Greek and the ‘narrative is strongly prejudiced against 
Aetolia’.391 The original Greek source material would likely over-estimate the impact of the 
Ardiaean emergence on account of the shock it caused in Greece and Polybius would have 
likely relished the opportunity to highlight this downturn in Aetolian fortunes. Beaumont has 
however argued that the statement by Polybius is unequivocal and indicates that Agron was the 
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first ruler on the eastern Adriatic coast to have an organised maritime power.392 Although the 
growth of an Illyrian power along the coast had some historical precursors, what was 
particularly important to Ardiaean power that set the kingdom apart, was their coastal position 
on the Adriatic and their ability to take advantage of that element. Dell has described this 
change as ‘a transformation of Illyrian piracy from disorganised sorties aimed at procuring 
foodstuffs to something like large scale raids and incipient imperialism’.393 The Ardiaean 
pirates were operating on a scale not previously seen; whilst instances of piracy from the 
evidence prior to 231 BC were sporadic, and poorly documented at best, the Ardiaean raids 
were conducted on a greater scale. 
  
 Ardaiaen piracy under Teuta has additionally come under scrutiny regarding the public 
and private spheres of plunder in the Ardiaean kingdom. Polybius is keen to distinguish 
between the public and private activities of the Illyrians and does so through an interview 
between Teuta and two Roman ambassadors. In the interview, Teuta makes the distinction, 
agreeing to undertake no public enterprise against Rome but stressing that it was not customary 
for Illyrian rulers to intervene in the private endeavours of their subjects.394 Holleaux branded 
Illyrian piracy as ‘a public institution, a state industry’, although this has been successfully 
challenged by Gabrielsen.395 Gabrielsen sets out his argument as follows: 
 
‘What clashed with Roman – and for that matter also with dominant Greek – 
perceptions was Queen Teuta’s total lack of interest in claiming the ‘industry of plunder’ as 
the exclusive prerogative of the state, one restricted to the public arena and rigorously guarded 
through governmental controls. Plunder as such was not objected to by anyone.’396 
 
 The Illyrians, in contrast to the Romans and Greeks, viewed private plunder as a 
legitimate practice. This situation outlined by Teuta in the interview does not seem to have 
changed under her rule however. Teuta notes that the practice of the state to not place a check 
on private plunder was an Illyrian custom.397 As such, the principles underlying the acquisition 
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of plunder did not develop under Teuta. Walbank notes that the retort given to this by the 
Roman ambassador is in all likelihood a post eventum and part of the Fabian tradition.398 
Although a likely later addition, the speech is useful for Polybius in positioning the Romans 
on the side of the victims of the piratical acts conducted by the Ardiaeans, whose conceptions 
of plundering differed greatly from those of the Romans and Greeks. By contrast, the account 
of Appian does not feature the interview and shows marked discrepancy from the Polybian 
version. Appian instead states that Agron was still alive when the siege of Issa was being 
undertaken and that an Issaean appeal to Rome prompted Rome to send an embassy which 
never reached its destination.399 As mentioned earlier, the version presented by Appian is less 
tainted by the annalistic tradition, especially from Fabius Pictor. Although both these accounts 
differ regarding the conduct of the interview and the source of an appeal to Rome, they both 
feature the contextual importance of the Illyrian piratical threat in drawing Roman attention 
towards the Adriatic. As stated earlier, the murder of the ambassador is a common theme in the 
historical accounts and prompted the Roman intervention in the region. 
 
The Roman decision-making process 
 
Roman decisions to instigate interventions were dependent on their justifications for 
intervening. For military interventions, as in the case of the First Illyrian War, this required a 
pretext to be established which outlined the reasons given in justification of the Roman course 
of action. A pretext in this context can simply be defined as a reason given to justify an 
intervention. These pretexts were important for the Romans in validating their interventions 
for domestic and foreign observers. Polybius alludes in his Histories to contemporary debate 
in Greece over the nature of Roman expansion and the implications of Roman rule.400 Polybius 
wrote his Histories for both Roman and Greek audiences alike, his work served as a means to 
answer these questions over the moral integrity of Roman actions in acquiring their ascendant 
status in Greece and the wider Mediterranean world. The need to justify military interventions 
and to be seen to act in a morally upstanding manner were important in the development of the 
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Roman concepts of bellum iustum (just war), ius ad bello (just cause for war) and ius in bello 
(just action in war). These concepts however were only effectively set out in a Roman context 
by Cicero in his treatise, De Officiis in the First Century BC, after the period being considered 
in this thesis. It is nevertheless important to consider the development of earlier notions of these 
concepts in prior periods to better consider the Roman decision-making process. 
The concept of a ‘just war’ can trace its origins back to antiquity. Ancient Greek sources 
provide some context for the later development of the concept by the Romans, although these 
do not form a comprehensive or coherent outline. Herodotus noted in his Histories that Croesus 
of Lydia was the first to commit injustices against the Greeks.401 Dewald has noted Herodotus’ 
treatment of the Greco-Persian War featured an ‘ongoing theme of reciprocal injustices’402 
Thucydides also discussed the ideas of justice in warfare, especially relating to waging a ‘just 
war’, in his History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides discussed throughout his accounts 
the justification for actions during the conflict, most notably through his ‘Melian dialogue’.403 
As mentioned earlier, Thucydides is sometimes regarded as the ‘first important Realist’, and in 
the Peloponnesian War, he saw the ‘dramatic erosion of the customs of war’404 Thucydides’ 
consideration of the important elements that constituted just and moral behaviour in war, and 
in going to war, demonstrated the importance of such concepts to Classical Greek thought. 
These accounts built on the wider cultural ideas of just action in Classical Greece ‘to harm 
one’s enemies and help one’s friends.’405 Dover highlights that the importance of the ancient 
Greek term δίκαιος, which has a range of meanings, of which he mentions ‘just’, ‘fair’ and 
‘honest’.406 These concepts were closely associated in ancient Greek inter-state relations and 
would have an important bearing on later Roman diplomacy with Greek states. The importance 
for Rome to exemplify these concepts in their dealings would have been important to 
developing strong relations in the Greek East. 
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 The Roman process of declaring war was established by the onset of the period being 
considered in this thesis, although discrepancies exist regarding the details of the process in the 
surviving accounts. Livy outlines the fetial declaration in Book I of his monumental history of 
Rome, asserting that the Romans copied it from the Aequicoli during the reign of Ancus 
Marcius in the 7th Century BC.407 The process outlined by Livy involved a demand of redress 
followed by a ceremonial throwing of a spear into enemy territory, and was instituted to ensure 
greater formality in the declaration of war. During the process, Jupiter was invoked by a legatus 
to witness the demand of redress and was called upon again to bear witness after thirty-three 
days if the Roman demands had not been met.408 Dionysius of Halicarnassus however has 
asserted in his account of the Second Samnite War, that three embassies were sent out rather 
than one in ten day intervals (providing a total of thirty rather than thirty-three days for the 
redress to be demanded) and no mention is giving to the throwing of a spear.409 It is not clear 
which source is correct in their description of the process. The early period of Roman history 
contained in the early books of Livy have particularly limited evidence; Livy himself notes that 
for events before 390 BC and the Gallic sack of Rome, the limited amount of written evidence 
available presented difficulties for him in reconstructing these periods of Roman history.410 
Harris has noted several problems with Livy’s account and has stressed that ‘the Livian version 
is betrayed by certain anachronisms’.411 Wiedemann has also noted that the language in Livy’s 
account is of the author’s own time in the First Century BC and the chronological origin of the 
throwing of the spear is vaguely assigned, merely being described as a previous act not carried 
out in Livy’s day.412 The problems inherent in the Livian version have limited the veracity of 
his account of the origins of the process, although as the earliest chronological citation (from 
the 7th Century BC), the account provides a more well-established origin for the process. 
Wiedemann progresses with his analysis to stress that ‘Livy and Dionysius tell us what some 
people in Augustus’ time thought had happened in the Seventh Century BC’413 The process 
outlined in Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ work however, is in the context of his account of the 
Second Samnite War in the late 4th Century BC. It is thus possible that the changes in 
Dionysius’ version reflect changes that occurred in Rome through the three centuries between 
the citations in Livy and Dionysius. In either case, the accounts provided by the two historians 
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for the origins of the Roman declaration of war are limited but display certain similarities on 
the fetial process that provide some insight. 
 The importance of a development in the exercise of the fetial process in 281/0 BC has 
caused further debate, although this should be seen rather as a fundamental change in the wider 
Roman process of declaring war. At the outset of the Pyrrhic War, a prisoner-of-war was taken 
from Pyrrhus’ army, compelled to buy a piece of land in Rome and then the spear was thrown 
onto this land to mark the war declaration.414 The reasoning behind this amendment to the 
process appears to be a practical one; the sending of the fetial priests on a lengthy sea voyage 
was impractical and the makeshift affair in Rome made greater practical sense for the Romans 
in their declaration of war. Some scholars have argued that this evidence marks the shift from 
the participation of the fetial priests in the embassies being sent out by Rome in favour of 
legati.415 Walbank however excludes this evidence and cites the change taking place later in 
the 3rd Century BC, in the aftermath of the First Punic War.416 The dating of the change rests 
on the value placed on the evidence presented by Servius Auctus in his commentary on Virgil’s 
Aeneid. This evidence comes from the 5th Century AD and is not as clear cut as Beard, 
Crawford and Goar have suggested. Harris has noted that ‘Walbank for some reason neglected 
the earlier evidence’.417 Although it is unclear why Walbank neglected the evidence, it could 
be due to the obscurity of the evidence in the 5th Century AD commentary or the limitations of 
the reference. Harris has also noted that the act of spear throwing would have been the most 
cherished of the fetiales as it represented ‘the most dramatic piece of magic in the whole 
programme.’418 It is likely that the decision to continue this practice in some form or another, 
was due to the drama of the exercise and the reverence that it may have held. Whether the 
earlier date of 281/0 BC or the later date of Walbank is correct, it is apparent that the change 
took place sometime during the 3rd Century BC in the period preceding that which is being 
considered in this thesis. As such, the fetial process for declaring war in the period being 
considered in this thesis, had recently undergone practical amendment with the embassies to 
foreign entities being undertaken by legati. This change ensured that the Roman declaration of 
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war was a simpler and more efficient process, enabling warfare to be conducted without the 
need for the lengthier deliberation of previous periods. 
 The use of legati as envoys in the process can be observed from the embassy sent to 
Teuta at the outset of the First Illyrian War, although the exact nature of this embassy is difficult 
to determine. Polybius asserts that Gaius and Lucius Coruncanius were appointed as 
ambassadors to conduct an investigation (ἐπίσκεψιν) into the matter of Ardiaean piracy.419 
Appian, on the other hand, does not provide a definitive purpose for the ambassadors but notes 
that they were sent out in tandem with the Issaeans, after the Issaeans themselves had raised 
concerns to the Romans.420 Dio meanwhile asserts that the Romans sent ambassadors with the 
purpose to entreat (παραιτούμενοι) and censure (αἰτιώμενοι) Agron on behalf of the Issaeans.421 
Although the sending of ambassadors is prominently featured in all the accounts, it is not clear 
precisely for what reason they were sent. Polybius provides the most discernible purpose, an 
investigation into Ardiaean activities and although this may be implied in the other sources, it 
is not explicitly stated. Holleaux, and later Badian, believed that the envoys were delivering a 
rerum repetitio and Badian goes so far as to suggest that the Roman envoys declared war on 
Teuta at that time.422 Walbank has however noted that ‘normally at this time a rerum repetitio 
was preceded by a conditional war-motion in the Senate and the comitia.423 As only a single 
embassy was sent out in all the sources and no motion was raised in either the Senate or comitia 
it is highly unlikely that the embassy constituted a rerum repetitio. The Romans were venturing 
into a region, moreover, where they had limited knowledge and experience and if the accounts 
of Appian and Dio are to be believed, in accordance with Issaean delegates. As such, it would 
be more natural for Rome to initially investigate in order to find out what was going on, rather 
than adopt a more gung-ho approach. Regarding the declaration of war, Gruen has highlighted 
the continuation of the siege of Issa by Teuta in Polybius’ account.424 This would suggest that 
the declaration of war occurred after news of the events reached Rome. Although the sending 
of envoys rather than fetial priests is evident in the accounts, there are not substantive grounds 
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to consider this an example of a rerum repetitio, an investigation being a more likely purpose 
for the embassy. 
 The rerum repetitio itself has raised further debate over its underlying motivation, 
which should be viewed with a consideration for developments over time. The rerum repetitio, 
literally a repeating of the matters/affairs/case, was a demand for redress of suffered injuries 
and operated as an ultimatum in the process of the Roman declaration of war. The process 
however has been seen as a cynical exercise by Harris, who describes it as ‘closely akin to 
blackmail’ operating as ‘non-negotiable demands, and they were usually set at an unacceptable 
level.’425 This however is too simplistic; as Rich notes, ‘the complexity of the decision-making 
process should not obscure the fact that the senate did have a real choice.’426 The rerum 
repetitio was subsequently not always utilised in a cynical manner. Harris however has stressed 
that the terms of the rerum repetitio were only accepted once, by Carthage in the Mercenary 
War in 238 BC. Harris is correct to highlight this as an anomaly in the process; Carthage 
essentially had no choice but to accept the terms of the rerum repetitio in 238 BC on account 
of their engagement in the Mercenary War after the costly First Punic War. Carthage in this 
instance, could hardly afford a reignition of hostilities with Rome in the midst of this conflict. 
Burton has argued that whilst the rerum repetitio was often set up with harsh demands which 
would likely be unacceptable, it is ‘also significant that the Romans made such attempts at all 
– sometimes even at the risk of eroding their own military-strategic position’.427 The 
aforementioned developments in the usage of the fetial process in the 3rd Century BC had 
profound consequences in the 2nd Century BC. Walbank has noted that ‘from the middle of the 
Third Century BC, the denuntiatio belli had become the effective declaration of war’.428 
Pretexts in this context became less tied to the fetial process and subsequently more susceptible 
to the cause of aggressive Roman military intervention. 
 These developments need to be placed in the context of a greater Roman capacity for 
conducting military campaigns. Popular Roman support for military campaigns is difficult to 
ascertain, although the Roman citizenry had a more vested interest in their success through 
their greater participation. The mid-Republican period of Roman history saw a greater of 
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Roman citizens called up to active service. Hopkins has provided approximate calculations for 
the number of Romans under arms, with Roman legionaries accounting for 17 per cent of the 
adult male population in 225 BC and 29 per cent in 213 BC at the height of the Second Punic 
War.429 Although pressed to a greater degree in military service, it is hard to determine what 
popular Roman attitudes were to their participation in these wars. Toynbee has stressed that 
‘perennial distant overseas service had naturally soon become intensely unpopular’.430 Harris 
has challenged this by arguing that ‘the Senate’s foreign policy would have been futile without 
a measure of popular support’.431 Given the lack of evidence from primary sources, it is difficult 
to ascertain the extent of popular support for Roman military interventions. Brunt however has 
asserted that ‘conscripts were not necessarily unwilling soldiers’ and notes that for wars that 
were far away with no discernible interest for the Roman public, ‘the government had to rely 
on sheer compulsion’.432 This would suggest that a discrepancy exists between wars which 
were fought far away and those which were fought closer to home. It is natural to expect 
campaigns in more inhospitable climates and conditions, which were especially fiercely fought 
and separated fighting men from home and families for a prolonged period of time, to have 
been more unpopular. The increase in the enrolment in Hopkins’ figures is unsurprising given 
the need for Rome to muster available manpower to deal with the threat of Hannibal; fighting 
a threat that posed such a direct danger to Rome would likely have spurred greater Roman 
resolve to achieving victory. The Roman military campaigns in Illyria that are being considered 
in this thesis were remarkably short and were not far away from mainland Italy and 
subsequently would likely not have been as unpopular as campaigns which were more arduous 
and further afield. 
 This in turn raises the important issue of the practical capability of  Roman armies to 
conduct warfare on a large scale. The best source of evidence for this can be found in the census 
figures that provide a record of registrations. Brunt notes that the data before 225 BC is 
particularly limited and even data from 225 BC onwards is subject to the ability of people to 
come forward and include themselves on the register.433 Polybius asserts that in 225 BC, the 
Romans sought to gather information on available manpower ahead of the campaign against 
the Gallic tribes of Northern Italy, and that Rome and her allies could muster 700,000 infantry 
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and 70,000 cavalry.434 Walbank has asserted that these figures originate in the καταγραφαί (the 
original registers) through Fabius Pictor and ‘are mainly reliable’; some uncertainty persists 
over the exclusion of Northern allies not on service and the less well sourced data for Southern 
Italy (Fabius Pictor omits the Greeks from Southern Italy who were exempt and the Bruttians 
who were used in a menial capacity).435 Brunt has also noted inconsistency in the breakdown 
of these figures, citing the exclusion of the Greeks and Bruttians from Southern Italy, as well 
as the Northern allies.436 The figures that Polybius sourced from Fabius Pictor were also utilised 
by other authors; Diodorus Siculus provides the same numbers as Polybius whilst Livy and 
subsequent writers round the total number up to 800,000 combined forces.437 If we are to place 
these figures in the context of the aforementioned percentage figures provided by Hopkins, this 
would suggest an increase from a standing army of around 130,000 combined infantry and 
cavalry troops in 225 BC to 223,000 by 213 BC. The large number of troops that Rome had 
levied during this period and the larger number still available to be drawn upon would have 
enabled the Romans to have a sizeable army to conduct campaigns. The increasing number of 
the troops levied during the Second Punic War however highlights the importance of the 
heightened security threat posed by Hannibal and the need to muster large armies in Italy to 
defend. This would suggest that although Rome had a large manpower pool to draw from, it 
did not fully engage its manpower potential. The figures nevertheless suggest an increase in 
the military participation of Roman and allied troops in warfare. This would have had the 
knock-on effect of producing soldiers who were more seasoned from such military service. The 
experiences of the Roman and allied soldiers who survived the intense fighting of the Punic 
Wars and the Gallic campaigns of 225 BC, would have made these troops battle-hardened and 
more experienced, enabling a more effective fighting force to emerge. 
The Pretext for Intervention 
Rome’s intervention in 229 BC was based on a pretext of Ardiaean aggression from 
their pirates in the Adriatic and through the murdering of a Roman ambassador.438 The murder 
of the Roman ambassador is a common feature in the historical accounts from antiquity 
although some discrepancies exist regarding the nature of the assassination. Polybius, Appian 
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and Cassius Dio all assert that the Roman declaration of war occurred immediately after the 
murder of the envoy and Polybius and Cassius Dio stress the importance that the words 
expressed by the envoy had in causing the aggressive reaction by the Illyrian ruler.439 Appian’s 
account is particularly noteworthy by his use of the preposition and demonstrative pronoun ἐπὶ 
τῷδε (meaning ‘upon this’).440 The usage of the expression in Appian’s account would suggest 
that the Roman intervention was made as a direct response to the murder of the ambassadors. 
Although Livy’s account of the First Illyrian War and its origins is now lost, a summary is 
provided in the periochae. This summary simply notes, ‘Bellum Illyriis propter unum ex 
legatis, qui ad eos missi erant, occisum indictum est, subactique in deditionem venerunt.’ (War 
was declared on the Illyrians after one of the ambassadors sent to them had been killed. Having 
been conquered, they surrendered).441 The summary provided in the periochae makes no 
mention of Illyrian pirates, nor any mention of the Ardiaei or any underlying Roman interest 
in the region; a simple factual statement is stressed in the summary which highlights the cause 
of the war in the murder of the Roman ambassador. Florus has provided a more obscure account 
of the origins of the First Illyrian War, describing the murder of both Roman ambassadors, not 
by sword, but rather by sacrificial axe.442 Florus’ account contains a number of factual 
inaccuracies, most notably in naming the Illyrian Queen, Teutana, which limits its veracity. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that Florus sought to present the murder of the Roman ambassador(s) 
in a particularly dramatic and vivid manner. Damon has noted that Florus’ Epitome is not the 
most useful of accounts and is anecdotal in sections.443 Den Boer likewise has highlighted the 
‘ineptitude’ of Florus as an historian but has also noted the originality of some of his ideas’.444 
Florus’ source material nevertheless remains a mystery, and it is possible that Florus’ version 
may be sourced in earlier annalistic traditions. Polybius’ version is drawn from annalistic 
traditions however, yet a marked discrepancy exists between the two accounts;445 if Florus’ 
account was sourced in the annalistic tradition, it would consequently need to be from a 
different tradition than Polybius. 
 The marked discrepancy between the accounts has raised complications with analysing 
the incident, although the common recording of the murder of an ambassador highlights the 
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importance of the event as a pretext. Polybius asserts that the Romans sent two ambassadors, 
Gaius and Lucius Coruncanius with the younger of the two (the one who addressed Teuta with 
bold speech in the interview) being put to death by the Illyrian Queen.446 Appian, on the other 
hand, has noted that the Roman ambassador that was killed by Illyrian pirates was Coruncanius, 
alongside the Issaean ambassador Kleemporus.447 Cassius Dio has not provided a definitive 
number of ambassadors that were sent by Rome, although he stresses that some were 
imprisoned and some murdered.448 Although all sources feature an ambassador murder, some 
confusion nevertheless persists with the number of ambassadors sent and the role of Issa in the 
process. A further piece of evidence from antiquity that sheds light on the situation can be 
found in an often-overlooked passage in Pliny’s Natural History. Pliny mentions that three-
foot tall statues were placed near the rostra in the Roman forum in customary fashion for 
ambassadors killed whilst in service to Rome; these statues included those of Publius Junius 
and Titus Coruncanius, two ambassadors slain by the Illyrian Queen Teuta.449 Sehlmeyer has 
asserted that Pliny’s source material for the passage was the annales, and that the statues could 
not have been well inscribed, given the discrepancy between this and the Polybian version.450 
Sehlmeyer is correct to stress the problematic annalistic version of events and highlight the 
discrepancy. Polybius’ account however only features the murder of one ambassador, even 
though two were sent out from Rome.  
It is unclear exactly where Pliny’s information came from for Publius Junius, although 
a reference to the murder of a Coruncanius is common in most of the sources. Sehlmeyer has 
also noted that for Pliny, the erection of these statues was meant as a means of honouring 
them.451 The placement of the statues in a prominent position in the forum was likely as a 
means of reminding the Roman public of the perceived injustices suffered; Pliny’s emphasis 
on their murder whilst in service of the Republic highlights this importance. Both Appian and 
Cassius Dio however have drawn attention to the importance of appeals from Issa in their 
accounts, although the Issaean appeal is absent from Polybius. Gelzer has argued that the lack 
of inclusion in Polybius is likely due to its omission from Fabius Pictor as it damaged the notion 
that Rome went to war as a result of an outrage.452 Walbank however has stressed that Issa did 
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not join the Romans until 229 BC.453 Whilst Gelzer’s proposal is possible, the idea that Issa 
had a strong diplomatic bond with Rome before 229 BC should be dismissed. Polybius may 
have elected to omit the Issaean embassy, if it actually occurred at all, as a means to reduce 
convolution in the passage and draw greater attention to the importance of Rome suffering a 
direct attack from the Illyrians; much in the same manner as the Greeks along the coast had 
also. This would have furthered the idea of a mutual experience for the Romans and Greeks at 
the hands of the Illyrians, setting out an effective precursor for the ‘interconnectedness’ 
between the foreign affairs of the two, who mutually suffered at the hands of the Illyrian 
common enemy.454 Derow has shed further light on the subject, by stressing the importance of 
the inclusion of Kleemporus in Appian’s account. Derow has noted that the name is unusual, 
occurring three other times in literature, one of whom was an Issaean ambassador during the 
time of Caesar’s pro-consulship of Illyricum.455 Whilst Derow is correct to highlight that the 
name is unusual, and a name also used for another Issaean ambassador, the evidence provided 
is circumstantial and is not as conclusive as Derow suggests. Gruen has offered a different 
interpretation which stresses that ‘Roman envoys went to Issa to deliver their complaint for an 
obvious reason: the Illyrian ruler happened to be there at the time, conducting a siege of the 
island’.456 This would appear a simpler and more sound argument; Gruen suggests that the 
ideas surrounding the Issaean appeals developed later with misinterpretations of the role of Issa 
in Polybius’ account.457 Although the role of Issa in the embassy is uncertain, a consensus 
exists within the surviving sources for the importance of a murdered ambassador, most likely 
named Coruncanius. This event can subsequently be seen as the pretext given for the Roman 
intervention. 
 Although the murder of an ambassador was a common feature in the ancient accounts, 
the nature of the incident as a pretext has drawn considerable debate in the secondary literature. 
Harris has noted that the ‘murder seems to be a fact, and even the leaders of the Senate may 
have believed the somewhat implausible claim, afterwards put about by the Romans, that Teuta 
herself was responsible.’ 458 Harris is right to question the claim of responsibility to Teuta, 
describing it as ‘highly convenient’ and without much evidence.459 This view is shared by 
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Petzold, who has raised issues regarding the characterisation of Teuta in Polybius’ account, 
undergoing a sudden mood swing from the cold-blooded murder of an ambassador to begging 
in subordination in the war’s aftermath.460 This shift is not effectively signposted in Polybius’ 
account. Teuta’s actions subsequently appear irrational and the mood swing depicted, without 
foundation. The scene depicting the embassy between the Illyrian Queen and the Roman 
envoys, together with the speeches recorded by Polybius, serve to dramatically juxtapose the 
behaviours of a foreign monarch with a Roman envoy. As mentioned earlier in the thesis, 
speeches in Polybius’ text raise considerable problems regarding their accuracy. The format of 
any embassy that took place and the content of the speeches recorded cannot subsequently be 
ascertained with any degree of certainty. Walbank has addressed the problematic scene in 
Polybius’ account and raised issues regarding its authenticity.461 Given the lack of concrete 
evidence for the events that took place, and the propagandistic nature of the source material, 
the manner in which the murder of the ambassador took place cannot be effectively determined. 
Eckstein has nevertheless asserted that war was inevitable upon the murder of an 
ambassador in accordance with Roman custom.462 This appears in direct contrast to Harris, 
who, in reference to the embassy,  asserts that ‘even without the murder, its rejection was likely 
to lead to war’.463 Gruen has also stressed that whilst the notion that ‘a member of the mission 
perished before returning home may well be true’, ‘the story lacked firm basis’ given the 
incongruity of the different versions in the surviving historical record.464 It is important here to 
distinguish between the better historically attested fact of the murder of an ambassador and the 
more conjectural descriptions used to describe the murder itself. The aforementioned statues in 
Rome described by Pliny, point to the significance of the event of murdering an ambassador. 
Pliny in the passage indeed stresses that it was customary for the Romans to honour the 
ambassadors who had unjustly been put to death (a fidenatibus in legatione interfectorum (…) 
iniuria caesis).465 Whilst the authenticity of the overly-dramatic and propagandistic depictions 
of the murder of an ambassador should be questioned, the simple notion of the murder itself is 
better historically attested. As mentioned earlier, the important moral and religious 
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underpinnings of Roman diplomacy would have made the act highly impious and provided the 
key pretext to Rome’s intervention. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Roman decision to intervene in the First Illyrian War was based on the important 
context of the escalation of Adriatic piracy conducted by the Ardiaei. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Ardiaean aggression played an important role in drawing Roman attention to 
the Southern Adriatic. The piratical raids of the Ardiaei during the 3rd Century BC played a 
fundamental role in shaping the Illyrian association with piracy in the Adriatic; ‘relatively little 
is heard about the Illyrians before the second half of the third century BC, when the Ardiaean 
kings expanded their territory southwards along the Dalmatian coast.’466 Earlier evidence for 
piracy is limited, documenting sporadic episodes and anecdotal phrases about the perceived 
habitual barbarity of this practice amongst the Illyrians. Illyrian piracy threatened burgeoning 
trade networks and commercial interests between Southern Italy and the South Eastern Adriatic 
coast. It is in the context of these trade networks that the response to Illyrian piracy was made; 
‘this vibrant regional and interregional trade in the Third Century B.C.E., likely attracted 
Roman merchants from mainland Italy to Illyria, less than a day’s sail away.’467 The Southern 
Adriatic was an area with important trade networks to Southern Italy, Sicily, the Greek 
mainland and the central Mediterranean. The economic, as well as strategic importance of 
controlling the Otranto Straits was an important underlying factor for Roman intervention. 
 The primary pretext for the Roman intervention, the murder of a Roman ambassador, 
is likely a factual occurrence. The manner in which the murder is depicted in the sources 
however has proven particularly problematic and has brought the authenticity of these passages 
into question. This is especially true for the surviving Polybian version; the Polybian version 
of events was likely engineered to fit into the wider themes of the Histories. Polybius’ 
background moreover provided him with plentiful personal experiences to draw from for his 
accounts, although modern scholars have noted that ‘Polybius composed the Histories in an 
intellectual environment largely favourable towards Rome, and strongly inclined to accept 
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imperialism’.468 Justifications were required for Rome’s military interventions in the form of 
pretexts which portrayed Rome as honourable in interstate relations. This requirement was 
prominent for the ancient sources and the pretexts which have been offered by them are often 
tainted by annalistic traditions or a need to present Rome in an overly favourable light. 
Although these events are depicted dramatically in the accounts, the murder itself is better 
historically attested. The murder of an ambassador would have prompted the Romans to act 
and precipitated the Roman intervention in the First Illyrian War. As Dzino has noted, ‘the 
First Illyrian War was caused primarily by Roman reaction to the murder of their envoys and 
was focused on humbling and dividing the Illyrian kingdom.’469 
 The Roman decision-making process furthermore, underwent important developments 
during the Third Century BC. Reforms to the rerum repetitio and the practical manner in which 
the Romans declared war facilitated the Roman commencement of hostilities. The ability for 
legati to effectively declare war through a denuntiatio belli had profound consequences for 
later Roman interventions. Walbank has noted that the importance of this development had an 
important bearing on the course of events in Roman declarations of war in 218 BC and 200 
BC.470 Together with the greater Roman capacity for waging war across the Mediterranean 
from increased sources of manpower, these provided the necessary conditions for more 
aggressive and expansive Roman interventions to emerge in subsequent decades. Harris’ view, 
that ‘Rome took almost the first opportunity to intervene there (in Illyria) once the acquisitions 
of the First Punic War had been put in order’ should be considered in this context.471 The greater 
practical capability of the Roman Republic to wage aggressive and expansive wars across the 
Mediterranean needs to be considered alongside any notion of a continued Roman proclivity 
for warfare in this fashion. These important developments in the Third Century BC 
subsequently provided the necessary practical means by which more aggressive and expansive 
Roman interventions could be enacted. 
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Chapter 4 – The Second Illyrian War 
 
Introduction 
 
The Roman intervention in the Second Illyrian War was precipitated by the perceived 
transgressions of Demetrius of Pharos and served to effectively remove him from his position 
of power in the region. The limited objectives of the intervention were reflective of the limited 
Roman interest in the region from the aftermath of the First Illyrian War. In both the accounts 
of Polybius and Appian, the war is directed specifically against Demetrius himself and his 
actions are cited as the cause of the Roman interventions.472 Eckstein has noted that the Roman 
action in intervening against Demetrius put an end ‘to a decade of indifference’ in which 
Roman concerns in Illyria were minimal.473 This is reflected in the sources, as the period of the 
interbellum is afforded sparse coverage, with events in Illyria being reintroduced with the 
Roman decision to intervene. This chapter shall consider the pretext for the Roman intervention 
of the perceived transgressions of Demetrius, together with a consideration of the limited 
Roman involvement and interest in the region. The importance of the diplomatic constructs 
that formed the bond between Demetrius and Rome shall be considered to effectively consider 
the implications of the perceived transgressions. The historical accounts of the Second Illyrian 
War concentrate on a portrayal of Demetrius, drawing particular attention to his character flaws 
and pouring contempt over his actions. Although the actions of Demetrius served as the key 
pretext for Roman intervention, the moralising tone of these accounts has limited their 
effectiveness. 
The nature and scope of Rome’s involvement in Illyria shall first be considered by 
analysing the series of Roman allegiances forged at the conclusion of the First Illyrian War and 
the efficacy of a range of terms that have been utilised by historians to define the associations. 
The concept of an ‘external hegemony’ as coined by Eckstein and outlined in the introduction 
to the thesis, shall be considered to assess the effectiveness of the concept in describing the 
limited nature of Rome’s involvement.474 The chapter will then progress to consider the context 
of a growing Macedonian threat. The Roman interventions in Illyria have often been seen in 
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the context of their hostility with Macedon in the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC; Illyria being seen 
as part of a larger geopolitical struggle between the Romans and Macedonians. Holleaux first 
outlined this view in 1935, asserting that Rome’s interventions in the First and Second Illyrian 
Wars were an attempt to prevent the Macedonian kings from extending their influence and 
power to the Adriatic.475 This has been furthered in more recent scholarship, most notably by 
Harris. Harris, in his discussion of Rome’s actions after the First Illyrian War, states that ‘the 
target of this policy, it must have been clear, was Macedon’.476 The importance of the wider 
geopolitical struggles with Macedon is overstated at this early stage however and owes much 
to hindsight of later hostilities. Eckstein has challenged this view by labelling it a ‘modern 
reconstruction of events’ and stresses that Polybius makes a concern of Macedon a minor issue 
to the Roman decision to intervene in Illyria in 219 BC.477 Bearing in mind the aforementioned 
theme in Polybius to show the ‘interconnectedness’ of the Roman and wider Greek political 
world, of which the Roman-Macedonian wars were a significant component, it is perhaps 
surprising that Polybius does not cite an earlier Roman-Macedonian tension. Errington has 
drawn attention to the importance of the events of 217 BC as a turning point in Roman-
Macedonian hostilities, noting that the harbouring of Demetrius of Pharos by Philip V, was 
‘not in itself a hostile act’.478 Whilst Errington is perhaps too strong with this assertion over 
Demetrius, he and Eckstein are nevertheless correct to question the validity of Roman 
hostilities with Macedon before 217 BC. Beginning in 217 BC, the Roman conflicts with 
Macedon were initially based on reacting and containing the threat posed by Macedon to the 
Adriatic. Rome’s greater interest during this initial period was focused on the more pressing 
threat of Hannibal in Italy; Rome sought to keep Macedon at a distance and protect its ‘external 
hegemony’ over the southern Adriatic. 
Roman Associations in Illyria 
 
Although no definitive description of Rome’s arrangements on the eastern Adriatic 
coast in the aftermath of the First Illyrian War is extant in the ancient historical texts, it is 
nevertheless important to initially consider what information can be gleamed from the 
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accounts. Polybius notes that during the campaign, Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnus, Issa, the 
Parthini and the Atintani all surrendered themselves to Roman protection.479 Appian asserts 
that Pharos and Corcyra were surrendered to the Romans by Demetrius, a friendship (φιλίαν) 
was subsequently formed between Rome and Epidmanus and the Atintani went over to the 
Romans.480 Appian in the conclusion of hostilities however notes that Pharos, Corcyra, Issa, 
Epidmanus and the Atintani were subject to Rome (ὑπηκόους).481 It is unclear from Appian’s 
account exactly what this status entailed, and the lack of a more definitive term with more 
explicit diplomatic meaning has rendered his description problematic. Appian however notes 
that the Romans made Apollonia and Corcyra free and later discusses the importance of the 
detaching of the Atintani from Rome by Demetrius of Pharos.482 Walbank has highlighted this 
passage as a clarification of the existence of free-states in the arrangement and he has stressed 
that it would ‘hardly be true of just these two states alone’.483 It is not clear however exactly in 
what ways these states could exercise their freedom. Appian, in an early fragment from his 
work on Macedonian Affairs, notes that in the late 3rd Century BC, Greeks were giving 
themselves over, ἐκόμισεν, to the Romans.484 This term conveys a range of meanings, ranging 
from paying heed to servitude, and this has added to the problems with Appian’s statements on 
the diplomatic relationships in his accounts. As such, the ancient sources provide some insight 
into the states that aligned with Rome in the aftermath of the First Illyrian War, although it is 
impossible to draw accurate inference on the precise nature of these relationships due to the 
limitations of the source material. 
 Eckstein has additionally highlighted the ‘innumerable references to relationships of 
amicitia or philia - i.e. friendship – among states’ in the sources.485 The informal and imprecise 
nature of these relations has caused greater debate amongst modern scholars regarding the 
precise nature of the relationship forged with Rome. Walbank has asserted that Corcyra, 
Apollonia and Epidamnus maintained rights to mint their own coinage, including some 
Corcyrean drachmae that bore the inscription: ROMA.486 Badian has however argued that these 
coins were struck by the Corcyreans at the request of Rome; an analysis that Walbank has 
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found convincing.487 This would reflect a traditional model of clinetela relationship, in which 
the actions of the client states to Rome were effectively restricted. Petzold by contrast has 
suggested that the polities within the region that were associated with Rome exercise autonomy 
over their own affairs, conducting themselves as they had before, principally on the basis of 
self-maximisation.488 Roman power in this scenario nevertheless retained importance in the 
political calculations employed by these polities. This perspective is more in line with 
Eckstein’s concept of an ‘external hegemony’ being employed by Rome. 
Hammond, by contrast, has argued that Rome exercised greater direct control over these 
entities in the form of a ‘Roman Protectorate’.489 The modern term ‘protectorate’ has been 
applied by scholars to describe the agreements and associations forged by Rome and a variety 
of entities east of the Adriatic at the conclusion of the First Illyrian War. A ‘protectorate’ as 
defined in international law and applied in this context refers to ‘a relatively powerful State’s 
promise to protect a weaker State from external aggression or internal disturbance, in return 
for which the protected entity yields certain powers to the protector. Typically, the legal basis 
for a regime of protection is a treaty by which the protecting State acquires full control over 
the external affairs of another State or territory, while the latter continues to have command 
over its internal affairs.’490 The term ‘Roman Protectorate’, used to describe the collection of 
states aligned to Rome, after the First Illyrian War, and then renewed after the Second Illyrian 
War, was first coined by Holleaux in 1928.491 The lack of terminology used by the ancient 
sources to effectively describe the arrangement has been particularly problematic to 
interpreting the nature and implications of Rome’s diplomatic arrangement. Difficulty in 
applying the term ‘protectorate’ is reflected by Hammond, who describes the term as 
‘euphemistic’ in defining ‘the area subjected to Rome’.492 Holleaux’s term nevertheless gained 
popularity in ensuing works, being utilised by both Hammond and Cabanes.493 On the other 
hand, Badian, and later Dzino, have seen the Roman arrangement as indicative of more of a 
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looser series of friendship alliances.494 The challenges to Holleaux’s original thesis were well 
founded, addressing the discrepancy between a formal arrangement in Hollaeux and the lack 
of a coherent and discernible arrangement of this sort in the extant sources.  
Eckstein however has offered alternative terminology to describe the arrangement, a 
‘sphere of influence’.495 A sphere of influence has been effectively defined by Keal as  the 
exertion of a ‘predominant influence’ by a single external power which ‘limits the 
independence or freedom of action of states’ within a definite region.496 The predominant 
influence of the external power is hegemonic, prevailing over the influence of other comparable 
powers over the region.497 In applying the concept to the situation in Illyrian in 229/8 BC, 
Eckstein has stressed the lack of Roman involvement in Illyria in the aftermath of the First 
Illyrian War, with ‘only the loosest of hegemonies in Illyria’ exerted by the Romans.498 This 
hegemony was dependent on the lack of competitors to challenge it, and broke down with the 
emergence of Demetrius of Pharos as a rival in the region later in the decade. Roman hegemony 
over Illyria during the period being considered in this thesis, was not forcibly entrenched by 
permanent administration or troops on the ground with Rome, instead, operating at a distance. 
This notion of ‘external hegemony’ suitably fits the nature of Rome’s geopolitical influence 
over the region during this period. Eckstein has asserted that ‘the Romans understood that it 
was possible to have real amicitia between unequal partner, and so the prevalence of amicitia 
with foreign states need not have been an ineffective means of exercising strong influence when 
Rome wished.’499 The informal associations which Rome signed suited the Roman need for 
flexibility in the arrangement in which a Roman ‘external hegemony’ could persist. For the 
entities along the Adriatic coast, the arrangements would have provided a notion of autonomy, 
reinforced by the hands-off approach of the Romans whilst affording them the protection of a 
stronger state from the aggressions of the Ardiaei. Gruen has noted that ‘the communities of 
Corcyra, Apollonia and Epidamnus possessed longstanding commercial connections with the 
Greeks of Southern Italy and naturally welcomed Rome’s assistance against Illyrian 
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marauders.’500 The informal bond of friendship could serve in this way as a means of drawing 
assistance again in future, as and when this would be required. 
The status of Apollonia and Epidamnus as important ports of embarkation for Romans 
travelling east of the Adriatic is well attested in the sources.501 This would have secured a 
greater means of contact between Italy and the eastern Adriatic coast and would, in ensuing 
decades, enable the Romans to effectively and safely send their armies across the Adriatic. 
Badian has stressed the importance of the diplomatic arrangements in ensuring Roman 
command across the Otranto Strait against further piracy.502 Dzino has also highlighted the 
importance of the Otranto Strait to Rome and has stressed the Roman diplomatic arrangements 
being forged or renewed with the ‘separate political entities affected by the war’.503 The 
importance of the strategic objective of ensuring greater control over the Otranto Strait and 
greater security over the wider Adriatic can be reflected in the diplomatic arrangements. This 
can be seen by the map cited in the Appendix and taken from Hammond’s examination of the 
‘Roman Protectorate’, which sets out the geographic boundary of the majority of the states 
aligned to Rome in the southern Adriatic.504 Although a slight discrepancy exists between 
Holleaux and Hammond regarding the geographic positioning of the Parthini, both agree to a 
rough geographic outline for the states diplomatically aligned to Rome. These states were 
directly across the Otranto Strait from Italy. As stated previously, these areas held the greatest 
strategic importance to Rome. The Roman desire to engage with these states, rather than 
entities in the Northern Adriatic reflected the disparate geopolitical makeup of Illyria and the 
importance to Rome of narrowing their involvement to these areas. 
 Perhaps some of our best evidence to better understand the nature of Rome's allegiances 
on the coast comes from an inscription from Pharos in the form of a psephisma in two separate 
fragments, which can be seen in the Appendix.505 The psephisma documents an appeal from 
Pharos to its metropolis, Paros, outlining the desolation of the city of Pharos and in the process, 
referring back to a prior diplomatic arrangement between Pharos and Rome. The poor quality 
of the fragments however, especially fragment A (Fig. 7a.), has made an analysis of the 
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contents of the psephisma very difficult. The most pertinent part of the inscription appears on 
line 8 of fragment A. Reconstructed, it is believed to read: συμμα - [ξίαν (καὶ φιλίαν)], 
potentially relating to an alliance and friendship existing between the two entities.506 The 
reading of this expression in the inscription has caused significant debate in the secondary 
literature. Derow has argued that ‘one substantial conclusion must emerge: that Pharos had an 
alliance, συμμαχίαν,with Rome from some point in the third century BC’507 Eckstein however 
has challenged this argument by asserting that the inscription ‘cannot bear the great political 
weight that has been put on it’ and that it is incongruent with the surviving written accounts.508 
Whilst both arguments make good points, neither provides a satisfactory answer to interpreting 
the psephisma. Derow’s assertion does not take into account the limitations and complexities 
of the terminology and Eckstein has sought to disguise the extant terminology to fit the 
psephisma into his overall argument. As mentioned earlier in the thesis, the distinction between 
socii (allies/associates) and amici (friends) and with socii et amici, is hard to effectively 
determine. The distinction was first raised by Mommsen, who asserted that socii et amici 
reflected a more formal alliance of friendship; this view has largely been discredited.509 It is 
subsequently not clear whether the ‘friendship and alliance’ being alluded to in the psephisma 
is indicative of a more formal form of alliance; in all likelihood it would have operated as a 
form of relatively informal friendship. Eckstein has stressed that Derow’s reading of the 
psephisma would strongly support Harris’ notion of an aggressive and expansionist Rome 
operating in the eastern Adriatic by 228 BC. This however does not take into account the lack 
of Roman interest in large parts of Illyria and the lack of direct control imposed on the region 
by Rome. This would be supported by the more tangible, if not necessarily more formal, 
diplomatic arrangement being set out in the inscription. 
Further questions have been raised regarding the dating of the psephisma and the dating 
of the diplomatic arrangement being referred back to in the inscription. Derow has dated the 
psephisma to the 3rd Century BC, asserting that the desolation of Pharos being referred to was 
from the Roman attack in 219 BC, with the diplomatic arrangement referring to 228 BC.510 
The Roman attack of 219 BC is the most historically attested attack on the city and it is to this 
historical attestation that Derow has based his claim. Burton has however challenged this claim 
by noting that the ‘city of the Pharians’ referred to in the inscription could not have had a 
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diplomatic arrangement with Rome in 228 BC by the fact that Demetrius was in control of 
Pharos after the First Illyrian War and had an agreement of amicitia with Rome.511 Eckstein 
has stressed that the dating of the psephisma remains uncertain; the inscription could be dated 
from any time from the early 3rd Century BC down to around 150 BC.512 Although the event 
of 219 BC is well attested in the sources there is certainly no guarantee that the desolation of 
Pharos mentioned in the psephisma refers to this precise event. Burton is certainly correct to 
highlight the practical problems raised by the earlier date however given the status of 
Demetrius in 228 BC. Eckstein has further highlighted the epigraphical problems with the 
inscription, asserting that ‘iota adscript turns out to be employed with words in the dative 
ending in omega, suggesting an earlier date; it is not, however, employed at all with words in 
the dative ending with eta (and there are perhaps eleven such cases on the inscription), which 
suggests a later date.’513 This once more raises the limitations of drawing substantive inference 
from the inscription. It is also difficult to effectively posit the inscription in the wider context 
as there are very few dateable Greek inscriptions from Illyria. As such, the inscription is 
particularly problematic to use, and the dating cannot be deduced with any degree of certainty. 
The diplomatic arrangement alluded to in Fragment A is suggestive of a συμμαξίαν καὶ φιλίαν 
(friendship and alliance), but the connotations of the diplomatic phrasing make it difficult to 
determine exactly what this would entail. 
 
Roman Treaties 
 
The terms of the Roman treaty at the conclusion of the First Illyrian War nevertheless 
can provide some important insight into the limited Roman strategic objectives in their 
intervention. Polybius outlined the terms of the treaty, noting that Teuta agreed to pay a fixed 
tribute to Rome, to abandon all Illyricum with the exception of a few districts, and to refrain 
from sailing beyond Lissus with more than two unarmed vessels.514 Appian makes no mention 
of the tribute, but stresses the Lissus clause in the treaty and that Pinnes could inherit Agron’s 
kingdom and be a ‘friend’ of Rome if he agreed to keep his hands off the newly aligned territory 
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513Eckstein, ‘Pharos and the Question of Roman Treaties of Alliance in the Greek East in the Third Century 
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514Polybius, Histories 2. 12. 
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to Rome.515 Cassius Dio mentions no terms of the treaty, only noting that Teuta abdicated 
power to Pinnes.516 The absence of the tribute in Appian’s account has drawn questions over 
the authenticity of the treaty that he presents, particularly when compared to the more 
comprehensive Polybian version. Both Appian and Polybius draw emphasis to particular terms 
in the treaty, most notably to a clause involving Lissus and the separation of territory. Walbank 
has noted that the terms of the Lissus clause ‘secured the freedom of the Ionian Sea for Italian 
and Greek shipping’.517 As mentioned earlier in the thesis, the objectives of the Romans and 
Adriatic Greeks were limited in the First Illyrian War and centred around the need to secure 
the southern Adriatic from Illyrian piracy. The Lissus clause would have provided greater 
protection for shipping routes across the southern Adriatic, the Strait of Otranto and the Ionian 
seas. The emphasis of the clause in Polybius would also have served to further demonstrate the 
mutual objectives of the Romans and Greeks in the Adriatic in reducing the risk of Illyrian 
piracy. By containing Illyrian vessels north of Lissus, the Romans could be presented in 
Polybius’ account as alleviating the Illyrian piratical menace from mainland Greece. The 
coastal areas were most important to Rome; the separation of the coast between the various 
states aligned to Rome, the territory controlled by Demetrius and that of the Ardiaean kingdom, 
together with the limitations of the Lissus clause greatly restricted the ability of another strong 
Illyrian maritime power to emerge. 
 Incongruity nevertheless exists between the sources, with Polybius citing the payment 
of a tribute and Appian highlighting a potential diplomatic friendship between Pinnes and 
Rome. Polybius makes no mention of Pinnes in his account and Errington has argued that this 
suggests that 'Polybius is not very well informed about Illyrian affairs’.518 It remains unclear 
as to why Polybius excluded him from his account, although it enabled Polybius to concentrate 
more on Teuta, whose role in the Polybian version, has been highlighted earlier in the thesis. 
Harris has highlighted the passage regarding a possible war indemnity, although he accepts that 
‘it is hard to see how the Illyrians could have paid much of an indemnity after the campaign of 
229-8’.519 Gruen has however commented on Harris’ claim, asserting that there is ‘no evidence 
and little likelihood’ for it.520 Harris’ statement rests on a vague mention in Polybius’ account 
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which is not noted elsewhere, a point which Harris concedes. It is unlikely that there was a war 
indemnity of a significant kind in any case given the precarious position of the Ardiaean 
kingdom in 228 BC. If a war indemnity was imposed, it would have merely reflected the greater 
Roman need to weaken the Ardiaean kingdom as a means of limiting their ability to conduct 
raids. Von Scala traditionally believed that Polybius’ source for the treaty terms was the 
Achaean record office.521 Walbank has however noted that it would be very unlikely for 
Polybius to have access to them and the more likely source is Fabius Pictor.522 Considering 
Polybius’ reliance on the annalistic tradition present in Fabius Pictor for other episodes of the 
First Illyrian War in Book II, and Polybius’ heavy reliance on annalistic traditions more 
generally for events predating 220 BC, it is more likely that Walbank is correct in sourcing the 
treaty terms in Fabius Pictor. Although incongruity exists between the sources, the treaty 
enabled Rome to secure its strategic objectives through their intervention. These were centred 
on the suppression of Illyrian piracy in the Southern Adriatic and ensuring the greater 
geopolitical stability in the region to safeguard against the emergence of another Illyrian 
maritime power in the Adriatic. 
 As Eckstein has argued, the primacy of these strategic interests in Roman decision-
making can be observed in contemporary Roman treaties with other states.523 Two particularly 
useful examples for contextual consideration were the Treaty of Flamininus of 196 BC that 
ended the 2nd Macedonian War and the Treaty of Apamea of 188 BC which ended the Roman 
war with Antiochus III.524 These treaties were signed after decisive Roman military victories 
at Cynoscephelae in 197 BC and Magnesia in 189 BC respectively. As such, they reflect Roman 
strategic motivations behind their interventions as the Romans in both cases dictated the terms 
of the peace. By contrast the Treaty of Phoenice in 205 BC was approached as a means of 
compromise between Rome and Macedon and involved the dividing up of territory in Illyria 
between the Romans and the Macedonians.525 As such, the Roman treaties forged in the 
aftermath of Roman victory can be seen to better reflect Roman aims. In the Treaty of 
Flamininus of 196 BC, the Romans exacted a war indemnity from Philip V of 1,000 talents, 
took all his ships bar ten and took one of his sons, Demetrius, to Rome as a hostage.526 Polybius 
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sets the indemnity at the lower rate of 200 talents and stresses that a mutual agreement of trust, 
πιστωσάμενοι, was agreed upon.527 Although a discrepancy exists between the two sources 
regarding the size of the war indemnity, the terms of the treaty are fairly congruent in both 
accounts. The terms set out in the treaty limited Philip’s ability to wage war and created a 
geopolitical imbalance through the taking of an important claimant to the throne as a hostage. 
The moral bond in Polybius’ account likely highlighted the importance of the arrangement 
between Philip V and Rome; an arrangement that Perseus would break in the ensuing decades. 
The terms of the treaty are similar to those enacted by Rome in 228 BC against the Illyrians. 
Prime concern in both of these treaties was afforded to a desire to weaken the enemy state, 
geopolitically and military by limiting their ability to wage war. The moral bond included in 
Polybius’ account of the Treaty of Flamininus was similar to that presented in Appian’s account 
of the Illyrian treaty of 228 BC. The establishment of a flexible bond with important moral 
underpinnings was beneficial to Rome and enabled them to control their scope of interventions 
in future through the framework of the diplomatic arrangement. 
 Similarly, the Treaty of Apamea in 188 BC showed similarities with the other two 
treaties. Appian outlines the terms of the treaty, noting that Antiochus III was stripped of all 
territory west of the Taurus mountains, banned from keeping elephants and was only allowed 
as many ships as the Romans would allow him, and must hand over 20 hostages to Rome at 
the discretion of the Roman consul. Antiochus III was also compelled to pay a war indemnity 
in instalments to Rome; all these clauses were in the treaty to ensure that Antiochus could then 
be made a ‘friend’ of Rome.528 Polybius shows a slight discrepancy over the war indemnity 
and adds further detail on the other clauses, stressing an additional war indemnity was to be 
paid to Eumenes II of Pergamum and that the hostages were to be aged between 18 and 45 with 
the process of hostage taking recycled every three years.529 The terms of the treaty are based 
on similar themes to the previous treaties signed in Illyria in 228 BC and Macedon in 196 BC. 
Both the Treaty of Flamininus and the Treaty of Apamea in some of the accounts feature four 
prominent clauses; military sanctions, hostages being taken by the Romans, a war indemnity 
and a bond of amicitia to be agreed upon between Rome and the respective entity. These terms 
weakened the foreign enemy of Rome geopolitically and militarily and reduced their ability to 
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wage war against Rome again. The terms of the Treaty of Apamea however were notably 
harsher than the previously agreed upon treaties. Grainger has noted that the results of the treaty 
greatly damaged the status of the Seleucid Empire, the result of which produced a situation 
where ‘Rome was clearly the one and only superpower in the known world’.530 Eckstein has 
likewise asserted that ‘the Roman Republic managed by 188 BC to create what political 
scientists call a ‘unipolar’ system in the Mediterranean’.531 Although it is difficult to 
completely ascribe this status to Rome in 188 BC, the Treaty of Apamea did nevertheless reflect 
a greater underlying Roman motivation to shape the region of Asia Minor in its own interests. 
Antiochus III was forced to hand over large amounts of territory, which was duly awarded to 
Rome’s Pergamene allies. The treaty marked an important shift in the tone and the scale of the 
terms from those previously, although the key themes of weakening the opposing state 
geopolitically and militarily were nevertheless present. 
 
Demetrius of Pharos 
 
Rome’s intervention in the Second Illyrian War was prompted by the actions of 
Demetrius of Pharos, although the timing of Rome’s intervention has posed important 
questions regarding the nature of the pretext to intervene. The ancient historical accounts focus 
specifically on Demetrius’ role in the prelude to the Roman intervention, emphasising an act 
of betrayal by Demetrius in violating the treaty from the First Illyrian War. Appian alludes to 
Demetrius' faithless spirit in his dealings with Rome and suggests that the Romans were 
initially wary of Demetrius at the time of the settlement for the First Illyrian War, asserting that 
the Romans had a mistrust, ἀπιστίαν, of Demetrius.532 The choice of term here by Appian is 
particularly poignant, being the antonym of the important Greek concept of πίστις, a concept 
that operated in a similar manner to Roman fides in underpinning diplomatic associations. 
Appian’s inclusion of an earlier Roman mistrust is an addition made in hindsight, likely as a 
means to present Rome as duly aware and suspicious at an earlier stage than in reality. Polybius 
likewise stressed the betrayal in his account, pointing to the ingratitude and temerity of 
Demetrius in his actions in disdaining the kindness afforded him by Rome.533 Polybius’ 
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emphasis on the service or kindness afforded to Demetrius by Rome, stresses the importance 
of their previous relationship. Walbank has however noted that the portrayal in Polybius’ 
account of ‘an aggressive and reckless Demetrius’ is likely an annalistic tradition.534 The source 
of the annalistic tradition in Polybius’ account is assumed by Gelzer to be Fabius Pictor,535 
although it is uncertain from which annalist the picture of Demetrius shown comes from. 
Although the source of the tradition is uncertain, the Polybian portrayal of Demetrius is 
reflected in a variety of sources. Cassius Dio also draws attention to the previous relationship 
between Demetrius and Rome, asserting that Demetrius abused their previous friendship 
(φιλίᾳ).536 It is perhaps not surprising that the sources draw so much attention to the importance 
of Demetrius of Pharos as it provided an effective pretext for the Second Illyrian War. The 
language and tone used in the sources served to highlight the important moral elements of the 
diplomatic tie that existed between the two entities. Whilst the sources present a hyperbolic 
image of Demetrius, the important element of fides was crucial to Rome’s diplomatic tie with 
Demetrius; the breaking of this bond would have been seen as an impious act to Rome. Badian 
has highlighted the example of Demetrius of Pharos as ‘the ungrateful client’; the Roman 
intervention was a demonstration of ‘the importance of remembering Rome’s beneficia. The 
nature of political clientela was becoming clear: the client must not forget his station and the 
benefits he had received from Rome’.537 Gruen has however stressed that ‘the contamination 
of hindsight and apologia taint the evidence’ and asserted that ‘Demetrius could hardly have 
banked on Macedonian support in 220 BC’.’538 The explanation for the irrational action by 
Demetrius has been explained by his character flaws in the sources. Gruen is correct to 
highlight the questions of authenticity that this raises to the accounts. For Polybius’ audience 
and the audiences of later historians, the notion of reckless action against Rome would have 
been considered impious given the status of Rome in the Mediterranean from the late 2nd 
Century BC onwards. 
 The delay of the Romans in intervening against Demetrius has however made an 
analysis of the pretext problematic. The actions of Demetrius that could be construed to violate 
the treaty occurred over the course of the period 222 BC to 219 BC, with no singular action 
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being especially highlighted in the sources.539 Dzino has suggested that ‘it is possible that 
Roman laissez faire trans-Adriatic policy in this period was understood as a signal to Demetrius 
that he could extend his influence, and later when his power grew it might have appeared to 
him that Rome was incapable of reacting to his provocations.’540 It is quite possible that the 
lack of a Roman response to the events from 222 BC onwards prompted Demetrius to continue 
his actions. Polybius indeed notes that Demetrius had observed that Rome had its hands full 
against the Gauls in Northern Italy and had taken advantage of the situation.541 Polybius may 
have emphasised this  to draw even greater attention to Demetrius’ betrayal, citing the betrayal 
in an early opportunity presented to Demetrius. Demetrius was held in particularly low regard 
by Polybius, who blamed him for influencing Philip V to turn westwards and combat Rome.542 
This may subsequently be considered as part of the broader Polybian hostility against 
Demetrius. The Romans were engaged in an arduous campaign in the 220s against the Gauls 
of Northern Italy and the Istrians by the end of the decade, which will have limited Rome’s 
ability to intervene. Walbank has stressed the importance of this, and the wider tensions 
between Carthage and Rome, stating that ‘the Romans only crossed over to close the back door 
because they feared what stood outside’.543 Walbank may be judging the episode with too much 
hindsight, although Roman priorities were not in Illyria for the period 222 – 219 BC but 
elsewhere.544 The Roman pretext as such, should be seen in the accumulative nature of the 
treaty violations. Rome needed to act against the breaking of the treaty and the fides which 
underpinned it, but only did so when it was capable of acting and when it was prudent to do so. 
Many of the treaty terms from the aftermath of the First Illyrian War contained clauses 
which sought to restrict Illyrian piracy, especially in the Southern Adriatic. These treaties 
however were signed by Teuta on behalf of Pinnes in both the accounts of Appian and Polybius, 
and not directly with Demetrius.545 Some historians have sought to stress that Demetrius may 
not have considered the treaty binding on him, and subsequently conducted piracy.546 This has 
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been challenged by Eckstein who stresses that Demetrius was the regent of the Ardiaei when 
undertaking Adriatic piracy and was thus subject to the terms of the treaty.547 Cassius Dio notes 
that Demetrius of Pharos had married Pinnes’ mother Triteuta in the interbellum and, in the 
process, had established himself as regent for the Ardiaei.548 Moreover Scerdilaidas, his 
associate in the piratical raids, was Agron's brother and thus part of the Ardiaean royal 
family.549 Whether the treaty directly applied to Demetrius or not remains somewhat unclear. 
He may well have believed that the treaty didn't, providing some context for his impulsive 
actions although crucially the treaty was believed to be in force by the Romans and provided 
the key justification for the subsequent intervention. Polybius in explaining the origins of the 
conflict, notably stresses how Demetrius' actions were in direct contradiction to the 
aforementioned treaty.550 If it is to be accepted that the Romans still saw the treaty as valid, 
then by breaking it Demetrius of Pharos had openly challenged and defied Rome and 
subsequently precipitated a Roman war against him. 
Further questions concerning the violation of the treaty by Demetrius have been raised 
over Demetrius’ involvement in the Battle of Selassia in 222 BC. Gruen has suggested that, by 
his participation in the battle, Demetrius in all likelihood sailed beyond Lissus in 222 BC, 
breaking the treaty in the process yet attracting no response from Rome.551 The most logical 
route taken by Demetrius and his forces would be by sea, making a landing at Argos. With a 
contingent of 1600 troops and the baggage needed to support these troops, maritime 
transportation would be quicker and more practical.552 Whilst this is the most probable route 
taken, the manner of travel for Demetrius and his forces to Sellasia remains uncertain. 
Polybius, in his account of the battle, asserts that Antigonus wintered at Argos and from there 
advanced with his army and allies into Laconia.553 This could be suggestive of an Illyrian 
advance over land rather than by sea given the troop dispositions alluded to by Polybius during 
the whole campaign.554 If this were the case, Demetrius’ actions would not be in violation of 
the treaty. Gruen however notes that such an action would involve an arduous overland journey 
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and should be considered a ‘most doubtful proposition’.555 In all likelihood therefore, 
Demetrius’ actions in participating in the Battle of Sellasia were in violation of the treaty. This 
however raises a further question as to why Rome did not launch an immediate military 
intervention against Demetrius. Some contextual reasoning can be seen in Rome’s operations 
in the Northern Adriatic. The Romans had been engaged in a bitterly fought war with the tribes 
of Cisalpine Gaul; a decisive victory was not achieved until 222 BC which freed the Romans 
up to tackle any threat posed by Demetrius.556 The additional delay might be on account of the 
outbreak of Istrian piracy in the Northern Adriatic in the following year. As mentioned earlier, 
the North Eastern Italian coast, before the establishment of Aquileia, was exposed to potential 
threats from the Northern Adriatic.557 With priorities being located elsewhere, a Roman 
military intervention against Demetrius of Pharos may have been delayed; upon victory in the 
First Histrian War, Rome swiftly moved against Demetrius. 
Moreover, Demetrius’ involvement in piratical raiding during the Histrian War was an 
important factor in provoking the Roman intervention in the Second Illyrian War. Dzino has 
argued that a joint piratical action between Demetrius of Pharos and the Histri in 221 BC 
‘finally made the Romans act’ and intervene against Demetrius in 219.558 The build-up of 
Demetrius’ depredations could not have gone unnoticed at Rome; the close proximity of the 
Histrian and Second Illyrian wars that Dzino alludes to, suggests the important link between 
the two events. Whilst Dzino is right to highlight the importance of the action in leading to the 
Second Illyrian War, the idea that the event ‘finally made the Romans act’ is overstated. In the 
two years between these events, the written sources record that Demetrius attacked or 
undermined places diplomatically aligned to Rome and in the Polybian version, sailed beyond 
Lissus with more than two pinnaces.559 The variety of violations of the treaty across the period 
222-219 BC needs to be noted here; the Roman intervention should be sourced in the 
amalgamation of these violations rather than a single violation which directly prompted Roman 
intervention. The timing of additional piracy conducted by Demetrius in the Polybian version, 
the piratical raid of the Cyclades after sailing past Lissus, is however more problematic. 
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Walbank notes that the event occurred before, rather than after his attack on the Adriatic states 
aligned to Rome and may be ‘strongly coloured by the propaganda of its Roman source.’560 By 
stressing this attack on these states, Polybius is able to dramatically present an act of betrayal. 
Hammond moreover has noted that by flouting the treaty and with affiliations with Macedon, 
Epirus and Acarnania’, Demetrius would control the Straits of Otranto and the Ionian Gulf, 
greatly jeopardising Rome’ position ahead of the Second Punic War’.561 Hammond’s 
highlighting of Demetrius’ affiliation with Macedon is too strong and likely due to hindsight 
of the war’s aftermath.562 By detaching members of the ‘protectorate’ however, Demetrius was 
undermining the economic and strategic reasoning behind Rome’s intervention in the First 
War. Although the violations of the treaty as a collective whole are the core reasoning behind 
Rome’s intervention in the Second Illyrian War, this particular violation had the greatest 
importance therein. The violation appears last in our sources and posed the greatest threat to 
Roman interests in the region. 
 
The Rising Macedonian Threat 
 
It is important to consider how the development of the threat to Rome posed by 
Macedon affected Rome’s interventions in the eastern Adriatic. Under the reigns of Antigonus 
Doson and Philip V, Macedonian domestic fortunes flourished as Macedon gained a greater 
control over Greece through victories in the Cleomenean and Social Wars. Eckstein notes that, 
building on the hegemony over Greece established by Antigonus Doson, Philip 'unexpectedly 
proved himself an outstanding military commander'.563 Errington has challenged this however 
by arguing that Philip V had been 'labouring under beginner’s difficulties' in his preoccupation 
with the Social War until 217 BC.564 Whilst Errington is correct to note that the Social War 
was Philip's priority, the campaign rather demonstrated his capability as a military commander, 
an important attribute for any Hellenistic ruler, especially given Philip's inexperience and 
youth. Whilst holding a prominent position and a growing military reputation, Philip 
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nevertheless needed to gain the support of all the members of the Symmachy in order to go to 
war.565 The growth of Philip's military reputation may have helped him gain greater support to 
push through his desires for greater military campaigns. Polybius in an aside from his main 
narrative hints at Philip's tremendous popularity in his early reign. Polybius asserts that 
Thessaly, Macedonia and all subject dominions were more favourable to him than any previous 
ruler; Polybius in light of this described him as the 'darling of all the Greeks'.566 Given this 
popularity and the youthful exuberance that followed his ascension, Philip may have been able 
to carry the support of many Greek states, putting him in a particularly powerful position. Philip 
subsequently had a strong power base in Greece and so long as he kept his Greek allies in line, 
had the potential to expand his position still further on the peninsula. This threatened the 
geopolitical status quo in Illyria in which Rome operated an ‘external hegemony’. The growing 
reputation of a young and inexperienced leader proving himself through successful military 
campaigns may have had an effect on Roman perceptions of Macedonian power beyond Illyria. 
The array of states who were included in the Hellenic Symmachy would have increased the 
power and influence of Philip in the region. Any effect of this nature would have furthered the 
need of Rome to use caution in their eastern Adriatic affairs, maintaining their effective 
‘external hegemony’ over Illyrian affairs. 
It is important here to consider this change in the geopolitical landscape of the region, 
and its subsequent implications for the course of the Roman interventions through Realist 
international relations theory. The shift in the geopolitical dynamic from a state of ‘external 
hegemony’ to the competition for power and influence between Rome and Macedon would 
lead to an inevitable conflict within the core principles of the theory. Eckstein notes that in 
‘confronting such competitors, it was natural that serious and unregulated conflicts of interest 
would arise between communities.’567 Although claiming the inevitability of a war between 
the two entities is too strong and owes too much to hindsight, the geopolitical imbalance had 
important connotations for the outlook of Illyrian leaders. Illyria was caught in between these 
two great powers, and in operating out of self-interest, could effectively secure preferential 
arrangements due to their strategic importance. Eckstein proceeds to stress ‘a tendency for 
weaker states to call upon strong states to protect them in local quarrels and conflicts’.568 In 
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light of growing hostilities between Rome and Macedon, Illyrian leaders would naturally seek 
greater protection from these stronger states. This however does not adequately consider the 
opportunities afforded to the Illyrians by this dynamic. As shall be discussed in the next 
chapter, Illyrian leaders took advantage of the geopolitical instability in the region to carve out 
preferential arrangements. 
 The importance of the Peace of Naupactus is highlighted in the ancient sources but has 
caused greater debate in the secondary literature. Polybius highlights the importance of the 
event through a lengthy speech by Agelaus of Naupactus.569 The speech itself famously alludes 
to storm clouds looming over the West, an inevitable invasion of Greece by the winner of the 
Hannibalic War and a notion of Macedonian prospects for a universal empire.570 Given the 
strong statements in its contents, the authenticity of the speech has been brought into question. 
Champion has argued that, like many reported speeches provided by ancient historians, the 
authenticity of the speech is dubious, its nature rhetorical, and the choice of its inclusion a 
political one of the author.571 Walbank by contrast has not questioned the speech's authenticity, 
instead arguing that Agelaus in the speech 'advised Philip to adopt a policy of defensive 
alertness; the clear implication was that he should not plunge into a war against Rome'.572 
Although the authenticity of the speech is unclear, Polybius’ inclusion of such a long speech 
in his Histories is likely on account of its aforementioned importance in explaining the key 
theme of ‘interconnectedness’ in his work. Eckstein indeed notes that the speech is integral to 
the entire structure of Polybius' Histories;573 Polybius probably wanted to mark the pivotal 
moment in his text with a significant and controversial speech in his historical account. Whilst 
ascribing a singular event to a gradually developing concept is challenging, Polybius probably 
did so to suit his purposes in writing his history. The event nevertheless serves as the first 
historical attestation for the beginnings of Roman and Macedonian hostilities and as such 
marked an important shift in the development of Rome’s interventions east of the Adriatic. 
 The importance of the speech has also been challenged as it relates to the wider context 
of Macedonian interests east of the Adriatic. Gruen has challenged the logic of Philip’s decision 
to turn his attention westwards in 217 BC, noting that Philip would not have envisioned a move 
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against Rome whilst his own kingdom was under assault.574 Polybius notes that Scerdialaidas 
had made raids over the Macedonian border and stresses that Philip moved to counteract the 
Illyria threat to the North as a prelude to his movement West.575 Whilst Polybius highlights 
Philip's lofty ambitions he nevertheless concedes this point. Philip's most pressing concern in 
217 BC was securing the Northern border to his kingdom before embarking on a major 
campaign in the West. Polybius rectifies this discrepancy by noting that whilst dealing with 
Scerdilaidas, Philip's nights were filled with dreams solely of world domination.576 The tone of 
the scene enables Polybius to vividly comment on the character of Philip, although the scene 
is used purely for dramatic effect. Whether or not Philip intended to attack Italy after dealing 
with Scerdilaidas is also unclear. Walbank believes that his likely plan was to cross over to 
Italy after gaining a foothold on the Adriatic coast, although he stresses that we don’t know 
where Philip built his fleet.577 Badian however stresses that Philip’s intentions were limited to 
the conflict with Scerdilaidas; his intentions on an Italian invasion being a later reinterpretation 
in the light of his attack in 214 BC on Apollonia.578 Although Philip’s intentions after dealing 
with  Scerdilaidas cannot be  known for certain, it does appear that the initial primacy of  
Philip’s concern was for the security of his northern border. 
 Philip’s proposed treaty with Hannibal further impacted on Rome’s interventions east 
of the Adriatic by exacerbating Roman-Macedonian hostilities. Polybius has provided a full 
text of the treaty in his Histories emphasising the importance of the document in the 
development of Rome's outlook east of the Adriatic.579 Rosenstein asserts that the ‘treaty of 
alliance between the two powers at least on its face envisioned military cooperation. It is not 
likely that either side really expected support to materialise’.580 With the separation of the 
Macedonians in Greece and Carthaginians in Italy, this is likely to have been the case. The 
implications however of the convergence of Rome’s enemies would have served to heighten 
Roman anxieties. Polybius’ inclusion of the text of the treaty in his work is interesting, and 
probably served to further emphasise this point. Polybius’ text did not include any mention of 
a possible invasion of Italy by Philip but served to highlight that Rome’s enemies were assailing 
against them. Walbank notes on the treaty that Polybius probably used official Roman records, 
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pointing to the existence of record collections in Achaea, Aegium and probably at towns like 
Argos and Polybius’ own hometown of Megalopolis.581 Although the origins of the text 
contained in Polybius’ account can’t be determined for certain, the nature of its inclusion and 
the style of the text, with its matter-of-fact undramatised style, would indicate that it was an 
insertion into the work, most likely being derived from some official record. The treaty 
moreover, outlines the conditions of a Roman defeat; the Romans would be compelled to 
release captive friends of Demetrius of Pharos and to relinquish any claim to the territories of 
Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnus, Pharos and Dimale nor hold any sway over the Parthini or 
Atintani.582 The particular inclusion of many Adriatic territories in the agreement is testament 
to their importance in the negotiations. The locations themselves included territories previously 
held by Demetrius, and territories that were aligned to Rome in the aftermath of the First 
Illyrian War. As such, the terms of the treaty were not only designed to restore Demetrius to 
his previous position, but to directly damage Roman interests in the Adriatic. Although these 
interests were threatened, the primary importance for Rome remained dealing with Hannibal 
in Italy; this would have been compounded by the disastrous defeat of the Romans at Cannae 
a year previously. After Cannae, Philip may well have been convinced of the likelihood of a 
Carthaginian victory in the war and may have sought a favourable position in the consequent 
settlement. In either case, Philip had in the treaty determined the focus of his interests on the 
Greek peninsula and the Adriatic moreover; by aligning himself with Rome’s sworn enemy in 
doing so, it had important ramifications on Rome’s handling of her eastern Adriatic interests. 
The terms of the alliance between Macedon and Carthage for the Romans in 215 BC 
ensured that Roman aims in the First Macedonian War were limited and largely restricted to 
keeping Philip occupied east of the Adriatic. To this end, Rome formed an alliance with the 
Aetolian League in 211 BC becoming friends and allies.583 The terms of the treaty outline the 
Roman and Aetolian roles in the war against Philip. Livy asserts that the Aetolian League was 
to confront Philip on land and gain any territory won as far as Corcyra whilst the Romans 
provided naval support of no less than twenty five quinquiremes.584 In examining the terms of 
the treaty, Eckstein notes the lack of territorial gain for Rome in the terms of the allegiance in 
contrast to the more explicit benefits afforded to the Aetolian League.585 Harris, whilst agreeing 
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with the potential reasoning for the treaty of keeping Philip occupied in Greece, suggests an 
additional reasoning ‘to establish the beginning of Roman power in Greece, though this was 
done in an inept and intermittent fashion.’586 This however doesn’t take into enough 
consideration the importance of Hannibal’s activity in Italy; with Rome under serious and 
continued threat from the Carthaginian presence, the Romans were hardly likely to be planning 
schemes of imperial expansion. This is furthered by considering the lack of territorial gain for 
the Romans in the terms of the treaty. The primary concern of the treaty should subsequently 
be cited in the pressing need to keep Philip contained across the Adriatic. Through the forming 
of an allegiance with the Aetolian League, the Romans gained an ally openly hostile to 
Macedon who could place more direct pressure on Philip. For modern scholars, an analysis of 
the implications of the treaty have often been influenced by its inclusion as an example in 
Machiavelli. Machiavelli highlighted the benefits for the Romans in aligning with a weaker 
entity on the peninsula to Macedon, ensuring greater geopolitical instability that they could 
later exploit.587 Whilst Machiavelli’s view highlights the importance of Rome’s diplomatic ties 
in Greece, the significance of this would not be realised until a later period than 211 BC. The 
Roman-Aetolian treaty subsequently served to limit the scope of Roman interventions east of 
the Adriatic, allowing Rome to focus on its primary concerns in Italy. 
The likelihood of a possible Macedonian invasion of Italy has caused further debate 
amongst scholars on grounds of practicality. Macedonian naval attempts on the Adriatic were 
particularly unsuccessful with a hundred strong Macedonian fleet retreating against a Roman 
counterattack with a fleet a tenth the size.588 Harris has noted that such deficiencies in the 
Macedonian fleet could hardly have filled the Romans with much dread.589 This however 
negates the lack of intelligence either side possessed of the opposing forces. Philip's fleet whilst 
considerably larger, was inexperienced and consisted of quickly amassed Illyrian λέμβοι. Philip 
consequently would likely not have full confidence in the ability of his fleet. Walbank notes 
that due to financial pressures on the Macedonian state, a fleet of such size had not been 
previously possible and that such a fleet could quickly transport around 5000 men.590 As 
mentioned earlier, λέμβοι were light vessels used for a variety of purposes, although most 
notably for quick effective raiding. Philip indeed had gathered the fleet together to deal with 
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inshore operations against Scerdilaidas in 217 BC, operations that his fleet of λέμβοι were 
better suited for. Philip’s subsequent successes in taking Lissus and pushing Scerdilaidas out 
of Dassaretis need to be considered. These success were followed by the Parthini and Atintani 
tribes falling to him, including the town of Dimale which Rome had successfully besieged 
during the Second Illyrian War.591 Waterfield has described the holding of Lissus by the 
Macedonians as an 'overt threat to Roman interests in the region, and a possible threat even to 
Italy'.592 Livy indeed notes that the Rome’s increased their fleet at Brundisium with the purpose 
to protect the coast of Italy and gather information on the Macedonian conflict.593 Dzino 
sources the Roman decision to reinforce their Adriatic fleet in the Adriatic to support 
Scerdilaidas and in light of Philip’s actions.594 Although it is unclear which of the reasons cited 
by Dzino carried the greater weight, the move was a reactive one by Rome, intended to protect 
Rome’s status in the Adriatic and establish what steps to take next through the gathering of 
information. Although in the eventual Peace of Phoenice in 205 BC, Philip gained control over 
the Atintani, formerly a member of the ‘Roman Protectorate’, Rome had secured a peace with 
Philip which enabled it to concentrate on the conflict with Hannibal.595 This was especially 
pressing given the turning of the tide in the campaign, with the war being directed to North 
Africa. 
Rome's strategy in the First Macedonian War has also raised debate regarding the status 
of Roman associations east of the Adriatic. In a fragment from Appian's coverage of Roman 
affairs with Macedon, Corcyra is described as a state allied to Rome in the form of a military 
alliance, συμμαχία, against Philip V who was in the process of attacking the city.596 Gruen has 
argued that collaboration of this sort was equivalent to Roman 'friendship' in line with previous 
Roman associations along the coast.597 This has been challenged however by Derow who has 
stressed that this indicates a more formal alliance between the two states and asserts that the 
terms συμμαχία and 'friendship' are not analogous.598 Derow is surely correct to stress that these 
are not equivalent terms, but it is important to place the usage in the appropriate context. As 
mentioned earlier, the term συμμαχία could refer to a more formal alliance or a more general 
form of military assistance. Given the nature of the context in the midst of the mutual war being 
waged with Macedon, the latter definition must also be considered a possibility, albeit a less 
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likely one. Derow later remarks that the treaty between Philip and Hannibal in 215 BC was 
designed to break Roman associations with Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidmanus, Pharos, Dimale, 
the Parthini and the Atintani although the absence of Issa has not been explained.599 The areas 
outlined in the treaty were those threatened directly by Philip in Southern Illyria and those 
which particularly pertained to Demetrius' targets for reacquisition. Pharos is the only location 
outside the Southern Adriatic listed and this, as established earlier, was previously the personal 
possession of Demetrius of Pharos. As such, Issa may not have been included as it did not fulfil 
either criteria sufficiently. This demonstrates the importance of the immediate context of the 
First Macedonian War on the Roman associations. The evidence is more supportive of Derow's 
view here which stresses the importance of the terms and a more formal form of alliance being 
formed. With Rome preoccupied in Italy, a form of allegiance with stronger military ties on 
the Adriatic would have been beneficial to Rome in achieving their main aim during the 
conflict of keeping Macedon tied down east of the Adriatic. 
 
Conclusion 
  
 Rome’s intervention in the Second Illyrian War reflected the continued strategic 
importance for the Romans to maintain their ‘external hegemony’ over the Illyrian region. The 
War itself was directed specifically against Demetrius of Pharos and, as Eckstein has noted, 
the ‘expedition of 219 BC had little impact beyond the removal of Demetrius’.600 The pretext 
for the Second Illyrian War was complex, with a range of treaty violations committed by 
Demetrius across a broad span of time. It is subsequently very difficult to effectively determine 
the significance of each individual treaty violation in acting as a catalyst for Roman 
intervention. It is nevertheless important to stress that in the accounts of Polybius and Appian, 
Demetrius had violated the sacred fides that underpinned his relationship with Rome.601 These 
accounts are too moralistic and character-driven, seeking to apportion the cause of the war 
solely in Demetrius’ perceived ingratitude and irrational behaviour. Errington however has 
suggested that the steady progression of treaty violations created a sense of suspicion, mistrust 
and hostility that built up to become the essential pretext for the conflict.602 With no single 
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discernible event in the extant sources that could constitute a pretext, this serves to effectively 
explain the complexities of the treaty violations and the delay in Roman action being taken. 
The initial settlement established in the aftermath of the First Illyrian War in 228 BC 
created a series of diplomatic associations across the Adriatic that can best be described as 
constituting a Roman ‘sphere of influence’. These relations were essentially loosely formed 
amicitiae, forged in many cases as a result of the deditio of several states to Rome during the 
military intervention itself. These affiliates to Rome nevertheless exercised ‘some degree of 
freedom of political action and self-determination even after their amicitia with the Republic 
had been established’.603 Rather than exercising direct control over these states, or impose any 
form of imperial administration, Rome gradually established itself through these relationships 
as a hegemonic entity in the eastern Adriatic. This hegemony was in line with the definition 
outlined by Doyle in comparison to imperial power.604 Rome expected the mutual bond of fides 
to maintain the diplomatic association between the entities in foreign affairs but Rome took no 
action in intervening in the domestic affairs of their affiliates. These associations served to 
demonstrate the limited nature of Roman strategic objectives in the region by upholding their 
‘external hegemony’. These were largely centred on the South-Eastern Adriatic coast and the 
islands of the Adriatic. The flexible relations that Rome had established with these states, 
together with the limitations imposed on the Ardiaean kingdom through the post-war peace 
treaty, enabled Rome to achieve its strategic aims. These aims were to suppress Illyrian piracy 
in the Adriatic and to ensure the greater security of the Southern Adriatic trade routes, most 
notably across the narrowest section of the Otranto Straits. These aims were congruent with 
the core motivations of the Adriatic Greeks, who sought Roman protection in the aftermath of 
First Illyrian War from the threat posed by Ardiaean aggression. 
Roman hostilities with Macedon posed a greater threat than previously on Roman 
interests in the eastern Adriatic, and south eastern Illyria in particular. The geopolitical 
expansion of the Macedonians into the region threatened the established Roman ‘external 
hegemony’ and the precisely defined Roman interests, focused on the strategic control of the 
Otranto.’605 Whilst Illyria features less in the surviving source material, this is nevertheless 
reflective of Rome’s limited interests in the region. Rome sought a more peaceful region on 
the eastern Adriatic coast which provided an effective check on any Macedonian aggression 
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westwards. The historical attestation of tensions between Macedon and Rome prior to 217 BC 
is intangible and owes much to later hindsight. From 217 BC down to the final Roman victory 
in 202 BC, the war with Hannibal remained Rome’s number one priority; in the war’s aftermath 
Rome was better able to foster diplomatic ties in Greece which would eventually lead to 
conflict with Macedon. In securing these alliances, Rome ‘overturned a long-standing, delicate 
balance of power in the region, a change that would ultimately result in Philip V’s defeat, 
witness the establishment of a new, more stable balance of power in Greece and neutralise the 
Macedonian threat for the next twenty years.’606 The quintessential elements of trust, 
faithfulness, loyalty and confidence that were wrapped up in the Roman concept of fides, still 
underpinned these alliances, and would be an important foundation for Roman hegemony over 
Greece. 
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Chapter 5 – The Third Illyrian War 
 
Introduction 
 
 Rome’s intervention in the Third Illyrian War and concurrent intervention in the Third 
Macedonian War cemented Rome as the sole influential superpower in the eastern Adriatic. 
The post-war settlement of the region saw the dramatic eradication of the two kingdoms of 
Illyria and Macedon, the establishment of a series of republican governments and the sacking 
of several towns and enslavement of their inhabitants. This represented greater Roman 
aggression in the aftermath of the campaigns although the ‘external hegemony’ was maintained 
as Rome did not directly administer the region. For Polybius, the events of 168/7 BC served as 
his initial choice of date to close his accounts; the date marked the conclusion of the global 
‘interconnectedness’ and Rome’s rise to power with the eradication of the Macedonian 
kingdom.607 In similar fashion to previous events, Polybius utilised the Third Macedonian and 
Illyrian Wars as a set-piece within his work to dramatically demonstrate the power, authority 
and influence of Rome over the ‘inter-connected’ world. Eckstein has described this broader 
development in the Second Century BC as the emergence of a ‘Roman unipolarity’ that 
emerged from the previous multi-polar interstate system.608 This chapter shall initially examine 
the important developments in the diplomatic arrangements between Rome, Illyria and the 
Greek East as well as the prelude to the Third Illyrian War. The post-war settlement of the 
region will also be examined as a means to consider these developments and place them in the 
context of the previous Roman post-war treaties examined in the previous chapter. 
 
 The pretext for the Roman intervention in the Third Illyrian War can be cited in the 
alliance forged between Genthius and Perseus. This dragged Illyria into the broader conflict 
between Rome and Macedon and compelled the Romans to intervene in the direct context of 
the Third Macedonian War. The alliance between Perseus and Genthius had important 
connotations for the Illyrian geopolitical landscape, which would be fundamentally altered by 
the Roman victory in these concurrent campaigns. Although there is a scholarly consensus 
regarding the origins of the Third Illyrian War,  Roman motivations behind their intervention 
in the Third Macedonian War has been the source of some debate. This debate has emerged on 
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account of an unsatisfactory pretext provided by Polybius to explain the Roman motivation for 
war. This pretext asserts that Philip V intended war with Rome and had planned it before his 
death in 179 BC. Perseus served as Philip’s agent in the affair, following the death of his 
father.609 Harris has highlighted the inadequacy of this pretext and stresses that ‘it simply does 
not explain what needs explaining – namely the Roman decision to begin war’.610 Gruen has 
however directly criticised Harris’ perspective by asserting that it ‘overlooks all the diplomatic 
preliminaries and the lengthy delays before Rome committed herself to war.’611Both these 
sources are correct to dismiss the premise put forward by the pretext and reject the notion that 
Perseus sought war. The Roman motivation behind their intervention is harder to determine 
and no singular pretext suffices to explain Rome’s intervention. The origins of the conflict 
however reveal Roman concerns over a geopolitical imbalance which led to a greater desire to 
affirm their geopolitical dominance over the eastern Adriatic. The Roman decision to intervene 
in the Third Macedonian War had important connotations for the Roman interventions being 
considered in this thesis. Wars were waged against the Macedonians and Illyrians 
simultaneously and both kingdoms overthrown in their aftermath. 
 
Roman Diplomacy with Greek States 
 
An important component in the expanding role of Rome east of the Adriatic was Rome's 
growing diplomatic role in the affairs of Greek states. The Treaty of Phoenice in 205 BC which 
ended the First Macedonian War featured many Greek states as associated members to the two 
parties, Rome and Macedon.612 Harris has argued that the Romans through their plethora of 
diplomatic associations in the treaty were muscling their way into Greek affairs and creating 
the necessary conditions that eventually led to appeals to them for military help.613 Eckstein 
however has noted that the inclusion in the list of the Ilians and Athenians was peculiar given 
the fact that they didn't fight in the campaign and describes the states more generically as 
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supporters of one side or another.614 Livy in the passage utilises the term foederi adscripti to 
describe these states, referring to them being drawn up in league, treaty or alliance.615 Whilst 
the terminology may be indicative of states united by alliance, it is more likely that the term 
refers to a less permanent arrangement. Rather than use the terms socii or amicii to describe 
these states, Livy chooses to depict the allegiance as one drawn up, possibly for the expressed 
purposes of the treaty. Harris in his suggestion that the arrangements were for the purpose of 
providing future military help is too conjectural given the situation in 205 BC. Whilst 
diplomatic associations with Greek states was key to that conflict, the informal nature of the 
description of the ties in Livy’s account, would suggest the importance of later developments. 
The inclusion of a plethora of states in the treaty on both sides is nevertheless suggestive of 
greater Roman involvement in the diplomatic affairs of Greece with the outlining of certain 
affiliations with Greek states. These affiliations may have been informal at this stage, but they 
nevertheless carried important resonances. 
 Rome would build upon these outlined affiliations in the aftermath of the treaty, forging 
stronger diplomatic relationships which would help precipitate the Second Macedonian War. 
Eckstein has noted a particular case regarding Rome's diplomacy with Pergamum through 
Rome's seeking of the Magna Mater deorum Idaea.616 Graciously at Rome's request in 204 BC, 
Attalus had managed to convince the priests of the Pessinus temple to give the Black Stone to 
Rome in accordance with a prophecy foretold in the Sibylline Books.617 Eckstein notes that this 
event strengthened the bond between the two states as the Romans of the period were very 
religious and especially so in a time of crisis.618 Recent Roman diplomatic arrangements had 
not been particularly successful with other states. Demetrius of Pharos had been an unreliable 
associate for Rome on the Adriatic coast and Roman diplomacy with Carthage had led to the 
reputation of the Punica fides, the Carthaginian faith noted for its perfidy. Gruen notes this 
importance by stating that 'the good faith of the Romans, their commitment to the defence and 
support of allies and friends who depended on their pistis or fides, stands as a prevailing motif 
in the history, or rather historiography, of Roman expansion in the Mediterranean.'619 Rome 
subsequently would have tried to continue and build upon their allegiances with states who 
proved more reliable, notably Pergamum, Athens and Rhodes. The arrival of envoys to Rome 
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representing the states of Pergamum and Rhodes appealing for action to be taken against Philip 
built upon the earlier associations.620 These appeals have subsequently been considered as a 
pretext for Roman intervention. Gruen asserts that the action turned Roman thought towards 
war whilst Warrior has argued that the appeals could have sought mere arbitration rather than 
outright military intervention.621 Warrior’s argument however negates the importance of 
Rome’s declaration of war against Philip during his siege of Athens.622 It is difficult to imagine 
that Philip was ever likely to accept the terms of the Roman ultimatum. As mentioned earlier, 
usage of the rerum repetitio had been superseded by the usage of denuntiatio belli in the process 
of Rome’s declaration of war. Polybius notes in the passage that the ultimatum was presented 
to Philip by means of an envoy in accordance with the new process.623 The greater ease by 
which the Romans could declare war on foreign entities served to facilitate more aggressive 
Roman interventions. 
The underlying motivation of supporting her allies was, nevertheless, crucial to Roman 
intervention. The series of embassies sent to Rome in 201 BC from Egypt, Rhodes, Pergamum 
and Athens provided the important pretext in forming Rome’s decision to intervene in the 
conflict.624 Livy’s account draws particular attention to the good standing these states had with 
Rome on account of their good faith. This is reflected in Harris, who notes that Roman fides 
was at stake, particularly in the case of Attalus.625 Rome was in the process of developing 
important diplomatic ties in Greece and in order to maintain the faith and confidence that 
underpinned those ties, Rome would have sought to honour the terms that underpinned them. 
Livy also provides a speech in the comitia from Sulpucius Galba which convinced the Senate 
of the need to go to war after the decision was initially rejected. The authenticity of the speech 
has been questioned, however. Harris has argued that the speech ‘has no claim whatsoever to 
authenticity, though it may of course accidently happen to reproduce the arguments Sulpucius 
really used’. This has been challenged however by historians noting that the speech may have 
been originally attested in Polybius.626 This however is difficult to ascertain given the nature 
of the section of Polybius being lost. The speech that is presented in Livy is nevertheless not 
veracious enough and too dramatic in tone and content. The initial rejection by the Senate was 
based on the exhaustive war that Rome had just emerged victorious in over Hannibal. Harris 
notes that the Second Macedonian War was ‘never popular’ whilst Eckstein has noted the 
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importance of the war-weariness of the Roman population and the uncertainty over whether 
the war was truly necessary.627 The underlying importance of the diplomatic ties to Rome is 
once more asserted in the prelude to the war. In the process of sending the ultimatum to Philip 
V at Athens, the Romans sought to consolidate its status amongst its allies, especially on the 
Adriatic coast.628 The support of such allies was very important for Rome ahead their campaign 
against Philip V to secure an effective landing place for crossing over to Greece and a base of 
operations from which to conduct the campaign. Eckstein asserts that for Rome, the Greek 
allies had proven particularly useful since 214 BC in their campaigns against Philip V.629 The 
decision to try and gain the support of the Greek Leagues is further suggestive of this; although 
an unsuccessful endeavour, it demonstrates the significance Rome placed on their Greek allies 
in the conflict and the value they saw in gaining the support of as many prominent entities as 
possible. 
Rome's greater diplomatic role in affairs east of the Adriatic can also been seen from 
the settlement at the conclusion of the war and the actions of Titus Flamininus. Polybius notes 
that having been subsequently invited to the Isthmian Games, Flamininus declared the 
'Freedom of the Greeks', freeing several Greek cities from garrison, tribute and foreign 
oppression.630 The decision made by Flamininus and the implications of the proclamation have 
however been questioned. Champion has argued that the episode was an example of Roman 
'propagandist diplomacy'.631 Dimitirev has, in turn, observed that the slogan of the 'Freedom of 
the Greeks' was associated with the treaty concluding the Second Macedonian War and was 
likely a senatorial suggestion but refined by Flamininus to suit Roman interests.632 The 
diplomacy as such appears to be part of a more deliberate and well formulated attempt by Rome 
to curry the favour of the Greek states. The Romans had first been accepted to the Isthmian 
Games in the aftermath of the First Illyrian War, when Corinth had granted the status to the 
Romans, after the Romans had sent envoys in the aftermath of the conflict.633 The speech by 
Flamininus in 196 BC however is demonstrative of the development of Rome’s growing status 
in Greek affairs. The consequent Greek response to the speech depicted by Polybius, however 
appears hyperbolic, as he describes the Greeks almost crushing Flamininus to death as a result 
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of their overjoyed reaction to the proclamation.634 It is hard to thus ascertain the authentic Greek 
reaction to Roman diplomacy although Rome's aim in the diplomatic action was to assert itself 
as the mediator of Greek affairs. Freedom was an important concept for the Greek states and 
in alluding to such a concept, Rome was able to better its reputation amongst several Greek 
states. Polybius indeed employed similar language in the earlier instance cited, when Rome 
had emerged victorious in the First Illyrian War.635  
Whilst this was indicative of a greater Roman involvement east of the Adriatic, Rome 
nevertheless did not subjugate the region. Eckstein has argued that Flamininus in 196 BC could 
have moved to create a more permanent provincia east of the Adriatic, in line with the creation 
of two provinciae in Spain the previous year.636 It is important however to put this in the context 
of the development of Roman diplomatic ties with the Greek states and the origins of the 
Second Macedonian War itself. The war, as mentioned earlier, had not been particularly 
popular in Rome and subsequently Flamininus may have understood the fragile nature of public 
opinion in Rome, especially considering the war-weariness of the Roman public. It is more 
likely however the case that Flamininus sought to curry the greater favour of the Greeks. Badian 
notes that Flamininus was a known ‘sentimental philhellene’ with a passion for Greek 
culture.637 He also likely realised the unpopularity of making a conciliatory gesture of 
liberation. Badian also notes that ‘the Greeks regarded it as (…) natural that the Romans should 
protect their freedom without expecting anything in particular in return.’638 The Romans were 
eager to maintain their important diplomatic ties in Greece and by appealing to the important 
concept of freedom in a Greek context, Flamininus was able to strengthen these ties. This was 
especially important in the context of Rome’s lack of administration in the region. In order to 
ensure that Greece was diplomatically attuned to Roman interests without their direct 
administration of the region, the Romans needed these strong diplomatic ties. In doing so, 
Rome was able to maintain the ‘external-hegemony’ alluded to earlier in the thesis. 
Roman Diplomacy in Illyria 
 
Rome's diplomatic ties in Illyria would be maintained and subsequently enhanced 
throughout the early Second Century BC during the reign of Pleuratus III, whose reign 
witnessed greater cohesion between the two entities. Pleuratus had been an associated member 
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to Rome in the Treaty of Phoenice as mentioned earlier and through the development of this 
relationship Pleuratus seems to have benefitted as a result of his tie to Rome. Livy notes that at 
the end of Roman hostilities with Philip, Pleuratus was rewarded with the territory of the 
Parthini and the town of Lychnidus on Lake Ohrid at the expense of Macedon.639 Dzino notes 
that by gaining this territory, Pleuratus was ‘becoming himself a significant political power in 
the region, strengthened by open Roman support’.640 This was an important step for Rome; the 
granting of territory to Demetrius of Pharos on the coast had not gone well for Rome in 228 
BC, and Rome may have been hesitant to entrust another entity in the region with a similar 
reward. Pleuratus, along with Scerdilaidas had however acquired a more longstanding Roman 
faith; Eckstein indeed describes Scerdilaidas as a ‘long-term Roman amicus.641 Dzino has 
suggested that ‘it is possible that the efforts of Scerdilaidas and Pleuratus strengthened the 
central power in Illyria to some degree. However, the dynasts in the region still maintained a 
significant level of independence.’642 Although the idea that Scerdilaidas and Pleuratus 
strengthened the central power in Illyria to some degree is possible, it cannot be determined for 
certain and lacks foundation from the sources. Dzino is correct to say however that these 
dynasts maintained a significant level of independence. These were dynasts rather than the term 
‘ruler’ which this thesis determined was more applicable for Demetrius of Pharos earlier; the 
basis of power for Pleuratus and Scerdilaidas was their familial ties to the Ardiaei; the basis for 
the enhancement of their power, was Roman support. This Roman support was predicated on 
a lack of Roman interest in Illyria, especially compared to the Greek East. Pleuratus in 
particular, offered Rome an ally who kept affairs in the region quiet (as noted by the lack of 
coverage for his reign in the written sources) and secured Roman interests on the eastern 
Adriatic coast. This enabled Rome to continue to exercise its ‘external-hegemony’ in the 
region. 
Pleuratus’ reputation as a loyal Roman ally is furthered in the historical accounts, 
reflecting the important trust that the Romans placed in him. Livy asserts that during the Roman 
campaign against Antiochus III, Pleuratus was permitted to sail into the Corinthian gulf with 
sixty λέμβοι and attack the Aetolian coast.643 This once more is indicative of an important 
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development in the trust that Rome placed in Pleuratus. A sizeable fleet of Illyrian λέμβοι under 
the command of an Illyrian dynast would likely have conjured up memories for the Romans of 
events from the 3rd Century BC; the Roman permission to Pleauratus to do so in aid of the 
campaign was indicative of this greater level of trust. Briscoe has noted that Pleuratus was ‘no 
doubt, acting on Roman instructions.’644 It is uncertain whether Pleuratus was following 
Roman instructions as part of the course of their diplomatic relationship or whether merely as 
part of the military campaign against Antiochus. Entrusting Pleuratus with the fleet in the 
campaign nevertheless demonstrates the faith that Rome placed in the bond with Pleuratus and 
the readiness of Pleuratus to aid their cause. Although there is no record of Pleuratus gaining 
any further territory or mention in the subsequent treaty of Apamea in 188 BC, the use of his 
fleet during this action demonstrates his growing power and influence along the Adriatic coast. 
With sixty λέμβοι at his disposal, Pleuratus had a considerable fleet for an Illyrian king and this 
would have not only helped him conduct further naval actions along the coast but also helped 
him become an important Roman ally in supporting Roman power and influence across the 
Southern Adriatic. Although the primary goal of Rome through these negotiations was to limit 
the power and influence of greater foreign powers, Pleuratus nevertheless profited from his 
long-term allegiance to Rome.645 Wilkes indeed asserts that the territory awarded to Pleuratus 
gave him control over the strategic route to Macedonia from the West, although this owed more 
to a desire to deny control for Macedon than a signal of their regard to Pleuratus.646 Taken 
together however, they are indicative of Rome’s desire to ensure Adriatic security and their 
preference to operate in Illyria at a distance through a trustworthy ally. 
Pleuratus’ status however was noted by contemporaries as being largely dependent on 
Roman support rather than on the back of his own merits. Polybius in his record of a speech 
by Eumenes II of Pergamum notes that Eumenes was of the opinion that Pleuratus had been 
raised up by the Romans to the position of first amongst all Illyrian kings, but he had 
accomplished nothing to do so beyond remaining loyal to Rome.647 Gruen however notes that 
the importance Rome placed on their allegiance with Pleuratus was ‘virtually none’, and that 
Eumenes’ speech echoed the thoughts of Scipio earlier in Book 21 of Polybius.648 Gruen has 
further noted that although the authenticity of the speech has been brought into question, the 
setting and circumstances are authentic and the tone and language should not be pressed as 
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there is no compelling reason for a Polybian invention.649 It is possible that Polybius may have 
used the speech to signpost the later relationship of Eumenes II and Rome throughout the 
Second Century BC, although the speech primarily serves to illustrate the gains of Pergamon 
in the Treaty of Apamea. Eckstein has noted that this marked the first instance that a reigning 
Hellenistic King was permitted to come before the Senate.650 By contrast, Pleuratus was 
afforded no visit and, as mentioned earlier, received not territorial gains in the post-war treaty. 
Whilst on the surface Pleuratus as a Roman ally was insignificant, attested by the limited 
mentions in the sources and the lack of territorial gain from the war, he nevertheless fulfilled 
the role that Rome sought in the region. This dependency on Rome for his position of power 
was an important element to Pleuratus and wider Illyrian rule in the early Second Century BC. 
With the growing diplomatic influence of Rome across the eastern Adriatic and the diminished 
status of Macedon following the Treaty of Flamininus in 196 BC, it was in the interests of 
Illyrian dynasts to work with, rather than work against, Rome. 
The implications of Pleuratus’ rule had important consequences for Rome’s dealing 
with Genthius, whose support Rome sought to maintain. The lack of Roman interest or 
attention in the region created a lull in Roman-Illyrian relations upon Genthius accession. The 
strong Roman diplomatic tie in the region owed much to Pleuratus’ loyalty and Livy notes that 
Genthius was to decide on supporting the Roman or Macedonian side for the prospective war 
based on impulse rather than reasoning.651 Livy here is perhaps too strong in his assertion that 
Genthius would act on impulse and it probably owes to an anti-Illyrian bias. As stated earlier, 
Genthius was more likely being pragmatic and keeping his options open. As shall be discussed 
later in the chapter, the geopolitical imbalance between Perseus and Rome in the region 
provided Genthius with the opportunity to side with either entity based on his own self-interest. 
Livy later asserts that Lucius Decius was sent to Genthius in 172 BC to ascertain whether their 
alliance still had any standing and to try and encourage him to side with the Romans during a 
prospective war against Perseus.652 Dzino notes that, compared to the piracy carried out by 
Genthius and mentioned in the previous chapter, it was ‘Genthius’ neutrality in the conflict 
between Perseus and Rome that was a much more serious problem in the eyes of the 
Romans.’653 Dzino indeed states that this is the reason for the earlier reference in Livy, being 
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a part of the ‘Roman tradition’ citing Roman suspicion in Genthius prior to Perseus’ 
approach.654 In lieu of the hindsight available to Livy, it is quite possible that Livy sought to 
source the uncertainty of Genthius earlier and use it to pour scorn on his lack of support for 
Rome. Nevertheless, the lack of Roman interest in Illyria and the geopolitical imbalance 
created a situation where Genthius was able to operate with greater flexibility. 
 
The Prelude to the Third Illyrian War 
 
The Third Illyrian War had an unclear pretext from the ancient sources and should be 
seen as part of the wider Roman conflict with Perseus. The most detailed account of the prelude 
to the Third Illyrian War has come from Livy, with much of the Polybian version lost. Livy 
develops Rome’s suspicion of Genthius through a series of failed diplomatic exchanges in his 
account and an Issaean appeal to Rome over alleged Illyrian piracy in the Adriatic.655 Gruen 
has stressed the lack of importance of Illyria for Rome in the 2nd Century BC, but has argued 
that if any action taken by Genthius inspired greater Roman concern, it was potential Adriatic 
piracy.656 Livy’s account bears important hallmarks to the Illyrian piracy of the 3rd Century 
BC; the inclusion in Livy’s account of the Issaean appeal may well have resonated in this way 
with his audience. Gruen is surely correct to highlight the potential Roman concern over this 
threat, although Livy’s account is problematic. The series of diplomatic exchanges is not 
featured in detail elsewhere in the accounts of other historians and the only mention of alleged 
piracy conducted by Genthius appears in the Livian version. As such, it is difficult to determine 
the veracity of Livy’s account. Briscoe notes that rather than the passages originating from the 
lost Polybian version, they have an annalistic origin, and this may help explain their 
inclusion.657 Although the now lost section of Polybius was available to Livy, Livy’s choice to 
draw on the annalistic tradition is noteworthy. By drawing attention to the Issaean appeal, the 
tradition presented Rome in an upstanding light, coming to aid of the Issaeans. The threat of 
Adriatic piracy was more tangible to the Romans, as Gruen noted, and would have been a useful 
pretext in the annalistic tradition. The importance of the alliance with Perseus, however, 
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overshadows this in importance, featuring in multiple accounts with the Third Macedonian War 
serving as the key context for Rome’s intervention in the Third Illyrian War. 
Livy notes that the report of piracy conducted by Genthius was given to the Senate by 
the praetor, Lucius Duronius who accused him of all the contemporary piracies in the 
Adriatic.658 The lack of an efficient Roman response to dealing with allegations of piracy of 
this extent has raised considerable debate amongst modern scholars. Dzino has stated that ‘the 
accusations had no immediate consequences for Genthius, so we can assume that the Senate 
did not blame him directly’.659 The delegation that was sent to Genthius in 172 BC had an 
ulterior motive in either case, to sound out the support of Genthius who was still technically 
bound by the ties of amicitia to Rome ahead of a likely war in Macedonia. Ormerod however 
highlights the preceding period of rule under Pleuratos, a period of greater amity between the 
kingdom and Rome.660 Gruen moreover has suggested that the ‘area under Genthius’ authority, 
far from being a matter of priority, had faded almost altogether from Roman attention.661 These 
two arguments provide important context for the lack of decisive action. Rome had enjoyed a 
period of amity under Pleuratos, where Illyria had become less of an issue; Rome likely sought 
a continuation of this situation under the new ruler. Dzino asserts that ‘the Roman mission to 
Genthius in 172 BC should be seen as the Roman concern for piracy, rather than proof of his 
anti-Roman stand’.662 Although a concern for Illyrian piracy in the Adriatic was understandable 
given its past history, this does not adequately explain the lack of decisive action and the 
conduct of Roman investigation into the Illyrian ruler’s activities. The amity with Pleuratos 
had proven advantageous to Rome in providing passive loyalty in a region of limited interest. 
In preparation for a Roman intervention in Macedonia, the maintenance of a strategically 
important alliance for Rome would have been of tremendous benefit. 
 The importance of the alliance in the prelude to Rome’s intervention can be seen in 
other sources. Appian asserts that Genthius’ first action was to sign an alliance with Perseus, 
and from there he subsequently attacked Roman Illyria and imprisoned envoys that had been 
sent to him.663 An attack on Roman envoys, once more, perhaps harkened back in Appian’s 
account to the Roman interventions of the 3rd Century BC. As mentioned earlier, Appian sought 
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to present the virtues and vices of leaders throughout his work and this passage serves to 
highlight Genthius’ character and conduct. Although the timing of this attack is unclear, the 
Romans may not have been aware of the alliance until their envoys were attacked. Attacking 
envoys displayed unstatesmanlike behaviour and the inclusion of the passage in Appian’s 
attack furthers his characterisation of Illyrian leaders during the period being considered in this 
thesis. Although the imprisoning of Roman envoys would have been an act that would directly 
lead to war, by first allying himself with Perseus, Genthius would have established himself as 
an enemy of Rome at an earlier stage. Florus only mentions the war briefly, considering it part 
of the wider Macedonian campaign.664 As mentioned earlier, the Polybian account of the war 
has not survived, although it served as a source for both Livy and Appian. Polybius does 
however mention the diplomatic exchanges between Perseus and Genthius and denigrates 
Genthius’ character in an aside.665 Judging by the manner in which Polybius treated Genthius’ 
character in the surviving sections, it would be unlikely that Polybius would have placed the 
blame elsewhere. The diplomatic exchanges between Perseus and Genthius in Polybius’ 
account and the diplomatic exchanges in Livy nevertheless illustrate the importance of 
Genthius’ stance of neutrality in the prelude to the war.666 Dzino has noted that this neutrality 
was a considerable problem for the Romans.667 Suspicions of Genthius, as mentioned earlier, 
are discussed in the sources although the continued sending of diplomatic missions to him 
would indicate that at the very least Rome held out hope of rekindling affiliation with Genthius. 
The alliance formed with Perseus would have made Genthius’ intentions abundantly clear and 
served as the key pretext to the commencement of hostilities. Subsequently, the Third Illyrian 
War should be considered in the context of the Third Macedonian War; the pretext for the 
Roman intervention being entwined in the wider conflict. The nature of this pretext however 
was not as evident as those that had been provided for the Roman interventions in the 3rd 
Century BC. The combined actions of Genthius and Perseus through their alliance, endangered 
Rome’s status of ‘external-hegemony’ in the region. Rome likely saw the more proactive step 
of eradicating the Illyrian kingdom in line with the Antigonid kingdom in Macedon as 
necessary to ensuring the geopolitical landscape of the region was suited to its interest. 
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The Pretext of the Third Macedonian War 
 
 As mentioned earlier, the Third Illyrian War served as a component in the broader 
Roman conflict with Perseus. The origins of the conflict with Peresus had an important bearing 
on the geopolitical landscape of the eastern Adriatic and the changing nature of Rome’s outlook 
in the region. The primary pretext provided in the sources is that of a pre-planned war by Philip 
V prior to his death in 179 BC and the continuation of the policy by Perseus.668 Harris has 
stressed that ‘some allowances must be made for the historian (Polybius) since his main 
discussion is lost (…) none the less his theory is most inadequate’669 Luce has asserted that 
Livy’s account of the outbreak of the Third Macedonian War in Book XLII has been 
‘universally deplored and condemned’.670 Although the main discussion is lost from the 
Polybian version, the appearance of the same pretext in Livy is important to note. Polybius’ 
work would have been available to Livy and the decision taken by Livy to include the same 
pretext for the conflict would suggest that the lost sections of Polybius built on this theme. 
Livy’s reasoning behind his choice of Polybius’ pretext remains unknown, although the citing 
of the pretext in both sources distanced the origins of the war from the events of the late 170s 
BC. Harris has suggested that Polybius ‘failed to apply his science of causes adequately to a 
war whose history he knew intimately’ due to ‘his personal involvement in political events’.671 
Polybius had been taken to Rome as a hostage in the aftermath of the campaign and his personal 
experiences of the war may have clouded his judgement. Harris proceeds to state that ‘Perseus 
had not behaved at all belligerently towards Rome, as Polybius knew’ and suggest that Polybius 
could not bring himself to suggest that the Roman Senate ‘had purposefully destroyed the 
equilibrium’.672 It is quite possible that Polybius felt incapable of apportioning blame to Rome 
or Perseus, but this needs to placed in the context of the composition of Polybius’ work. 
Polybius was writing at a time when these events were in the recent past and apportioning 
blame to either party would potentially neither appeased his Roman or Greek audiences. 
 Subsequently, modern scholars have attempted to posit the underlying motivations 
behind Rome’s intervention elsewhere. Bickermann has suggested that Rome may have held 
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anxiety over a potential Macedonian-Syrian alliance.673 Bickermann here built on the previous 
work of Mommsen, who stressed the continuation of Roman concerns over Macedon 
throughout this period.674 This however negates the fact that Antiochus IV had made an alliance 
with Perseus’ bitter enemy, Eumenes II of Pergamum.675 Perseus previous connection to Syria 
via his marriage to Laodice, the daughter of Seleucus IV did not have the same political value 
upon Antiochus IV taking the throne. Harris has highlighted Polybius’ account of Antiochus’ 
invasion of Egypt and has stressed that Polybius did not agree that Quintus Marcius Philippus 
had hopes of preventing Antiochus from capturing Alexandria.676 The notion that Rome held 
anxiety over a potential Syrian-Macedonian alliance is thus too problematic and not validated 
in the ancient sources. The potential threat of a Syrian-Macedonian alliance would also have 
been minimal compared to the previous ‘Pact between the Kings’ in the late 3rd Century BC. 
Syrian power in the aftermath of Rome’s victory at Magnesia in 190 BC had greatly weakened 
and, in any case, Syrian attentions were focused on Egypt rather than Italy or the Greek 
peninsula. It is thus unlikely that Roman harboured substantial concerns over a potential 
Syrian-Macedonian alliance.  
A potential fear of a direct attack on Italy by Perseus should also be dismissed. This 
stems from Eumenes II’s appeal to Rome where a potential invasion of Italy was insinuated by 
Eumenes.677 Harris has doubted that the original source for the passage in Livy was Polybius 
and it may stem from an annalistic tradition.678 The speech serves an important purpose in 
Livy’s account in documenting the actions of Perseus and providing additional reasoning 
behind the Roman intervention. The speech dramatically serves to denigrate Perseus’ character 
and provide the Romans with greater moral impetus to intervene. Gruen and Harris, however, 
have both asserted that Perseus had no navy and no logistical means of launching an invasion 
of Italy.679 Walbank has also noted that ‘for all their exaggeration, Eumenes’s complaints to 
the Senate on the eve of the Third Macedonian War give some indication of the fruits of Philip’s 
consolidation’.680 In the figures he provides for the Macedonian armed forces, no naval forces 
are listed. There was a natural incentive for Eumenes to overstate the threat to Rome posed by 
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Macedon in encouraging the Romans to go to war, although it is not clear whether the Romans 
truly believed in the possibility of an Italian invasion, in spite of the logistical issues. The 
figures provided by Walbank include 30,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry and enough grain to feed 
an army for ten years.681 If Rome had concerns over Perseus, they would surely have been by 
his capability of campaigning with his army on the Greek peninsula rather than directly at Italy 
via a naval invasion. 
 Perseus presented an additional threat by disrupting the geopolitical balance amongst 
the Greek states. Polybius asserts that upon taking the throne and renewing his father’s alliance 
with Rome, Perseus immediately began to intrigue in Greece.682 The sudden shift in Polybius’ 
account from Perseus’ diplomacy with Rome to intriguing in Greece is used by Polybius to 
cast the Macedonian king in a negative light from the outset of his reign and enables Polybius 
to highlight the duplicitous nature of his international relations. Indeed, in the same passage, 
Polybius progresses to discuss the character and habits of the new Macedonian king.683 
Polybius nevertheless lived through these times in Greece and was able to draw on his own 
experiences. Later in the Histories, Polybius alludes to the various discussions amongst Greeks 
regarding the relative merits of Roman expansion in the region in the aftermath of the Third 
Macedonian War.684 Greeks would no doubt have similarly discussed the various advantages 
of siding with the Macedonians or Romans during the preceding period. Harris has noted that 
Perseus’ appeal to the ‘anti-Roman left’ in the Greek States had become ‘particularly tiresome’ 
for the Romans, and that it ‘created a possibility that these states might abruptly change their 
policies in directions unfavourable to Rome’.685 This reflects Eumenes’ speech recorded in 
Livy, that suggested that an increase in Perseus’ popularity in the Greek East ensured a counter 
Roman decline.686 Gruen however has argued that ‘it was precisely Rome’s withdrawal from 
Hellenic affairs that gave an opening to Perseus and the opportunity to resuscitate Macedonia 
as a patron of Hellas. The Greeks (…) found the Antigonid a more promising hegemon’687 By 
continuing to operate in affairs east of the Adriatic from a distance, Rome presented an 
opportunity for Perseus to position himself as an alternative hegemon in the region. This would 
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have been concerning for the Romans as the geopolitical imbalance would have threatened 
their ‘external-hegemony’. 
Roman Settlement of the Region 
 
 The Roman post-war settlements in the concurrent Third Illyrian and Third Macedonian 
wars demonstrated a greater Roman aggression towards the region and the continuation of 
Rome’s ‘external-hegemony’. Rome in 167 BC eradicated the kingdoms of both the Illyrians 
and the Macedonians and shaped the geopolitical balance of power east of the Adriatic. The 
most dramatic way in which this was affected was through both kings being imprisoned by the 
Romans and marched through Rome in triumphal procession.688 The ritualistic act of 
submission for the king and his entourage denoted a clear departure from the previous post-
war settlements in Illyria. Rather than establishing a means by which the defeated entity 
remained in power, albeit tied to Rome by treaty, the Romans transparently removed the 
vestiges of the established regimes. The triumphs themselves were indicative of the important 
development in Rome’s underlying motivations in intervening. The triumph awarded to Paullus 
over Macedonia was well renowned for its splendour and opulence and the spoils returned to 
Rome demonstrated the tangible rewards in conducting military campaigns. Livy notes that the 
procession featured 120 million sesterces captured from the Macedonian treasury and that an 
equally large amount had been lost by Perseus in flight.689 Beard, citing the triumph in question, 
has asserted that the depiction in the surviving record 'conjured Roman victory over eastern 
cities and dynasties, prompting readers to think of the triumph as a model of imperial 
expansion'.690 Scenes of such abundant and palpable Roman success could naturally have 
served as a form of Roman propaganda with a clear message of Roman dominance over their 
foreign rivals. Gruen also notes that 'the repute of the generals soared at such demonstrations; 
the more so when they utilised the cash to finance lavish games, make dedications at shrines, 
build public monuments and bestow handsome gifts'.691 Although Livy notes that Anicius' 
triumph over Genthius was appropriately less lavish than the triumph of Paullus over Perseus, 
the triumph featured an abundant spectacle with much booty including the royal furniture, 
military standards and pecuniary spoils.692 As the Third Illyrian War served as a subsidiary 
campaign to the Third Macedonian War, being led by a praetor rather than a consul, Livy's 
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claim is hardly surprising. The rich spoils and captive royal household were a transparent 
display of power, authority and superiority of the Romans over their defeated Illyrian 
adversaries. As such, the Roman triumphs over Illyria and Macedon were indicative of a 
change in Rome's dealings with foreign states and a clear development beyond the stability 
sought in previous post-war settlements. 
 The spoils taken from these wars also reflected an important shift in the economic 
benefits that Rome accrued from intervening in the region. The plunder taken from the 
campaigns was divided up in the Roman triumphs. Rosenstein has stressed that the plunder 
taken directly in the field was separate from that which a Roman commander would deposit in 
the treasury; on the occasion of a triumph, this would have been distributed to the men, in small 
but not insignificant quantities.693 Livy reports that in the triumph of Anicius over Genthius, 
forty-five denarii were given to each soldier, double to each centurion and three times to each 
member of the cavalry, whilst large amounts of gold and silver together with twenty million 
sesterces were deposited in the treasury.694 Livy notes that although the plunder and spectacle 
of the triumph were noteworthy in their own right, they paled in comparison to the earlier 
triumph of Paullus over Perseus.695 Plutarch in the aftermath of Paullus’ campaign however 
has stressed that the distribution of the large quantity of spoils was so uneven that it caused 
unrest amongst Paullus’ troops.696 The spoils of war were thus unevenly distributed amongst 
the different ranks, with the bulk being taken back to the Roman treasury and the lion’s share 
of the rest being taken by the commander himself. Livy stresses in his account that the spoils 
taken by Paullus from Perseus far exceeded any taken previously and the figures he provides 
for the provision for the troops exceeded the provisions given to the soldiers from the Illyrian 
campaign.697 Although the dividing up of the spoils was unequal and caused unrest amongst 
the troops, all soldiers, nevertheless, got a share of the spoils and were thus likely drawn to the 
material gains that could be acquired from the campaign. The unrest itself, moreover, reflected 
the importance of the spoils that could be gained from such a campaign and the desire of the 
Roman soldiers to get their share. In the aftermath of this campaign, Livy also asserts that the 
Romans despoiled seventy Epirote towns, enslaving 150,000 persons in the process.698 
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Although it is unclear how the Epirote slaves were divided up between the various ranks, the 
Romans in the campaign evidently gained a great deal of plunder and a number of spoils. 
 In the Roman post-war political setup for Illyria and Macedon, Rome geopolitically 
shaped the region without taking on unwanted administrative responsibilities. Livy notes that 
Macedon was divided into four separate republics, with capitals at Amphipolis, Thessalonica, 
Pella and Pelagonia and restrictions were placed on associations between the republics and also 
on their economies.699 The economic limitations on the various regions were probably enacted 
in light of the substantial spoils taken from the war with Perseus. This has demonstrated the 
profits which the region was able to generate. In taking these measures, the Romans were able 
to restrict the ability for a powerful Macedonian state to emerge in the aftermath of the war. 
Frank has also noted that in establishing the republican system in the region, Paullus drew on 
his Roman experience and created strong senates and comparably weak assemblies.700 By 
creating powerful elites in the republican governments, Rome would have been able to 
establish an effective means of governance for the region that Rome could more readily rely 
on. Eckstein has suggested that the establishment of a provincia was considered but ultimately 
rejected on the grounds of limited Roman manpower and the inability of the Republic to 
effectively guard over a large barbarian border.701 Although it is difficult to determine whether 
or not the establishment of a provincia was seriously considered, the problematic nature of 
doing so, as Eckstein has highlighted, would not have rendered the exercise worthwhile. As 
has been discussed earlier, Illyria was largely a divided region before and during periods of 
Roman intervention and the Romans likely saw administering a region that was so diverse 
problematic. By limiting the territory of each area of Macedonia and Illyria, the Romans 
created a divided eastern Adriatic with each state acting as a counterbalance to one another. 
This ensured that no singular power east of the Adriatic could emerge to rival Roman 
hegemony in the region. Roman hegemony was established not by direct administration but by 
diplomacy, building on the diplomatic ties Rome had continued to build across the wider Greek 
world. The threat of force, as had been shown in their victories at Pydna and Scodra was the 
means by which Roman hegemony could be enforced. 
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 The Romans took more aggressive action in their post-war settlements by ravaging 
territory east of the Adriatic in the aftermath of their intervention and took a large quantity of 
additional spoils and slaves in a demonstration of Roman military power. Some discrepancy 
exists amongst the ancient sources however regarding the precise details of the settlements 
ravaged by the Roman army. Livy notes that the Romans gathered gold and silver from seventy 
Epirote towns that had gone over to Perseus, then proceeded to plunder the cities and destroy 
their walls.702 Appian likewise describes the despoiling of seventy towns by the Roman army 
in similar fashion although these seventy towns represented all the towns subject to Genthius 
with no reference to geographic location.703 Waterfield has added that the countryside was 
ravaged and settlements were captured and looted on the grounds of continued resistance.704 
The key element in both the accounts of Appian and Livy is the previous loyalty of the towns 
to Genthius. The Romans in targeting these towns specifically, sought to demonstrate their 
power and influence in the region and deter states from resisting Rome’s hegemony. By 
selecting these towns, the Roman interventions were directed especially against those areas 
hostile to Rome rather than to the region as a whole. In the context of the benefits afforded to 
Roman allies earlier in the Treaty of Apamea, Rome through their interventions in the 2nd 
Century BC sought to make a clear distinction between those states that they were aligned to, 
and those they were hostile to. By presenting the rewards and punishments of resisting the 
Roman army, Rome would have been able to effectively demonstrate the value of establishing 
and maintaining diplomatic relations with Rome and thereby encourage more states to side 
with Rome. 
The arrangement of Illyria after the campaigns further demonstrated Rome's desire to 
establish an effective hegemony from afar. The intention of Rome in the aftermath of the 
campaign was to secure the region with minimal administration and a limited allocation of 
resources. Livy asserts that the region was divided into three parts, carefully divided in 
accordance with traditional tribal areas and the geography of the region.705 These particular 
regions represented different areas of tribal strength, from the Illyrian tribal kingdoms of the 
3rd and 2nd Centuries BC and the coastal region which included many Greek settlements. This 
is demonstrative of Rome dividing the region up into areas of differing Roman interest. As 
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mentioned earlier in the thesis, Roman interests were most pronounced in the South-East and 
along the Adriatic coast, and by separating these off as a separate region, Rome could better 
manage their interests. The Romans however made certain distinctions in terms of tribute 
between states that had remained loyal and those who had sided with Genthius.706 The Romans 
had demonstrated through this action the value of cooperation with Rome and by ensuring that 
all states paid considerably less tribute than previously, the Romans likely sought to attain a 
generally favourable Illyrian outlook on Rome. This would once again ensure that Illyria would 
remain secure with no singular tribe or state gaining too much power or threatening the Roman 
crafted settlement of the region. 
 The underlying significance of the events of 168/7 BC has however been the source of 
debate in considering the wider implications of the Roman post-war settlement on the 
development of Roman imperial expansion. Polybius initially considered the events in his 
Histories to be the apogee of the development of the two underlying themes in his account, the 
rise of Rome and the greater ‘interconnectedness’ of world affairs. This, as Polybius asserts in 
his preface, was achieved over a span of 53 years, from the Second Punic War to the climax of 
the Third Macedonian War.707 Eckstein notes that ‘Polybius believed that the Third 
Macedonian War changed everything’ in establishing Roman pre-eminence, eradicating 
Macedon and fundamentally shifting the nature of Mediterranean geopolitics and inter-state 
relations.708 Polybius’ decision to extend his work down to 146 BC may be reflective of the 
importance of the start date rather than the end date of his work. Polybius’ Histories through 
this extension take on an additional important dimension in considering the rivalry between 
Rome and Carthage in Rome’s rise to power. For Sallust, writing a century later, the importance 
of the removal of the Carthaginian rival, led to greater complacency in Rome and greater 
internal strife with the absence of a foreign rival to unite the Roman people around a common 
cause.709 The importance of the Punic wars in Rome’s rise to ascendancy have been well 
attested by modern scholars.710 Clark has gone one step further however in stressing 146 BC 
as a dramatic turning point in Rome’s imperial expansion.711 The development, as has been 
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demonstrated over the course of this thesis however was more gradual and dependent on 
Rome’s changing interests, priorities and geopolitical status. Whilst events such as those in 167 
BC and 146 BC highlight this development, they should be considered as apogees of 
developments in the preceding periods. 
Although the Roman actions in 168/7 BC can be considered an important development 
in Rome’s involvement in the eastern Adriatic, the nature of a wider shift in Rome’s outlook 
and attitude to imperial expansion has been the subject of further debate. The notion of this 
shift first developed in antiquity. Although Polybius originally viewed this shift as taking place 
with the conclusion of the Third Macedonian War in 168/7 BC, his later decision to extend his 
account down to 146 BC reflected the importance of these later events. For the Roman historian 
Sallust writing in the First Century BC, the later events were most important, and he postulated 
during an aside to his account of the Catilinarian conspiracy, that events in the previous century 
had changed Rome's outlook internally and externally: 
'But when our country had grown strong through toil and the practice of justice, when 
great kings had been vanquished in war, savage tribes and mighty peoples subdued by force of 
arms, when Carthage, the rival of Rome's dominion had perished root and branch, and all seas 
and lands laid open, then Fortune began to be savage and to throw all into confusion (...) a 
craving first for money, then for power, increased; these were, as it were, the root of all evils.'712 
For Sallust, Rome's outlook on the Mediterranean world and the problems of the Late 
Republic could be sourced to Rome’s interventions of the mid-Second Century BC. Whilst the 
Third Punic War was most notable in this development for Sallust, the earlier Macedonian and 
Illyrian interventions in 168/7 BC were an important component in the development. Clark has 
furthered this in the modern scholarship by citing the destructions of the cities of Corinth and 
Carthage as a tangible record of Rome's changing outlook on the Mediterranean world. In this 
regard, she asserts that Roman actions brought an effective cessation to hostilities and solved 
the increasing problems from 'decades of prior Roman victories which failed to produce a 
success that could last'.713 Although Clark is correct to highlight the dramatic destruction of 
Carthage and Corinth in 146 BC, the earlier events in Macedon and Illyria were also important 
developments in this shift.  
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The notion of ‘producing a success that could last’ is also problematic. Rome did not 
choose to directly administer the regions of Macedonia and Illyria in 167 BC, an action which 
would have enabled the Romans to build upon their military successes of that year. Roman 
interests in Illyria were still limited to the coastal areas, especially in the South-Eastern 
Adriatic. Dzino has noted that ‘Roman interests were precisely defined, focusing only on the 
eastern parts of the Illyrian kingdom which impacted the strategic control of the Otranto. The 
Romans were not interested in the hinterland of the Adriatic.’714 Rome would not build upon 
their military successes until the construction and development of a provincia of Illyricum in 
the subsequent centuries. Eckstein has highlighted the importance of Rome's geopolitical 
positioning in the Mediterranean in reflecting a fundamental change in the manner in which 
Rome dealt with foreign states. Eckstein notes that by 188 BC and the Treaty of Apamea, Rome 
had achieved a status of 'unipolarity'; a position of being the sole military and diplomatic 
superpower.715 This development is important to consider and would have had a bearing on 
Roman dealings with foreign states. Polybius indeed outlined in his Histories, that Rome had 
become the μίαν ἀρχὴν, the sole dominant power, in the Mediterranean by the mid-2nd Century 
BC.716 Eckstein’s citing of the shift in 188 BC did not correlate with the situation in Illyria as 
Illyria was geopolitically divided between the two competing powers of Rome and Macedon, 
a state which would continue until the events of 168/7 BC. At this point, Rome became the sole 
superpower in the region. Illyria, which had once represented a disparate series of tribal 
communities, had achieved a greater geopolitical coherence, albeit under Roman hegemony. 
This greater coherence would in turn become defined and solidified by the establishment and 
development of the provincia of Illyricum in subsequent periods which saw a shift from 
Rome’s ‘external-hegemony’ to Roman direct administration. 
Conclusion 
 
The Roman military interventions in 168/7 BC against Genthius and Perseus reflected 
the apogee of an important shift in the nature of Roman interventions. The removal of Illyrian 
and Macedonian political structures, together with the despoiling of several towns, represented 
a greater Roman aggression in securing their post-war settlement. Through these actions the 
Roman commander Paullus, ‘achieved the double goal of rewarding his hard-working soldiery 
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and of avenging those perceived to have been the most egregious traitors to the Roman cause 
during the war’.717 Rome presented two drastically different alternatives of being affable to 
Rome or hostile in a dramatic display of their military might. It is important not to overstate 
the importance of these specific events however as Polybius sought to in explaining the 
development of the key themes in his Histories. Similar events cited in the later destruction of 
Corinth and Carthage present dramatic and poignant displays of Roman might but underlying 
developments throughout the late 3rd Century BC and early 2nd Century BC should be 
considered also. Rome did not agree a peace treaty to the Second Illyrian War, nor did she have 
any desire to in the Third Illyrian War. The events of 167 BC should subsequently be seen as 
the apogee of these developments. Nevertheless, Eckstein has noted that ‘on the plane of the 
general balance of power, the disappearance of the Macedonian monarchy, one of the great 
counterweights to Rome, fundamentally altered even more in Rome’s favour the balance of 
power within the Mediterranean.’718 The eradication of the Macedonian kingdom and the later 
eradication of the Republic of Carthage demonstrated Rome’s new position atop the 
Mediterranean inter-state hierarchy and would in turn develop aggressive Roman imperial 
expansion still further in the ensuing decades. 
The greater aggression by Rome in their interventions in the Third Illyrian and Third 
Macedonian wars was nevertheless employed as a means to consolidate Rome’s ‘external 
hegemony’ over the region. The threat posed to the geopolitical balance by the alliance of 
Genthius and Perseus prompted Rome to intervene and to take punitive actions against those 
states that opposed them in the aftermath. These measures were taken to ensure Rome’s 
‘external-hegemony was maintained’ and to demonstrate the value of securing an association 
with Rome. The Roman post-war settlements enabled the Romans to better define the scope of 
their limited interests in the region. By affirming Rome’s ‘external hegemony’ the war served 
to a greater geopolitical balance to the region with Rome able to exercise its status from afar. 
As Wilkes notes, ‘after the settlement, Anicius withdrew all his forces from the strongholds’ 
and ‘the Senate dealt with each situation as it arose and once Roman interests were secure, 
matters were allowed to drift.’719 The division of the republics that were established was based 
on the geopolitical divisions outlined earlier in the thesis but represented a greater Illyrian 
coherence than the disparate series of tribal communities that existed in Illyria before the 
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Roman interventions. The disparate outlooks that once predominated in Illyria had been 
effectively displaced by the position of Rome at the centre of Illyrian geopolitics. 
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
 
 The period of 230 BC to 167 BC featured a series of interventions by the Roman 
Republic in Illyria that saw the development of Rome’s status in the region to become the 
hegemonic entity in Illyria. This was achieved through a number of successful military 
campaigns and diplomatic agreements that developed Roman interests territorially, militarily 
and diplomatically in Illyria. Roman interests in Illyria at the outset of the period were largely 
minimal and focused on areas in the Southern Adriatic. The Roman military interventions in 
the 3rd Century BC had limited strategic aims and were directed against the aggressions of the 
Ardiaei and Demetrius of Pharos. These campaigns were short and one-sided, with the Illyrian 
threats effectively and efficiently dealt with by the Romans. In the aftermath of the 
interventions however, Rome did not establish any permanent settlement but swiftly removed 
their forces back across the Adriatic. As Eckstein has noted during this initial period 'the Senate 
did not yet perceive of maritime lllyris as a permanent strategic asset, or the Greek East in 
general as a permanent area of strategic involvement.720 In ensuring a limited involvement in 
Illyria, Rome nevertheless embarked on forging a series of diplomatic associations with what 
would reflect a ‘sphere of influence’ along the south-eastern Adriatic coast and prominent 
islands in the Adriatic. These diplomatic associations, largely involving ties of friendship, 
served to provide Rome with the diplomatic flexibility it needed to operate in a region in which 
its residual interests were minimal yet maintain the significance of the bond through the 
important moral underpinning of fides. Trust was essential to the construction and maintenance 
of these relationships; ‘in the absence of any formal constraints (such as juridical law), 
friendship relies on a culturally shared notion of a compact of trust for its practice and 
efficacy.’721 In maintaining the limited nature of its interventions during the initial period, 
Rome placed a greater trust in individuals in Illyria to varying degrees of success. Illyrian issues 
were, throughout the initial period of the 3rd Century BC, minor considerations for the Romans. 
Roman conflicts with Carthage, Macedon and the Gallic tribes of Cisalpine Gaul predominated 
the concerns of Roman decision-making, reducing the scope of Rome’s initial interventions in 
Illyria. 
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 The subsequent period primarily concerned with events of the 2nd Century BC featured 
important developments in Rome’s interventions in Illyria that saw Rome shape the 
geopolitical landscape in a more proactive manner in accordance with its interests. This was 
initially achieved through a greater Roman diplomatic involvement in the affairs of the Greek 
East, which began in the prelude to the Second Macedonian War. Eckstein has described the 
events of the period 203-200 BC as bearing witness to a ‘diplomatic revolution’ in 
Mediterranean inter-state relations.722 The events of this period were highlighted by Polybius 
as fundamental in the establishment of a greater ‘interconnectedness’ of world affairs, with the 
affairs of Italy, Illyria, Greece, Asia and North Africa becoming intertwined.723 This 
phenomenon was crucial to Polybius’ work and shaped the way in which he presented the 
events of the period that was covered in his Histories. Rome’s diplomatic involvement in the 
affairs of the wider Greek world developed in the early 2nd Century BC in line with a series of 
successful campaigns by Rome in the Greek East.724 The greater status of Rome through these 
two developments had important connotations for Roman interventions in the mid-2nd Century 
BC, which saw Rome adopt a more aggressive approach to affirming its hegemonic status. This 
culminated in the apogee of the development in the Third Illyrian and Macedonian wars and 
their aftermath which fundamentally altered the geopolitical landscape of Illyria and the wider 
eastern Adriatic. Rome’s rise to become the hegemonic power in the Mediterranean served as 
Polybius’ second theme in his Histories and provided the important milieu for considerations 
of Roman interventions in Illyria during the period considered in this thesis.725 The growth of 
Roman power in the mid-Republic greatly affected Roman interventions during the period in 
changing the underlying dynamics of Roman international relations; a development that would 
continue into subsequent decades. 
 
Contextual Issues 
 
The Roman interventions in Illyria occurred within a range of important contexts which 
had particular implications for the interventions and the manner in which they have been 
perceived. The importance of the Adriatic to Roman decision-making in the interventions 
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should not be understated as the stretch of water between Italy and Illyria formed the barrier 
and the connection between Rome and prospective interventions in Illyria. At the outset of the 
period considered in this thesis, Adriatic commerce was developing in the quantity and quality 
of the goods being traded. The majority of the evidence suggests that the bulk of important 
trade networks were located in the Southern Adriatic, where contact to wider Mediterranean 
trading networks was evident. Although the evidence has naturally been limited by the 
availability of the surviving material evidence, enough evidence has been published from 
which effective inference can be drawn. Regional discrepancy has been observed from the 
published data as in ‘the period from the 4th to the 1st century BC’, the ‘region was not unified. 
(…) The differences were mainly in the different political and economic circumstances 
experienced by the Greek colonists and indigenous communities.’726 It was across this 
regionally diverse Adriatic that Rome intervened in Illyria. Illyrian piracy was predominantly 
focused on the Southern Adriatic where prosperous and vulnerable cities were located along 
the Epirote coast and where merchants operated across the wide trade networks. Roman initial 
interests in the region were centred around the Southern Adriatic and the Otranto Straits more 
particularly. This area had suffered most from Adriatic piracy, had strong trade networks and 
most importantly, offered the shortest crossing east from Italy. The Southern Adriatic was 
subsequently an area of specific strategic importance to Rome and this was reflected through 
the Roman interventions into the area during the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC. 
 Illyria at the outset of the period considered in the thesis consisted of an incoherent and 
disparate series of tribal communities which each had its own outlook, culture, political system, 
economy and interests. As Dzino notes, ‘Illyricum never existed as an ecological or 
geographical region, a unified polity, and indeed there never were any Illyrians inhabiting it. It 
was the creation of Rome and the consequence of the projection of Roman power over a 
heterogenous space’.727 Developments prior to the start of the period considered in this thesis, 
created a noticeable correlation between communities in certain areas. Those along the 
Southern Adriatic coast and the adjacent islands received contact from Hellenic and Hellenistic 
influences from Greek settlers and traders. The Northern Adriatic and Illyrian interior, devoid 
of these significant contacts, retained traditional Celtic influences from the mainland. These 
developments created a greater Illyrian coherence as the cultural identity of particular areas of 
the region began to take shape. Greater political coherence in turn was achieved through the 
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greater scope of the power and influence of a succession of Illyrian rulers. Wilkes has stressed 
that an impression began to emerge from the Third Century BC of ‘a new and more lasting 
political order among the Illyrians, not only among the Dardanians’.728 Through the 
geopolitical hegemony developed by the Romans until the end of the period considered in this 
thesis and the eventual establishment of a Roman provincia in the subsequent period, greater 
Illyrian geopolitical coherence was achieved with Rome at the centre. 
 An underlying factor for the Roman interventions mentioned in the ancient sources was 
Illyrian piracy in the Adriatic. This provided the key context for the initial Roman interventions 
and shaped the nature of these interventions to be focused on eradicating the piracy. Although, 
as this thesis has shown, it is highly problematic to ascribe Illyrian piracy as a widespread and 
perennial problem in the Adriatic, the bulk of the evidence provided by the written sources has 
highlighted the prevalence of the practice carried out by the Ardiaei. As de Souza has noted 
‘relatively little is heard about the Illyrians before the second half of the third century BC, when 
the Ardiaean kings expanded their territory southwards along the Dalmatian coast’.729 The 
Ardiaei threatened the Adriatic like no Illyrians had done before with the array of land and sea 
forces at their disposal.730 The greater potency of this threat to settlements along the coast and 
traders traversing the Adriatic, drew Rome’s attention and the subsequent murder of an 
ambassador compelled Rome to act decisively. Rome reacted strongly to the Illyrian piratical 
threat in the 3rd Century BC by engaging in two substantial campaigns, the first against the 
Ardiaei and the second against Demetrius within the ensuing decade. Rome in both of these 
campaigns acted with ruthless efficiency, quickly suppressing the threats posed before 
returning back to Italy; ‘no military or naval forces were left behind; no administration was 
imposed’.731 Roman interventions against Illyrian piracy in the Adriatic were thus limited in 
nature with the aim of suppressing the piracy. 
Presentation in the Sources 
 
 The way in which the Roman interventions in Illyria have been understood and 
appreciated has been shaped by the way they have been presented in sources both ancient and 
modern. In the ancient sources, there was a continual need to provide effective justification for 
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Rome’s actions in intervening to both domestic and foreign audiences. The justifications are a 
key feature of the surviving ancient historical texts, which have sought to provide just and 
honourable reasons for the Roman interventions. Harris notes this importance to Rome by 
asserting that ‘when a pretext was found, the second century Senate no doubt believed that the 
ensuing war was a bellum iustum’.732 The importance of issuing pretexts, together with 
diplomatic ultimatums through the processes of rerum repetitio and denuntiatio belli were 
crucial for the Roman Senate and aristocracy moreover to present itself to its own people as 
just and honourable in its actions. Foreign observers would need to be convinced by the efficacy 
of the pretext provided and in Roman compliance with their already established diplomatic 
arrangements. Presenting itself in this way, as a just and moral agent in inter-state relations, 
furthered the diplomatic standing of Rome and enhanced their reputation to other states. 
Ancient historians sought pretexts, moreover, as a means to more effectively explain Roman 
interventions. Derow alluded to a contradiction on this matter in Polybius, that ‘manifests itself 
through Polybius’ work, particularly in the form of inconsistency between his general 
statements about Rome’s expansion and his detailed analyses of the causes of wars’.733 
Polybius had a set narrative that he subscribed to about the nature of Roman expansion and the 
justifications provided for Roman interventions in his account had to fit this narrative. Roman 
annalistic traditions were important sources for Polybius and he relied on them especially for 
the period preceding 220 BC, where his corroborative evidence was weaker. The annalistic 
traditions that provided him with information for Rome’s interventions in the Illyrian Wars 
have been especially problematic for subsequent scholars and the moral justifications provided 
for them have resulted in considerable debate. The efficacy of these justifications are mixed, 
and the limitations of the extant sources has weakened the inference that can be drawn from 
the surviving historical record. 
 The ancient historians have, moreover, sought to highlight particular themes within 
their work and the Roman interventions in Illyria have been presented within this framework. 
Polybius wrote his history to demonstrate the remarkable rise of Rome and structured his work 
through the inclusion of specific set-pieces to demonstrate the development of an 
‘interconnectedness’ between the affairs of Italy, Greece and North Africa. The presentation of 
the events in this way would shape subsequent historiography and influence subsequent 
historians, notably Livy and Appian, for whom Polybius was a key source for the period 
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considered in this thesis. Both of these historians sought to show Rome in a positive light to 
appease their Roman audiences and to highlight the vices and virtues of individual characters 
to serve as examples. All of these sources are Greco-Roman and present the events as part of 
Rome’s story rather than that of Illyria. Wilkes has stressed that the surviving record for the 
Illyrians derives exclusively from ‘external sources’ and that Greeks and Romans alike 
compete in expressing their contempt and detestation for them.734 The lack of an Illyrian 
perspective cannot be rectified, although the thesis has approached the subject from a more 
nuanced perspective. Considering the greater array of archaeological sources available and 
considering events with Illyria as a focus has provided a greater balance to considerations of 
the Roman interventions. 
 Modern scholars have, in turn, shaped the way in which the Roman interventions in 
Illyria have been considered. Recent coverage of these events has predominantly presented 
these interventions within broader works on Roman imperial expansion and imperialism.735 As 
Eckstein has asserted, ‘the two wars (of the 3rd Century BC) in maritime Illyris hold interest 
for the history of Roman expansion because they are the first Roman military interventions east 
of the Adriatic.’736 The interventions in Illyria have served predominantly as a stepping-stone 
to bigger and more important phenomena for Rome and the Hellenistic world. By focusing on 
Illyria, and bringing in outside context where relevant, this thesis has tried to address this. 
Examinations of the interventions in Illyria for modern scholars developed from considering 
the thesis set out by Mommsen and then Holleaux which advocated that these wars were fought 
for self-defence and out of fear from external threats.737 Subsequent historians have sought to 
defend or challenge this thesis, drawing upon the Roman interventions in Illyria as examples 
in their arguments. In a region where Roman interests were initially minimal and limited in 
geographic scope, Rome initially intervened in Illyria in reaction to the external threat posed 
by Adriatic piracy and sought to protect their limited interests. Roman interests in the region 
progressed over the course of the period, alongside their greater involvement in Greek affairs. 
Although these Roman interests developed, their strategic aim of ensuring a geopolitical 
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landscape in Illyria that enabled them to exercise an ‘external hegemony’ with no strong rival 
to their hegemony in the region persisted. 
 
The Roman Interventions 
 
The Roman interventions in Illyria during the period considered in this thesis were 
limited in scope and served to protect the limited Roman interests in the region. The pretext for 
the First Illyrian War can be attributed to the murder of a Roman ambassador, an event which 
is commonly featured in the extant sources.738 Harris has noted that ‘the murder seems to be a 
fact, and even the leaders of the Senate may have believed the somewhat implausible claim, 
afterwards put about by the Romans, that Teuta herself was responsible.’739 This claim, made 
by Polybius, was likely based on an annalistic tradition found in Fabius Pictor and is 
particularly untrustworthy.740 Although the Polybian version, complete with its inclusion of an 
interview with Teuta, is particularly problematic, the murder of an ambassador is well attested 
in the historical record and served as the direct catalyst for the Roman intervention. The 
underlying motivation of Rome was to suppress the Ardiaean piracy in the Adriatic that had 
escalated in the late 3rd Century BC. This provides the effective context for Rome’s 
intervention; ‘the sudden transformation of Illyria from an area traditionally practising small-
scale piracy for food into a serious maritime power makes the Roman reaction all the more 
understandable’.741 The Roman treaty and the concurrent establishment of diplomatic relations 
with a series of entities to establish a ‘sphere of influence’ provide the strategic motivations for 
the Roman intervention. Rome moved to better secure the South-Eastern Adriatic, the area with 
the most direct security risk to Rome and where trade and piracy had been most prevalent. 
Rome reacted to the underlying threat posed to the Adriatic by the Ardiaei and efficiently dealt 
with the threat. No direct administration was forged, but through the ‘sphere of influence’, 
Rome began to exercise an ‘external-hegemony’ over a part of Illyria. 
The diplomatic ties that bound these entities to Rome were informal bonds of 
‘friendship’. A tie of friendship, by its very nature as ‘an informal and extra-institutional human 
relationship secured by bonds of personal trust and affection between partners’ depended on 
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the way the tie was construed.742 As a flexible and informal arrangement, Rome utilised its 
‘friendships’ throughout the Mediterranean world to adapt to suit its own interests. Friendships 
worked particularly effectively for Rome in Illyria and the wider Greek East. As this was a 
region where Roman interests and involvement were minimal at the outset of the period being 
considered in this thesis, the ties of ‘friendship’ allowed Rome to gradually become more 
embroiled in affairs east of the Adriatic as it saw fit. The important moral bond of fides, that 
underpinned all Roman international relations, was particularly pertinent in a diplomatic tie 
that was so informal. In order for the tie of friendship to maintain its value and significance, 
the underlying moral bond had to remain strong. A breaking of the diplomatic trust that 
provided the foundations for friendship resulted in the breakdown of the affiliation. 
Whilst these diplomatic ties were initially predicated on mutual bonds, the growing 
power and status of Rome in the wider Greek East caused important changes in the dynamics 
of the diplomatic ties. Braund has asserted that friendship served as ‘a concept capable of many 
different interpretations and emphases: for example, friendship might be a relationship between 
powers of roughly comparable strength, but it could easily be a relationship between dominator 
and dominated.743 Rome’s growing geopolitical standing east of the Adriatic caused this 
dynamic to change, with foreign states increasingly seeking out an affiliation with Rome rather 
than vice versa. The growing prominence of Rome in Greek affairs, which eventually 
culminated, by the end of the period considered in this thesis, in Roman hegemonic power in 
the Greek East, changed the dynamic upon which friendship operated. Badian has stressed that 
the term amicus could refer to a friend on equal footing or politely refer to an unequal friendship 
that operated in a similar fashion to that of a patron and client.744 Friendship in this way 
operated flexibly, adjusting to suit the statuses of the entities involved. Rome’s growing power 
nevertheless ensured that a greater number of states actively sought affiliation with Rome. 
Rome’s intervention in the Second Illyrian War was largely predicated on the 
breakdown of fides in Rome’s diplomatic relationship with Demetrius of Pharos; the military 
intervention was made to effectively remove him from power. Demetrius’ actions in violating 
the treaty from the First Illyrian War are attested in a variety of sources.745 The language and 
tone utilised in these sources is suggestive of the importance that breaking the bond of fides 
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had to Roman diplomatic relations. No single individual violation of the treaty is given special 
preference in regard to the formulation of an effective pretext in the sources, and the delay in 
the Roman intervention has proven particularly problematic for analysing the war. Walbank’s 
note however on the timing of the various violations has provided some potential clarity on the 
subject. Walbank has stressed that the act of detaching the Atintani from Rome was the last in 
a chronological series of violations by Demetrius against Rome.746 Although the significance 
of this event in prompting the Roman intervention is unclear, the action served as a more direct 
attack on Roman interests. In being the last of a series of violations, it is possible that this 
violation was the most important, although nothing definitive can be determined. Rome’s 
intervention therefore was made against Demetrius for his series of treaty violations which 
undermined the fides of his diplomatic relationship with Rome. The war itself had the strategic 
aim of removing Demetrius from power; to this end the Roman Senate organised the ‘sending 
a fleet and an army in 219 BC to bring the Illyrians to heel’.747 No treaty was signed at the end 
of the conflict and no discernible change to the dynamic of Roman intervention in the region 
occurred after Demetrius was removed from power. Rome continued after the war to 
implement an ’external hegemony’ over the region. 
A definitive pretext for Rome’s intervention in the Third Illyrian War is difficult to 
source in the extant sources but the Roman decision to intervene was a consequence of  
Genthius’ alliance with Perseus. The alliance threatened the geopolitical balance in the region 
of Rome’s ‘external hegemony’ and Rome intervened to affirm its hegemonic status in the 
region. Dzino has noted that ‘the decision of Genthius was disastrous in hindsight – the Roman 
army commanded by Lucius Anicius Gallus defeated him even before news of the beginning 
of the war reached Rome.’748 The dramatic Roman victories in the Third Illyrian and Third 
Macedonian Wars marked an important geopolitical shift in the region, by eradicating the two 
kingdoms, leaving Rome as the sole hegemonic power east of the Adriatic. Roman actions in 
the aftermath of the war in sacking Epirote towns and enslaving large numbers of their 
inhabitants, reflected this greater aggression of Rome in conducting its Illyrian interventions. 
This aggression ensured that Rome’s external hegemony persisted. Whilst the Romans did not 
directly administer the region, the Roman army was a short sail away across the Adriatic and 
was prepared to intervene to uphold this geopolitical status. Subsequent periods would witness 
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the emergence of a provincia of Illyricum and the growing importance of Illyria as a part of 
the Roman Empire. 
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Appendix 
 
Fig. 1. Map of the Adriatic showing sites of Greek colonisation. Map taken from P. 
Cabanes, ‘Greek Colonisation in the Adriatic’ in G. R. Tsetskhladze (ed.), Greek 
Colonisation: An Account of Greek Colonies and Settlements Overseas: Volume II (Leiden, 
2008), p. 156. 
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Fig. 2. Gnathian style jug (pelike). Vessel on display at the Archaeological Museum of 
Split. Import from Southern Italy. Dated from the beginning of the 3rd Century BC. 
Photograph taken at the Archaeological Museum of Split 20/8/2014. 
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Fig. 3. Cosmetic Vessel (lekama) depicting a female head in profile. Vessel on display at the 
Archaeological Museum of Split. Import from Southern Italy (Magna Graecia). Dated from 
the 4th Century BC. Photograph taken at the Archaeological Museum of Split 20/8/2014. 
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Fig. 4. Hoard of bronze coins from Pharos, excavated in 1900 near the village of Vrbanj. 
Coins on display at the Archaeological Museum of Split. The coins depict a young man’s 
head in profile (obverse) and a wine cup (kantharos) together with the abbreviated Greek 
letters ΦΑ, short for ΦΑΡΙΟΝ (reverse). Dated End of the 3rd Century/Beginning of the 2nd 
Century BC. Photograph taken at the Archaeological Museum of Split 20/8/2014. 
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Fig. 5. Table showing the numerical data for Gnathia found at Eastern Adriatic locations 
(published sites only). Data taken from M. Miše, Gnathia and Related Hellenistic Ware on 
the East Adriatic Coast (Oxford, 2015), p. 19. 
 
Eastern Adriatic location Number of Gnathia found 
Motovun 0 
Nesactium 10 
Kastav 1 
Osor 4 
Zadar 24 
Nin 1 
Radovin 1 
Jagodnja Gornja 2 
Nadin 2 
Trojan 1 
Murter 1 
Danilo 1 
Dragišić 10 
Škarin Samograd 3 
Velika Mrdakovica 2 
Bribir 1 
Cape Ploča 20 
Salona 7 
Dugiš 1 
Stobreč 7 
Stari Grad 31 
Vis 183 
Palagruža 0 
Lastovo 2 
Lumbarda 2 
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Kopila 2 
Nakovana Cave 7 
Gradac 1 
Ošanić 7 
Risan 5 
Budva 25 
Gostilj 12 
Ulcinj 9 
Durres 8 
Apollonia 15 
Jezerine 3 
Ribić  
Kamenjača 2 
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Fig. 6. Map of the ‘Roman Protectorate’ (228 BC). ‘Inset Map – Holleaux, placing the 
Parthini in the Northern bulge instead of in the Genusus Valley’. Map taken from N. G. L. 
Hammond, ‘The Illyrian Atintani, the Epirotic Atintanes and the Roman Protectorate’, 
Journal of Roman Studies, Vol. 79 (1989), p. 24. 
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Fig. 7a. Fragment A of an inscription of a Psephisma of an appeal from Pharos to Paros. On 
display at the Muzej Staroga Grada. Most probably dated from the 2nd Century BC. 
Photograph taken at the Muzej Staroga Grada 19/8/2014. 
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Fig. 7b. Fragment B of an inscription of a Psephisma of an appeal from Pharos to Paros. On 
display at the Muzej Staroga Grada. Most probably dated from the 2nd Century BC. 
Photograph taken at the Muzej Staroga Grada 19/8/2014. 
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Fig. 8. Modern Albanian 100 Leke coin minted in 2000, showing Teuta complete with 
Athena styled Classical Greek panoply (obverse) and denomination complete with laurel 
wreath (reverse). 
           
 
Fig. 9. Modern Albanian 50 Leke coin minted in 2000, showing Genthius on horseback 
(obverse) and denomination complete with laurel wreath (reverse). 
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Fig. 10. Modern bust of Agron. On display at the Rozafa Castle Museum (on the site of 
ancient Scodra), Skhoder. Photograph taken 13/8/2014 
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Fig. 11. Modern bust of Teuta. On display at the Rozafa Castle Museum (on the site of 
ancient Scodra), Skhoder. Photograph taken 13/8/2014 
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Fig. 12. Modern bust of Genthius. On display at the Rozafa Castle Museum (on the site of 
ancient Scodra), Skhoder. Photograph taken 13/8/2014 
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Fig. 13. Table showing the shipwreck totals for the Mediterranean and Adriatic across 
several centuries. Data gathered by the Illyrian Coastal Exploration Programme and 
published in J. G. Royal, ‘Illyrian Coastal Exploration Program (2007-2009): The Roman and 
Late Roman finds and their contexts’, American Journal of Archaeology, Vol. 116 No. 3 
(2012), p. 442. 
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Fig. 14. The engravings on the stele di Novilara Dated from the 7th Century BC. ‘Scale 
Approximately 1:6’. Taken from M. Bonino, ‘The Picene ships of the 7th century BC 
engraved at Novilara (Pesaro, Italy)’, Internutional Journal of Nautical Archaeology and 
Underwater Exploration (1975), Vol. 4 No. 1, p. 12. 
 
